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The Ties that Bind: The Traditional Irrigation Systems of Uzbekistan, Social Capital, and
Implications for Current, Successful Management
Chairperson: Jeffrey A. Gritzner
The 2002 government-mandated formation of water user associations across Uzbekistan
has greatly transformed water management in the country. Such a transfer in
management is only capable of happening with a large stock of social capital to facilitate
cooperative management. In order to assess the potential for successful management of
water by the water users, this study examines traditional water rights and land tenure,
modes of water management, and the operations and maintenance of the irrigation
system. The degree to which social capital was present in the system is evaluated by
looking at the following functions: decision making, resource mobilization, coordination
and communication, and conflict resolution.
Through examining the historical accounts by visitors to the region, it becomes clear
that social capital played a major role in the success of the traditional irrigation systems.
Decision making was locally based, and the knowledge and the ideas of the farmers were
respected and taken into account. Resource mobilization happened through both intraand inter-village cooperation. By connecting water rights to maintenance, not only was
free riding not an option, but also, networks were developed and fortified through
collective action each spring. Coordination and communication occurred through formal
and informal networks that allowed information to travel in both directions vertically as
well as horizontally. Conflict resolution occurred at the scale in which the problems
developed. Most conflicts were resolved through consensus.
The networks and trust that facilitated the successful management of water in the
traditional communities of Central Asia have been squandered by changes instituted first
by the Russians and then the Soviets. Changes in the economy and a shift from small to
large-scale farming have served to diminish social capital. Technical and legal reforms
will not work without representative, open and responsive communities. As such, the
adoption of water user associations must involve the development of households and
villages independent of the legacy of collective and state farms in the countryside.

11

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The work represented in this thesis is largely contributable to the efforts and
assistance of many. First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. Jeffrey Gritzner for
always being available and for his wealth of knowledge on all things water and Central
Asia. I would also like to thank Dr. Sarah Halvorson for her patience, assistance, and
critique in the formation and execution of this study. These professors always made time
for me, and I greatly appreciate their generosity. At the same time, numerous individuals
from friends to colleagues have also made invaluable contributions. Thanks especially to
Nancy Forman-Ebel, the interlibrary loan staff at The University of Montana, Malik
Hodjaev, Luke Potoski, and Bahodir ibn-Bolta. Thanks also to the faculty members of
The University of Montana Geography Department for their knowledge, support, and
encouragement. Finally, I would like to,acknowledge the contribution of many great
friends in Missoula and elsewhere, and the unwavering love and support of my parents.
This work was supported by contributions from the Yamaguchi Foundation, the
Social Science Research Council, and The University of Montana.

Ill

CONTENTS
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS..................................................................................

vii

Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................

1

B ackground.................................

2

Literature R e v ie w ......................................................................

6

.....................................................................................

19

Purpose

Methodology

............................................................................

20

2. THE ARAL SEA TRAGEDY: CAUSES, EFFECTS
AND RESPO N SES...................................................................

23

Effects from the Desiccation of the Aral S e a ...........................

24

Causes of the D esiccation..........................................................

30

Trends in Amelioration Efforts

.................................................

37

...............................................................................

41

3. LAND TENURE AND WATER R IG H T S..............................................

44

Uzbeks and the Development of Khiva,
Bukhara and K okand.......................................................

46

Problems and Shortcomings in Understanding
Land Tenure in Transoxiana...........................................

50

Shari a, Odat and Land T e n u re .................................................

53

Traditional Land Tenure in the K h an ates..................................

57

Water R ig h ts...............................................................................

68

Effects of Cotton and the Emergence of a
Cash Econom y................................................................

69

Changes to Tenure under the B olsheviks..................................

73

Conclusion

IV

Chapter

Page

3. continued
Land Tenure since Independence..............................................

78

Conclusion..................................................................................

81

CHANGES AND PERCEPTIONS TO THE
MANAGEMENT OF WATER
IN UZBEKISTAN......................................................................

85

The Administration and Power of the K h a n ...............................

89

Hierarchy of the Administration.................................................

92

Land and Water Taxes in the K h an ates.....................................

95

Water Management in the K hanates...........................................

101

Redrawing the Boundaries to Water Management
under the Soviets.............................................................

110

Changes to Management since Independence............................

114

Conclusion..................................................................................

116

5. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE
IRRIGATION SYSTEM AND AGRICULTURE.....................

119

Technology and Operations Prior to the Arrival
of die R ussians................................................................

122

Maintenance of the Traditional S y s te m .....................................

130

Major Disruptions to the Traditional S y s te m ............................

134

The Irrigation System since Independence...............................

144

Conclusion

...............................................................................

147

6. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND LAND AND WATER R E F O R M ...............

150

Social Capital and the Irrigation S y s te m ..................................

151

4.

Chapter

Page

6. continued
The Current State of Social Capital and Implications
for the Adoptionof W U A s...............................................

158

Barriers to the Successful adoption of WUAs in
U zbekistan

, . .

160

Socialism versus N eoliberalism .................................................

162

Further S tudies............................................................................

164

Conclusion...................................................................................

167

Works C i t e d ........................................................................................................

169

VI

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

Page

1. Geopolitical Map of Uzbekistan................................................................

20

2. The Aral Sea Basin......................................................................................

24

3. Salinized Lands as a Percentage of All Irrigated Lands
in Uzbekistan, by Oblasts and ASSR, in 1985
..........................

29

4. Sector Water Use in Uzbekistan

.............................................................

32

5. Map of Central Asia in the Mid-Nineteenth C entury.............................

50

6. Agricultural Implements of Central A s ia .................................................

133

V ll

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

Page

1. Geopolitical Map of Uzbekistan...............................................................

20

2. The Aral Sea Basin....................................................................................

24

3. Salinized Lands as a Percentage of All Irrigated Lands
in Uzbekistan, by Oblasts and ASSR, in 1985 .....................................

29

4. Sector Water Use in Uzbekistan

32

............................................................

5. Map of Central Asia in the Mid-Nineteenth

C entury...................

50

6. Agricultural Implements of Central A s ia ................................................

133

V ll

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Yer-dehqanning jani; suv-unii^ qani. (Land is the farmer’s soul; water is his lifeblood.)
-Uzbek Proverb*

The 2002 government mandated formation of water user associations (WUAs)
across Uzbekistan has greatly transformed water management in the country. With this
mandate, much of the maintenance and operation of irrigation systems has been moved
from the government to the local farmers. This transfer of responsibility is expected to
improve water usage, rehabilitate irrigation and drainage systems (I&D), and restore soil
health and crop yields. Recent attempts to engineer WUAs elsewhere in the world have
produced a very mixed record owing farmers not participating as the elites had hoped.
Failures to comprehend how farmers behave and react to changes in irrigation systems
has created a need for studies that focus upon social capital—the social features that
allow participants to pursue shared objectives^—and the performance of irrigation
systems. In order to improve the chances for success of WUAs in Uzbekistan, this thesis
examines the historical record of operations and maintenance (O&M) of the irrigation
system in Uzbekistan along with the modes of organization. Through this study, how
social capital has been developed and used is highlighted, and conclusions drawn on what
the barriers to a successful transfer of water management might be.

*Taken from Jonathan Michael Thurman, □ Modes of Organization in Central Asian Irrigation:
The Ferghana Valley, 1876 to PresentO (Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University, 1999).
^Robert Putnam, "Tuning in. Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in
America," PS: Political Science and Politics 28, no. 4 (1995): 664.

Background
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Uzbekistan’s subsequent, though
unasked for, independence led many within Uzbekistan, as well as the world, to feel
hopeful for an improvement in the country’s irrigated agriculture and the health of the
Aral Sea Basin. Unfortunately, reform in Uzbekistan’s water management has been
complicated by the country’s over reliance upon agriculture to drive its economy—
agriculture constitutes over thirty percent of the country’s gross domestic product
(GDP)^—and employ its largely rural population—over forty percent of the jobs are in
agriculture."^ Over the past ten years this already decrepit irrigation system has suffered
because the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) lacks the equipment, expertise and
financing to maintain its canals, pumping stations, diversion head-works, drainage
facilities and dams.^ This has led to a continuing degradation of the water management
regime and all of its subsequent effects as water continues to become more scarce and
polluted and farm yields dwindle.
Up until 2003, Uzbekistan’s irrigation system remained very similar to the
centralized and hierarchical top-down system put in place by the Soviets,^ but all this
changed in 2002 when the GOU passed resolution No. 8, which mandated the formation

^Philip Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia (London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 2000), 55.
^CIA, The World Factbook2004', available from
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.
^Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia, 62.
^Viktor Dukhovny and Vadim Sokolov, Lessons on Cooperation Building to Manage Water
Conflicts in the Aral Sea BasinVNESCO-Green Cross International Project, 2003; available from
http://webworld.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp/cd/aral_sea.html; Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia,
62.

of WUAs throughout the country/ The associations, which consist of farmers who work
cooperatively to manage and maintain their irrigation systems,^ are envisaged by the
government to increase the efficiency of on-farm water use, and promote rehabilitation of
the irrigation and drainage systems. These self-governing associations are commonly
found in both developed and developing countries—for example India, the Philippines,
and the United States. They have a mixed record of success.^ Resolution No. 8 led to the
rapid formation of over 100 WUAs in the following twelve months. This dramatic and
important change in the organization of water management has enthusiastically been
supported by the international community, which has pushed for such reforms in the
basin since 1997.^° More recently, in December of 2003, the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) set aside $25 million to support the formation of the
WUAs.^*
These WUAs are hastily being viewed as a panacea to the myriad causes and
subsequent effects of water mismanagement in the Aral Sea Basin:
Management of water by a WUA inherently results in water savings and solves
the [problems of water losses, soil salinization, water logged soils and
diminishing crop yields], because it is the users who manage the resource, and
’ USAID Regional Mission for Central Asian Republics, Acquisition and Assistance Offer:
Request for Applications (Rfa) Number EwI 76-04-002 Water User Associations Support ProgramVSPJD,
2003; available from http://www.fedgrants.gov/EPSData/AID/Synopses/124/EW176-04002/Final_RFA_l76-04-002.doc.
* Philip P. Micklin, Development of Self-Governing Irrigation Systems in Uzbekistan: Problems
and Prospects (Tashkent: Central Asia Mission: USAID, 1997), 7, CCN-0(X)3-Q-14-3165-00.
’ David Gilmartin, "The Irrigating Public: The State and Local Management in Colonial
Irrigation," in State, Society and the Environment in South Asia, ed. Stig Toft Madsen (Surrey, UK: Curzon
Press, 1999), 236.
Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia, 55.
USAID, Acquisition and Assistance Offer: Requestfor Applications (RFA) Number EWI 76-04002 Water User Associations Support Program, 11.

who enforce cost recovery policies. This leads to increased crop yields,
improving the livelihoods of farmers within the WUA. Therefore, maximizing our
investment in WUA development and related policies will help improve the
welfare of participating farmers.
This optimistic take on the power and potential of transferring the responsibility of O&M
from the state to the farmers comes despite the WUAs’ repeated e c o n o m ic ,so c ia la n d
environmental^^ failures in Central Asia.
Any major change to a large-scale irrigation system cannot be successfully
accomplished without learning from the lessons of the past. Starting in the nineteenth
and extending into the twentieth century, colonial powers began replacing traditional
irrigation systems with large, centralized operations. These new systems were a
testament to human’s ability to transform natural environments by delivering huge
amounts of water to arid landscapes. Central Asia is no exception to this pattern. The
modernization of Central Asia, which was started under the Tsar and continued by the
Soviets, saw the destruction of the environment and local cultures as the socio-economic
adaptations developed over millennia by the local peoples “gave way to non-sustainable
economic activity” and development.^^ The Soviets transformed all aspects of the

*- Ibid., 12.
USAID Natural Resources Management Project, Problems Facing Water User Associations in
Uzjbekistan2QQfi\ available from http://www.nrmp.uz/docs/wua_problems_en.doc; Kai Wegerich, Water
User Associations in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan: Study on Conditions for Sustainable
DevelopmentUmvtrsity of London, 2000; available from
http://www2.soas.ac.uk/Geography/WaterIssues/OccasionalPapers/AcrobatFiles/OCC32.pdf.
Wegerich, Water User Associations in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan: Study on Conditions for
Sustainable Development.
Kai Wegerich, "Water The Difficult Path to a Sustainable Future for Central Asia," in Central
Asia: Aspects o f Transition, ed. Tom Everett-Heath (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 260.
Jeffrey A. Gritzner, "Patterns of Socio-Economic Adaptation in Central Asia: A Geographical
Perspective," in Economies in Transition: Europe to the Bering Strait, ed. Jeffery A. Gritzner and Dennis
ODonnell (Missoula: Public Policy Research Institute, The University of Montana, 2001), 147.

irrigation system by implementing nomothetic understandings of water management. At
the same time, the Soviets considered their cultural adaptations formed in the northern
woodlands of Europe to be superior to the local adaptations formed in the dry deserts and
steppes of Central Asia.
The current attempt to transfer water management is best understood as a concern
of nature-society relations. In an attempt to anticipate the problems that might frustrate a
transfer of water management to user associations, this thesis examines the historical
modes of organization and O&M of irrigation systems in Uzbekistan. Although
numerous studies have examined the role that Soviet disruptions have played in the
current water crisis in the region, no studies have looked at how social capital has been
developed and used in the indigenous irrigation systems. In fact, Eric Sievers asserts that
despite social capital’s en vogue status no studies have looked at how this capital has
historically been developed in Central Asia, and its implications for current projects in
the re g io n .T h is study examines the development of social capital in the pre-Soviet era
in the water management system in order to examine ways in which local-level collective
action was fostered and utilized, and how this might shed light on the potential
problems for the adoption of WUAs in Uzbekistan.

For exan^le, Sarah L. O’Hara, "Central Asia's Water Resources: Contemporary and Future
Management Issues," Water Resources Development 16, no. 3 (2000); Thurman, 0 Modes of Organization
in Central Asian Irrigation: The Ferghana Valley, 1876 to PresentO.
Eric Sievers, The Post-Soviet Decline of Central Asia: Sustainable Development and
Comprehensive Capital (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 91.
Gilmartin, "The Irrigating Public: The State and Local Management in Colonial Irrigation," 236.

Literature Review
This literature review is divided into three sections. The first section examines
the recent literature on the interdisciplinary nature of irrigation studies, and focuses upon
how irrigation studies have too often left the social aspects of water management out of
the equation. The second part of this review focuses upon the usefulness of social capital
in evaluating irrigation systems. This section concludes with four variables through
which Uzbekistan’s irrigation history and potentials can be evaluated. The final section
of the literature review examines the theories and expectations of self-governing systems
in resource management, focusing upon WUAs. Through reviewing the theoretical and
historical literature of irrigation practices and water management, this review highlights
the interdisciplinary as well as the nascent nature of irrigation and water management
studies.

Broadened Understandings of Water Management and Irrigation
The twentieth century witnessed the rapid development of large-scale irrigation
systems throughout both the developing and developed world. At first, the design and
operation of such systems were merely understood in terms of engineering, all but
ignoring the peoples, histories and their roles in irrigation systems. This section of the
literature review examines the progression of water management, focusing on the
behavorialist approach adopted by geographers to understand the complexities
surrounding problems of irrigated agriculture and water management. Specifically, this
section reviews the role of both political and technological change and their implications
with regards to farmers and water use.

Irrigation systems are normally comprehended as being either physical,
organizational, or social systems. The physical view of an irrigation system focuses upon
the infrastructure itself, and is thought of as a technocracy. The second view considers an
irrigation system as little more than an organizational construct. In this view, one is
concerned with the politics and bureaucracy of the management of water. The third way
irrigation systems are normally examined is as a social sphere. In this view, irrigation is
seen as a social activity with different users with different interests interacting within the
system.^® This study, however, in following with recent trends in irrigation studies,
views an irrigation system as constituting all three spheres—the technical, organizational,
and social—and includes all three components when the term irrigation system is used.
With this definition of an irrigation system, irrigation is understood as an
interdisciplinary study that incorporates economics, politics, sociology, hydrology and
geographyTraditionally, however, western development agencies and academia have
largely developed, analyzed and treated irrigation projects solely in terms of hydrology,
engineering and law, all but ignoring the individuals and social aspects involved in water
management and agriculture.^^

Jan Willem Eggink and Jan Ubels, 0 Irrigation, Peasants and Development 0 (Wageningen,
Agricultural University of Wageningen, The Netherlands, 1984), 121,
Thomas A. Perreault, Anthony J. Bebbington, and Thomas F. Carroll, "Indigenous Irrigation
Organizations and the Formation of Social Capital in Northern Highland Ecuador," Yearbook, Conference
of Latin Americanist Geographers 24 (1998): 3; Thurman, 0 Modes of Organization in Central Asian
Legation: The Ferghana Valley, 1876 to PresentO, 2; Juha I. Uitto, "Perspectives on Water Environment
Management," in Central Eurasian Water Crisis: Caspian, Aral, and Dead Seas, ed. Iwao Kobori and
Michael H, Glantz (New Yoric: United Nations University Press, 1998), 1.
~ Robert Chambers, "Basic Concepts in the Organization of Irrigation," in Irrigation and
Agricultural Development in Asia, ed. E. Walter Coward (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1980), 28;
E. Walter Coward, "Planning Technical and Social Change in Irrigated Areas," in Putting People First:
Sociological Variables in Rural Development, ed. Michael M. Cemea (New York: Oxford University Press,
1991), 46; Daanish Mustafa, 0 State, Property and Power in the Geography of Access to Irrigation Water
and Vulnerability to Flood Hazard in Pakistan0 (Boulder, Colorado, University of Colorado, 1999); Elinor

Starting with Gilbert W h ite,w ater resources geography expanded the variables
through which water management was understood^'* to include the role of perception,
decision making, and human adjustment. As technology changed the scale and manner
of irrigation during the twentieth century, Gilbert White noticed a growing gap between
the “knowledge and performance” in irrigation and water-resource management.^^ As
traditional modes of water management were replaced by more technologically advanced
ones, farmers and their roles in these systems were ignored.^^ White’s early work on
water-resources geography paved the way for later geographers to apply a behavorialist
approach to understanding water management and irrigation systems. Currently
geographers bring an interdisciplinary framework “to the assessment, interpretation and
remediation of problems involving the human use of water as a resource,”^^ and thus
remain at the forefront of an integrated approach to irrigation studies.
Despite the early recognition of the social variable to the effective development
and operation of irrigation systems, large scale water engineering projects in the
twentieth century have been designed and maintained without much emphasis placed
I

upon the farmers, their social structure or historical context. This lack of appreciating
Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems (San Francisco: Institute for
Contemporary Studies Press, 1992), 5; Gilbert F. White, The Changing Role of Water in Arid Lands
(Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1962), 7.
"■’ Ian Burton, Robert W. Kates, and Gilbert F. White, The Environment as Hazard (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1978), xii.
Mustafa, □ State, Property and Power in the Geography of Access to Irrigation Water and
Vulnerability to Flood Hazard in PaMstanO, 19.
25

White, Tlte Changing Role of Water in Arid Lands, 4.

^'^Ibid., 7.
Ruthaford H. Platt, "Geographers and Water Resource Policy," in Water Resources
Administration in the United States, ed. Martin Reuss (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press,
1993), 36.

farmers in the design and maintenance of large scale irrigation projects has led to their
characterization as inefficient and failing to meet production goals. Geographers and
other social scientists have now come to see these disappointing results partially as a
product of governments and development agencies failing to take into account how
farmers and water users respond to new and technologically sophisticated irrigation
systems.^*
A defining feature of large scale irrigation systems, such as that found in the Aral
Sea Basin, is their hierarchical and centralized bureaucratic arrangement. This
arrangement results in elites—water managers, engineers, and public officials—being too
far removed from the “on-farm situation to know the conditions of efficient use... and are
bound by inflexible operating rules of water allocation.”^^ These engineers and
bureaucratic officials are not only too far removed from the on-site conditions, but they
also lack the skills to understand the processes of social change that results from the
implementation of large centralized irrigation systems.^® Failure of these water projects
has led to a more ecological perspective that looks at the “interplay between rules and
patterns of behavior and the natural and engineered environments in which these rules...
occur.”^* This ecological perspective, which intends to bring together both the physical

Mohamed T. El-Ashry, "Policies for Water Resource Management in Semiarid Regions," Water
Resources Development 7, no. 4 (1991): 234; David M. Freeman and Max K. Lowdermilk, "Middle-Level
Farmer Organizations as Links between Farms and Central Irrigation Systems," in Putting People First:
Sociological Variables in Rural Development, ed. Michael M. Cemea (New York: Oxford University Press,
1991), 114; Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems, 3; Thurman, □ Modes of
Organization in Central Asian Irrigation: The Ferghana Valley, 1876 to PresentD, 2.
E. Walter Coward, "Irrigation Development: Institutional and Organizational Issues," in
Irrigation and Agricultural Development in Asia, ed. E. Walter Coward (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University, 1980), 17.
^ Burton, Kates, and White, The Environment as Hazard, 1.; Eggink and Ubels, □ Irrigation,
Peasants and DevelopmentO, 3.
Coward, "Irrigation Development: Institutional and Organizational Issues," 17.
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and social variables necessary for successful water management,^^ caUs for an analysis of
human-environmental interactions and the impacts of social organization on the
management of natural resources.^^

Social Capital and Successful Management of Natural Resources
The broadened and multifaceted understanding of irrigation and water
management has brought the role of social capital into water-resource management. The
following section reviews the literature on social capital by defining the term, offering a
brief history of its development and application in resource management, and examines
the ways it can be used to comprehend irrigation projects.
Since its popularization by political scientist Robert Putnam in 1993, social
capital has quickly become a tool for comprehending development projects and group
behavior.^ Despite its recent surge in popularity, social capital still remains vaguely
defined in the literature.^^ One commonly referred to definition,however, defines

Anthony Bottrall, "Fits and Misfits over Time and Space; Technologies and Institutions of
Water Development for South Asian Agriculture," Contemporary South Asia 1, no. 2 (1992): 36; Eggink
and Ubels, OIrrigation, Peasants and DevelopmentO, 134; El-Ashry, "Policies for Water Resource
Management in Semiarid Regions," 234; Platt, "Geographers and Water Resource Policy," 36; Brian
Spooner, "Irrigation and Society: The Iranian Plateau," in Irrigation's Impact on Society, ed. Theodore E.
Downing and McGuire Gibson (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1974), 44.
Perreault, Bebbington, and Carroll, "Indigenous Irrigation Organizations and the Formation of
Social Capital in Northern Highland Ecuador," 1.
^ For example, Jonathan Fox, "How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of
Social Capital in Ruml Mexico," World Development 24, no. 6 (1996); Giles Mohan and John Mohan,
"Placing Social Capital," Progress in Human Geography 26, no. 2 (2002); Ostrom, Crafting Institutions
for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems’, Perreault, Bebbington, and Carroll, "Indigenous Irrigation
Organizations and the Formation of Social Capital in Northern Highland Ecuador."; Jules Pretty and Hugh
Ward, "Social Capital and the Environment," World Development 29, no. 2 (2001); Norman Uphoff and
C M. Wijayaratna, "Demonstrated Benefits from Social Capital: The Productivity of Farmer Organizations
in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka," World Development 28, no. 11 (2000).
Sievers, The Post-Soviet Decline of Central Asia: Sustainable Development and Comprehensive
Capital, 32.
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social capital as the “features of social life—networks, norms and trust—that enable
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives.”^^
The interest of social capital to geographers is its ability to influence social
relations and group behavior and values/^ Before going further, it is important to briefly
highlight the distinction between social capital and other forms of capital such as human
and human-made capital. Capital is understood as an asset that produces streams of
benefits.^’ As used in economics, capital has traditionally referred to natural resources,
physical capital (human-made capital), and the capacity of individuals to utilize and
produce capital (human capital).^ What separates social capital from these more
traditional forms of capital is that social capital produces benefits first and foremost for
the collective group, and not merely for individuals.^^ In this sense, social capital is seen
as the functional value of social relations
Geographers and other social scientists have invested so much effort into social
capital owing to its ability to maximize efficient use of resources and the environment by

^ For example, Fox, "How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social
Capital in Rural Mexico," 1089; Mohan and Mohan, "Placing Social Capital," 192; Pretty and Ward,
"Social Capital and the Environment," 211.
Putnam, "Tuning in. Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America,"
664.
James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press,
1990), 301.
Uphoff and Wijayaratna, "Demonstrated Benefits from Social Capital: The Productivity of
Farmer Organizations in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka," 1876.
40

Ibid.

Perreault, Bebbington, and Carroll, "Indigenous Irrigation Organizations and the Formation of
Social Capital in Northern Highland Ecuador," 3; Uphoff and Wijayaratna, "Demonstrated Benefits from
Social Capital: The Productivity of Farmer Organizations in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka," 1876.
Perreault, Bebbington, and Carroll, "Indigenous Irrigation Organizations and the Formation of
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shaping norms and rules that facilitate group behavior/^ This understanding has led to
the viewing of social capital as something that can be stored, invested, and spent not
unlike human-made or human capital."^ Thus, in water management, social capital has
come to be understood as a way to maximize efficiency of water use and encourage
rehabilitation of irrigation systems/^
Social capital is applicable to the study of irrigation systems for three distinct
reasons. First, the switch in focus of water management from technical to social
variables^ places emphasis upon the role that social capital has had upon the
performance of irrigation systems, as well as social capital’s ability to transform water
management in the future. Second, despite water’s importance in arid landscapes, it has
traditionally not been used effectively. Allocation of water is normally dominated by
those with political and geographical advantages. This produces shortages for some and
overuse for others. This discrepancy in access causes water logging and salinity, as well
as crop failure. Social capital, though, has the potential to facilitate adaptive collective
behavior, and thus minimize these management problems."*^ Finally, social capital allows

Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems, 13; Perreault, Bebbington,
and Carroll, "Indigenous Irrigation Organizations and the Formation of Social Capital in Northern Highland
Ecuador," 3; Pretty and Ward, "Social Capital and the Environment," 212.
Perreault, Bebbington, and Carroll, "Indigenous Irrigation Organizations and the Formation of
Social Capital in Northern Highland Ecuador," 2.
Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems, 13.
^ Ibid., 8; Perreault, Bebbington, and Carroll, "Indigenous Irrigation Organizations and the
Formation of Social Capital in Northern Highland Ecuador," 4; Platt, "Geographers and Water Resource
Policy," 36.
Pretty and Ward, "Social Capital and the Environment," 215.
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for site-specific examination of development projects, which accounts for the discrepancy
in both the space and time of projects.^
In order to understand how social capital can improve water management, the
functioning of social capital must be understood. The key terms of social capital are
trust; reciprocity and exchange; rules and norms; and organizational roles and
connectedness. The following are brief definitions of the above terms:
-Trust enables group behavior, which lubricates interaction and reduces
transaction costs.^^
-Reciprocity can come in two forms. The first is specific reciprocity where
things of equal value are exchanged. Diffuse reciprocity, on the other hand, is the
continuous relationship of exchange.^®
-Rules are the formal regulations put out by authority figures and norms are the
preferences and terms of acceptance by a group that facilitate group behavior.^ ^
-Connectedness is the ease with which ideas and capital are exchanged within a
community. Connectedness exists on both a micro and macro level. On the
micro level, there are both connections within a local group such as members of a
church, and connections between local groups, such as between a church and a
school. At the macro level, there are connections between local groups and
external agencies, such as a group of farmers and a development agency, and
between external agencies, such as between a development agency and the state.^^

Working with social capital, Norman Uphoff has established four basic functions
of irrigation management that can be evaluated for performance by farmers and

^ Mohan and Mohan, "Placing Social Capital," 196; Perreault, Bebbington, and Carroll,
"Indigenous Irrigation Organizations and the Formation of Social Capital in Northern Highland Ecuador,"
4.
Pretty and Ward, "Social Capital and the Environment," 211.
^Ibid.
^‘ Ibid.
Ibid.: 212.
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managers. These functions are decision making, resource mobilization and management,
communication and coordination, and conflict resolution.^^
-Decision making and planning are facilitated by farmers and managers who have
clear rules, precedents, and procedures that steer how participants strategize and
behave in a group setting, hi order for this to happen, rules and norms must be
clearly understood by all, and these rules must be enforceable.
-Resource mobilization involves the delivery of sufficient water, maintenance of
the irrigation system, and the technical operation of the system. In order for this
to be accomplished, designated roles supported by rules must be in place to ensure
the water gets to where it is needed by the farmers.
-Coordination and communication is necessary for fostering democratic
participation through which rules and roles are established and communicated that
coordinate activities necessary for the irrigation system.
-Conflict resolution must be quickly and equitably achieved to ensure that
collective action is not impeded. In order to accomplish this, rules and precedents
must be established that facilitate the resolution of conflicts in a manner perceived
to be fair by all.

These four indicators provide a framework for assessing the ability of an
organization to manage its water resources, and thus these indicators measure the amount
and to what extent social capital has been constructed in a place.^"^ It is important to note
that these functions can be accomphshed through both formal and informal roles and
mechanisms.^^

Perreault, Bebbington, and Carroll, "Indigenous Irrigation Organizations and the Formation of
Social Capital in Northern Highland Ecuador," 5; Norman Uphoff, Improving International Irrigation
Management with Farmer Participation: Getting the Process Right (Boulder; Westview Press, 1986);
Uphoff and Wijayaratna, "Demonstrated Benefits from Social Capital: The Productivity of Farmer
Organizations in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka," 1877.
^ Perreault, Bebbington, and Carroll, "Indigenous Irrigation Organizations and the Formation of
Social Capital in Northern Highland Ecuador," 5.
Uphoff and Wijayaratna, "Demonstrated Benefits from Social Capital: The Productivity of
Farmer Organizations in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka," 1878.
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Theory to Self-goveming Irrigation Systems
Self-governing irrigation systems are the application of social capital to the
management of water. This section of the literature review focuses upon the theories of
self-governing modes of organization and the keys to successful transformation of water
management from the state to local user associations. The section starts with a definition
of common property and successful management. The section then continues by
examining what is necessary in a user association in order for there to be successful
management of its resources.
Natural resource theorists feel that social capital can be manipulated so
individuals perform increased duties and management practices when property, defined
not as an object but rather a “social relation that defines the property holder with respect
to something of v a l u e , i s distributed amongst users of the natural resource. The
distribution of property and thus responsibility to the farmers promotes cooperation and
compliance because the owners feel invested to maintain value of their property.^^
Shared resources can be successfully managed—defined as when “the natural resource
has not been squandered, that some level of investment in the natural resource has
occurred, and that the co-owners of the resource are not in a perpetual state of
anarchy”^^—when each user is allotted responsibility that comes in tow with ownership.
In order for water to be successfully managed, entitlements and costs must be clearly
identified. In a common-property regime, such as farmers sharing an irrigation system.

^ D ^ e l W. Bromley, "The Commons, Common Property, and Environmental Policy,”
Environmental and Resource Economics 2 (1992): 2.
Ibid.: 3.
Ibid.: 2.
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competition for scarce water is displaced by “compliance in that each irrigator cooperates
by complying with the internal rules of water allocation among competing interests.
Farmers cooperate for the simple reason that in the absence of this shared structure of
rights and duties there would be anarchy
Common-property theory and the call for more social aspects being integrated in
water management have been realized in the increasing promotion of WUAs by donor
agencies and national governments. The persistent problems in the latter half of the
twentieth century of the “design, construction, operation, management and use of
irrigation projects” have encouraged donor agencies, national governments, and NGOS to
focus upon the importance of “organizing farmers to make the most effective use of the
capital investment” to correct these irrigation systems.^ This shift from investing in
physical capital to social capital relies upon the belief that organizing people to facilitate
action/participation can alleviate a legacy of poor design and maintenance.^^
WUAs can facilitate the rehabilitation of irrigated agriculture through incentives
to the farmers to better manage the system, and the fact that the management is locally
situated. With the ownership shifted from the state to the farmer, the system is better
managed because the farmers have more incentive to participate in management,^^ and
have the ability to do so in a timelier manner.^^ At the same time, the fact that the

Ibid.: 3.
“ Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems, 8,
Ibid., 13.
Robert C. Hunt, "Organizational Control over Water: The Positive Identification of a Social
Constraint on Farmer Participation," in Social, Economic, and Institutional Issues in Third World Irrigation
Management, ed. R. K. San^ath and Robert A. Young (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), 144.
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irrigation system is locally managed “empowers [farmers] to select meaningful slices of
generalized science and put them to work in their particular social and ecological
niches,”^ and this promotes the appropriate management and operation procedures of the
irrigation systems.®^
In order for WUAs to be successful, members must first and foremost receive
benefits from working together,^ and these benefits must exceed the costs associated
with collective management. In addition to benefits, the following factors are important
to successful management of water resources by WUAs:
-emergence through grassroots reaction to mismanagement of water resources
-clear understanding and ability to enforce rules
-a local mechanism to resolve disputes.
The success of WUAs is limited by the interest and participation in a collective
management system by the members themselves. If members actively form the WUA,
they are more likely to take an active role in membership and be proactive in pursuing the
goals of the association to improve water management as well as irrigation and drainage
systems.^^ On the other hand, if the organization is not established by members

Shashi Kolavalli and Jeffrey D. Brewer, "Facilitating User Participation in Irrigation
Management," Irrigation and Drainage Systems 13 (1999): 262.
^ David M. Freeman, "Wicked Water Problems: Sociology and Local Water Organizations in
Addressing Water Resources," Journal of the American Water Resources Association 36, no. 3 (2000): 485.
65

Kolavalli and Brewer, "Facilitating User Participation in Irrigation Management," 255.

66

Ibid.: 252-3.

Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems, 11; Wegerich, Water User
Associations in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan: Study on Conditions for Sustainable Development.
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disappointed with how water was being managed, they will likely see a transfer of
management from the state to themselves not as an opportunity, but instead as a burden.^^
Clear physical boundaries for WUAs must be established and rules put in place to
ensure that free riding is not an option.^^ Members must feel that their membership and
active participation is necessary in order to receive the benefits of belonging to the
association. Free riding though is a real problem, given the legacy of such behavior
under the Soviet system.^®
Finally, WUAs must be able to settle disputes that arise between members.^^ The
resolving of disputes must result in negative behaviors being punished. Again, if
members do not feel that the association is capable of managing disputes, then they will
feel that the organization is weak and incapable of protecting their vested interests in the
association.
If successful collective management is not realized by the WUA, the physical
system of water management, as well a subsequent decline in farm yields, will result.^^
This decline in the association’s ability to manage the water will then spiral out of control
as benefits of membership are lost, and thus members lose incentive to participate and
belong to the WUA. Given the already poor state of the irrigation system in Uzbekistan,

Wegerich, Water User Associations in Ud>ekistan and Kyrgyzstan: Study on Conditions for
Sustainable Development.
Rauf F, Khouzam, "Collective Action in Irrigation," in Water Quantity/Quality Management
and Conflict Resolution, ed, Ariel Dinar and Edna Tusak Loehman (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1995),
295; Kolavalli and Brewer, "Facilitating User Participation in Irrigation Management," 262; Ostrom,
Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems, 20.
^ Thurman, □ Modes of Organization in Central Asian Irrigation: The Ferghana Valley, 1876 to
Present!], 16.
Khouzam, "Collective Action in Irrigation," 295.
^ Kolavalli and Brewer, "Facilitating User Participation in Irrigation Management," 262.
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a further deterioration in the system from a failed adoption of WUAs could have a
disastrous effect on the welfare of the farmers, ecological health of the basin, the
country’s economy, and, ultimately, the political stability of the country.

Purpose
With the transfer of intra-farm O&M of the irrigation and drainage systems from
the state to local associations of farmers, the GOU, World Bank, and USAID, not to
mention the rural farmers, hope that the long legacy of water waste and its subsequent
environmental damage will improve. Because the institutions and economics that
produced the water crisis are still in place,^^ this thesis suspects that WUAs will be a
destabilizing force only capable of affecting marginal changes, and thus improvements,
in the irrigated agriculture in Uzbekistan. This study, however, intends to examine the
historical role of O&M and modes of organization of the irrigation system to gain insight
into how social capital has been developed in the region. This understanding of social
capital will then be used to consider the changes that have taken place in the irrigation
system during the past few hundred years in order to offer an insight into the problems
the farmers will face in participating in WUAs.
Although development agencies are already examining the barriers to the
adoption of WUAs in the region,^"^ they are looking predominantly at the irrigation
system in a technocratic manner, all but ignoring the historical and social context. At the
same time, any studies on irrigation in the region completed by development agencies

Wegerich, "Water The Difficult Path to a Sustainable Future for Central Asia," 258.
For exanq)le, USAID Natural Resources Management Project, Problems Facing Water User
Associations in Uzbekistan.
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need to be looked at with a suspicious eye. Development agencies and the GOU have
pushed for the implementation of WUAs for nearly ten years. The outcome of any
research they conduct will be affected by the finances and politics intertwined with the
development and support of WUAs already underway in Uzbekistan. For these reasons,
it is vital that independent research is undertaken that examines the development and
application of social capital to water management in the region.

Methodology
The development of social capital and its implications for the on-going transfer of
water management in Uzbekistan today will be accomplished through examining books,
journal articles and newspapers to draw out the patterns of the irrigation system at the
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time of the arrival of the Russians in Central Asia in the mid nineteenth century. The
primary focus of the study examines irrigated agriculture and the water-management
system set within the larger context of the economic, social, and political setting at the
time. With the primary focus upon the irrigation system before interruption by the
Russians, changes that occurred under the Russians and Soviets will be drawn upon to
highlight aspects of the traditional system.
The irrigation system is examined through three different spheres: land tenure,
management and O&M. These spheres are each explored in their own chapter. The
examination of land tenure in the nineteenth century provides an understanding of how
the land was controlled, used, and understood by the farmers. The chapter on water
management shows how decisions were made in the system, who controlled the system,
and where responsibility for decisions was located. The chapter on O&M focuses upon
the nature and traditions of irrigated agriculture, and how the farmer fit into the irrigation
system as a whole. The patterns of land tenure, management, and O&M are then used to
draw conclusions on the formation and utilization of social capital based upon the four
indicators established in the literature review: decision making, resource mobilization,
coordination and communication, and conflict resolution.
In terms of setting, the historical context will be focused loosely upon the current
political extent of Uzbekistan. Prior to the arrival of the Russians, the steppes and deserts
of modern-day Uzbekistan were largely under the domain of three Khanates: Khiva,
Bukhara, and Kokand. Land tenure, administration and O&M were similar among the
three Khanates. Owing to the similarities and the majority of the historical information
focusing on Bukhara and Kokand, this study will focus primarily on those two, and then
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highlight differences that existed between the khanates when appropriate. With the
limitations in the sources of material and the changes in political boundaries in the region
over the past two hundred years, however, some information will be included that applies
to the Aral Sea basin as a whole, and not specifically to the area represented by modernday Uzbekistan.
The study begins by examining the nature and extent of the current irrigation
system in Uzbekistan. Special attention is given to the problems associated with the
system. The next chapter examines the nature of water use and its connections with land
tenure and Islam. After this, the material focuses upon the administrative aspects of the
irrigation system and taxation. The final historical section examines O&M of the system,
and the role that the farmers played in the system. This section also examines the
implications of changes in the technology developed from site-specific adaptations versus
nomothetic views of irrigation. These chapters then culminate in an examination of the
development of social capital and its implications for the current transfer of water
management.

23
CHAPTER TWO
THE ARAL SEA TRAGEDY:
CAUSES, EFFECTS, AND RESPONSES
You cannot fill the Aral with tears.
-Mukhammed Salikh

Water management in Uzbekistan today is largely defined and limited by the
desiccation of the Aral Sea. Thus, any study of water management in the region must be
well-grounded in the history, causes, and implications of the Aral Sea tragedy. This
chapter takes a broad view of the desiccation of the Aral Sea, examining it as the most
striking symptom of water mismanagement under the Soviets. From such a vantage, the
chapter explores the numerous social and environmental costs associated with the
desiccation. Following the costs, the complex and layered nature of the causes of the
desiccation, along with obstacles to improvement, is explored. The chapter then
concludes with an examination of recent trends in attempts to ameliorate the
environmental damage sown in the basin’s landscape. It should be noted that the
literature, focusing upon the Aral Sea is extensive, and this chapter is by no means an
exhaustive review. Instead, this chapter attempts to offer a background to the current
situation in Uzbekistan by briefly examining the causes and effects of the desiccation of
the Aral Sea, and current as well as previous responses to the environmental tragedy. By
doing this, both the dire need for improvement in water management and the major
obstacles to improvement will be drawn out, and the problems facing the basin today
offer context to the history of water management in the previous century that will be
explored in the proceeding chapters.
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Effects from the Desiccation of the Aral Sea
The current political borders of Central Asia roughly follow the boundaries of the
Aral Sea Basin. All of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan lie within the basin.
Southern Kazakhstan and most of Kyrgyzstan do as well too (see Fig. 2). These five
countries, forming the politically defined heart of Central Asia, account for ninety-two
percent of the basin’s area.’^ Afghanistan and Iran account for about eight percent of the
basin, and China a one percent.
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Fig. 2. The Aral Sea Basin. Taken from Mathieu Bousquet and Karen Frenken, Irrigation in the
Countries of the Former Soviet Unions in Figures {Rome, Italy: FAO, 1997).

Dukhovny and Sokolov, Lessons on Cooperation Building to Manage Water Conflicts in the
Aral Sea Basin.
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Much of the surface water in this basin drains into the Aral Sea. Once covering
over 60,000 square kilometers (km^),^^ it was the fourth largest sea in terms of surface
area, and more important than its size was the integral role it played in the social,
ecological, and economic life of the region. The Aral Sea though has shrunk over the
past forty years, forming two lakes that together cover only 24,000 km^,^^ constituting
roughly one-third of the sea’s original surface area. The sea continues to diminish in size
as water continues to be diverted from the rivers feeding the sea to irrigate the crops of
the basin. According to UNESCO, it is optimistic to think 10 km^ of water reaches the
sea t o d a y W h e n one compares this number with Wegerich’s assertion that 23 km^ of
water needs to reach the sea to sustain its current extent, the terrifying rate at which this
sea continues to shrink becomes apparent.^^ This gross disappearance of a sea has
quickly and justifiably been called one of the most pressing human induced
environmental disasters. The Aral Sea, lying at the bottom of the basin, stands atop the
totem of misuse and mismanagement of the Central Asian environment under Soviet
control.
The Aral Sea began shrinking in the 1960s, as ever increasing amounts of water
were diverted from the rivers of the basin to irrigate the cotton fields. The Soviets saw
Central Asia’s hot and long growing season with fertile soils as the perfect place to grow

V. M. Kotlyakov et al., "Concept for Preserving and Restoring the Aral Sea and Normalizing
the Ecological, Public Health and Socioeconomic Situation in the Aral Region," Post-Soviet Geography 33,
no. 5 (1992): 283.
^ Michael H. Glantz, "Creeping Environmental Problems in the Aral Sea Basin," in Central
Eurasian Water Crisis: Caspian, Aral, and Dead Seas, ed. Iwao Kobori and Michael H. Glantz (New York:
United Nations University l^ s s , 1998), 44.
UNESCO, Water Related Vision for the Aral Sea Basin (2000).
^ Kai Wegerich, □ Institutional Change in Water Management at the Local and Provincial Levels
in UzbekistanO (London, University of London School of Oriental and African Studies, 2002), 138.
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the cotton for their textile industry in the north. The only thing that stood in the way of
turning the region into a giant cotton plantation was the aridity. In the nineteenth
century, the tsar started taking over land and developing irrigation projects to allow for
the sowing of cotton across the deserts. What the tsar started the Soviets finished: the
development of a massive and complex irrigation system to facilitate the opening of
“virgin lands” to be sown with cotton. This centralized system was as big as it was
inefficient, and broke a long tradition of small-scale, local irrigation that had developed
in the oases of Central Asia over thousands of years.
Located in the heart of the arid lands that dominate Inner Asia, Uzbekistan is a
country predominantly consisting of deserts and steppe. The arid nature of this region
has limited the economy and settlement throughout history. Despite the dry conditions
that limit agriculture, fertile soils and a long growing season with an abundance of solar
input have always given the region a natural propensity to supporting permanent
agricultural settlements. Accordingly, Central Asia has a long and productive history of
oasis settlements, supported by irrigated fields, dating back to the sixth millennium BC.^°
The historical record shows sophisticated and extensive irrigation systems that supported
“proto-urban” civilizations in the third century BC.^* The extent and maintenance of
these systems ebbed and flowed over time as conflicts and politics impacted the
settlements and cities. Despite the fluctuations to the irrigation systems of the Aral Sea
Basin, they persisted throughout time and remained a necessary component to the local

D.R. Harris; V.M. Masson; Y.E. Berezkin; M.P. Charles; C. Gosden; G.C. Hillman; A.K.
Kasparov; G.F. Korobkova; K. Kurbansakhatov; A.J. Legge; S. Limbrey., "Investigating Early Agriculture
in Central Asia: New Research at Jeitun, Turkmenistan," Antiquity 67, no. 255 (1993): 324.
** M.A.; Shahmirzadi Joyenda, S. Malek and Tosi, M., "The Bronze Age in Iran and Afghanistan,"
in History of Civilizations of Central Asia, ed. A H. Dani and V.M. Masson (Paris: UNESCO Publishing,
1996), 222.
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economies. The archaeological record shows little evidence of human-induced
salinization, and the International Merv Project failed to find any indication of
salinization near Merv.®^ Under Soviet control, however, irrigation systems and farming
practices radically changed, and with them so too did the environmental health of the
basin.
Much as the shrinking lake serves best as a symbol of the Soviet’s
mismanagement of the environment, the visible scar of a disappearing lake serves as a
shocking pronouncement of the grave, “creeping environmental problems” the region
now faces.*^ The recklessly inefficient agricultural plan and irrigation system causing the
Aral Sea crisis is also contributing to various other environmental problems that together
form a web of disasters that endanger the people and limit the newly formed
governments’ abilities to make quick and successful transformations from the Soviet era
to the next. Overexploitation of the basin’s water resources to satisfy the thirsty cotton
that covers the landscape has resulted in, but is not limited to, soil degradation, loss of
fisheries, decline in human health, and desertification}^
Soil degradation is clearly seen in the prevalence of water-logged soils and
salinization throughout Uzbekistan. Over seventy-five percent of the land is salinized in
downstream provinces in Uzbekistan, such as Bukhara, Khorezm and the autonomous

*■Sarah L. and Hannan O'Hara, Tim, "Irrigation and Water Management in Turkmenistan: Past
Systems, Present Problems and Future Scenarios," Europe-Asia Studies 51, no. 1 (1999): 27.
Glantz, "Creeping Environmental Problems in the Aral Sea Basin."
^ In addition to the listed creeping environmental problems, the destruction of hydrological
regimes and the disruption of climatic conditions are major concerns for the health of the basin. For an
excellent review of the environmental problems in the Aral Sea Basin see Michael H. Glantz, "Sustainable
Development and Creeping Environmental Problems in the Aral Sea Basin,” in Creeping Environmental
Problems and Sustainable Development in the Aral Sea Basin, ed. Michael H. Glantz (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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Karakalpakstan.^^ The soils in Uzbekistan are naturally saline. Overuse of water, poor
site selection for fields, heavy seepage from unlined canals, a lack of adequate drainage
systems and an increase in the salinity of the irrigation water, however, have caused the
salt concentration to build up to unhealthy levels in the soils. The accumulation of salts
produces secondary salinization by downstream farmers using brackish water to irrigate
their crops. Secondary salinization is responsible for the lower part of the basin
experiencing the most degraded soils (see Fig. 3). The decline in soil fertility is a major
contributing factor to diminishing cotton yields. In 1979, scientists estimated the loss of
cotton crop due to salinization to be about half a million tons for Uzbekistan—nine
percent of that year’s actual yield.®^ The cotton crop peaked in 1981, and has continued
to plummet since.^ Also, soil salinity has been, and continues to be, overcome by
applying excessive amounts of water to flush the salts out of the root zone for the
duration of the growing season. This excessive use of water increases both the scarcity of
water in the basin and the prevalence of salts in the soil in the long run.
The desiccation of the Aral Sea has caused the destruction of fish spawning
grounds, while the increased salinity in the sea has killed off all of

fisheries. In

addition to the fisheries, efforts to maintain a cotton monoculture have also resulted in the
loss of the trapping, transportation, tourism, and food-crop economies. The loss of these
other economic sectors makes the basin’s economy especially susceptible to disruption,**
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Fig. 3. Salinized Lands as a Percentage of All Irrigated Lands in Uzbekistan, by Oblasts and ASSR,
in 1985. Taken from Smith, “Salinization in UzbeMstan", 27.

and because of this it is now that much more difficult to try to scale back or reduce cotton
production in the region.
Heavy use of pesticides and a lack of water to flush them down are responsible
for numerous public health problems in the basin. These problems include, but are not
limited to, an infant mortality rate of 100 per 1,000 (one of the highest in Asia), an
increase in cancers owing to poisoned water and particulate matter from the exposed
seabed, and the contamination of mother’s milk.*^ Because of pollutants in breast milk in

Thomas R. McCray, □Enviro-Economic Imperatives and Agricultural Production in
Uzbekistan: Modem Responses to Emergent Water Management Problems 0 (Lawrence, Kansas,
University of Kansas, 1998), 68.
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Karakalpakstan, mothers are advised not to breast feed their children.^ These conditions,
among others, have led to the reduction of life expectancy around the Aral Sea by nearly
twenty years.^* Unfortunately, with the health concerns predominantly affecting the
marginalized Karakalpak minority group in remote Karakalpakstan, physical and political
considerations have limited attempts to improve these problems.^
One of the most fnghtening and underexposed results of desiccation in the basin
is desertification. According to the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, a new desert is forming
south and east of the Aral Sea at a rate faster than the expansion of the Sahara. The
desert is referred to as the Oqkum, or White Desert, because of the toxic salt pans that
cover its surface.^^ Scientists fear that the Oqkum will continue to grow and completely
overtake all of Central Asia.^^

Causes of the Desiccation
Starting with glasnost and increasing with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the
environmental problems in the Aral Sea Basin have attracted considerable attention and
corresponding efforts to deal with this catastrophe. The majority of attention has focused
^ Glantz, "Creeping Environmental Problems in the Aral Sea Basin," 48.
^ D P. Bedford, "International Water Management in the Aral Sea Basin," Water International 21
(1996): 65.
Glantz, "Creeping Environmental Problems in the Aral Sea Basin," 48.
Reuel R. Hanks, "A Separate Space? Karakalpak Nationalism and Devolution in Post-Soviet
Uzbekistan," Europe Asia Studies 52, no. 5 (2000): 949.
Tsuneo Tsukatani, "The Aral Sea and Socio-Economic Development," in Central Eurasian
Water Crisis: Caspian, Aral, and Dead Seas, ed. Iwao Kobori and Michael H. Glantz (New York: United
Nations University Press, 1998), 45.
^ Asomitdin A. Rahkov, "Desertification in the Aral Sea Region," in Creeping Environmental
Problems and Sustainable Development in the Aral Sea Basin, ed. Michael H. Glantz (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 67.
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upon the legacy of irrigated agriculture, as it is the main use of water in the b a s i n , a n d
more specifically, cotton, which requires ten times more water than wheat.^ Within the
basin, Uzbekistan is responsible for over fifty-four percent of all irrigation,^^ and grows
over sixty-eight percent of the basin’s cotton.^® In Uzbekistan alone, over ninety-one
percent of the water used is for irrigation.^ Thus, as this environmental crisis is waterled owing to profligate irrigation practices, Uzbekistan, as the largest water user, must
reform its water use practices if the economic viability of the basin is to be restored.
It is important to note that despite the Aral Sea being a water-led crisis, this is not
to say that the Aral Sea Basin suffers from water scarcity, where water scarcity is
understood as 2000 people or more sharing one million cubic meters (m^) of water a
year.^^ In terms of population to water available, the worst-off state in the basin,
Uzbekistan, has only 192 inhabitants per one million m^ of water.

This distinction

accentuates the role water management (or mismanagement) and Soviet planning have
played in creating the current crisis. The worst aspects to Soviet water and agricultural
management include.

Peter Sinnott, "The Physical Geography of Soviet Central Asia and the Aral Sea Problem," in
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Responses to Emergent Water Management Problems0,118.
^ Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia, 37.
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100

Wegerich, "Water: The Difficult Path to a Sustainable Future for Central Asia," 256.

David R. Smith, "Environmental Scarcity and Shared Water Resources in Post-Soviet Central
Asia," Post-Soviet Geography 36, no. 6 (1995): 358.

32

Sector Water Use in Uzbekistan
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B Domestic use
■ industrial iBe
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94%
Fig. 4. Sector Water Use in Uzbekistan. Note that the difference between this figure and the statistic
found on the previous page derives from 94% of the water being used by agriculture, of which 91 % is
used for irrigation. For further clarification, see Sokolov, “Integrated Water Resources Management
in Uzbekistan”. Figure taken firom Wegerich, “Institutional Change in Water Management at the
Local and Provincial Levels in Uzbekistan”. 90.

but are not limited to, a lack of water pricing, which instilled a culture of water waste; an
absence of crop rotation;*®^ poorly leveled fields;*®^ overuse of pesticides;^^ and a “low
quality... of design, construction and operation of irrigation systems.”*®^ As a result,
Uzbekistan now suffers from “water losses from evaporation, infiltration, and deep
percolation; water logged soils; soil erosion both from irrigation and wind, with a loss of
topsoil; and a decline in fertility.*’^^ Complementing the region's environmental

Kotlyakov et al., "Concept for Preserving and Restoring the Aral Sea and Normalizing the
Ecological, Public Health and Socioeconomic Situation in the Aral Region," 285.
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problems, competition for deficient amounts of water and anger over water quality are
responsible for transboundary and local conflicts.
Although it is easy to identify a shortage in terms of the quantity and quality of
water as being responsible for the desiccation and all of its ensuing costs, it is not quite so
simple to pinpoint how humans have fostered this problem, and even more difficult to
identify how to ameliorate the situation. McKinney, however, identifies two popular
explanations for the environmental destruction of the Aral Sea: failures in economic
planning and increased water losses owing to changes in farming and irrigation
practices.
The first explanation, predominantly backed by former Soviet water planners and
economists, believe that the Aral tragedy stems from a poor regional economic plan.
This group considers the narrow goals and shortsightedness of the Soviet economic
planners responsible for the current environmental and socio-economic problems. By
instituting a regional economic plan that favored national interests—increased cotton
production—without considering the regional costs, poor planning led to the shrinking of
the sea from ever-increasing water shortages.

This economic plan required greater

amounts of water to be diverted from the rivers to supply the expanding fields, which led
to the environmental destruction, as well as competition over water and economic
vulnerability.^^®
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On the other hand, Wheeler and Micklin point to the loss of traditional farms and
irrigation practices after the Bolshevik Revolution as being responsible for the current
shortage of water. Driven by their belief that technology and collectivization would
improve crop yields and lessen the burden of the Central Asian fanner, the Soviets
quickly transformed irrigation systems with large canals that fed large, collective farms.
In doing this, modem technology and farming techniques supplanted the traditional
practices that had developed in the region over thousands of years.^^^ The profound
changes to how the farms operated and the irrigation system was managed served to
destabilize irrigated agriculture in the region. Micklin considers this disruption of
traditional irrigation methods to have started the region down a path of unsustainable
water use, as ever-increasing amounts of water were lost through poor design and a
culture of water waste that the system encouraged.

From this view, any attempt to

rectify water shortages in the basin cannot deal solely with the infrastructure,
management, or culture of water management, but must, instead, deal with the major
changes that occurred to all three under Soviet control. The role that changes in
technology played in the irrigation systems is covered in depth in chapter five.
The destruction of the Aral Sea is complex. Not unlike its effects, the causes of
the desiccation are many. Institutional changes resulting fi-om technology as well as
ideological changes in Central Asia have played a major role in water shortages. At the
same time, economic plans that considered water an inexhaustible resource of the Aral
Sea Basin allowed for ever-greater amounts of water to be diverted from the rivers to the
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fields, all in the name of the good of the nation. Although McKinney identified these two
ways to explain how water shortages arose, this is not to say that only one is correct. Both
factors are responsible for the condition of the Aral Sea, and any attempt to improve the
basin's ecological health must address the large-scale irrigation system as well as the
relics of the Soviet command economy. Unfortunately, amelioration of the Aral Sea is
not only compounded by the coalition of factors causing water scarcity, but also by
Uzbekistan's troubled political and economic conditions.
With irrigation accounting for over ninety-one percent of the water used in
Uzbekistan, the most meaningful and significant water savings must come from a
reduction in irrigated lands and cotton production. At this time, because of Uzbekistan's
heavy reliance upon cotton production, any reduction in irrigated lands is both politically
and economically unfeasible. Since 1992, Uzbekistan has been the world's second
largest exporter of cotton.^

Based upon 1998 estimates, over forty-one percent of

Uzbekistan's $2.83 billion in exports were cotton. The next largest export was gold at
nine p e r c e n t . L a s t year, cotton accounted for thirty-six percent of the nation’s $44
billion GDP.^^^ These statistics underscore the importance and domination of the cotton
monoculture to the country's financial standing, but these numbers only represent the
importance in terms of dollars.
Uzbekistan's agricultural sector, largely made up of cotton production, continues
to be the largest source of employment in Uzbekistan, where thirty percent of the

CIA, The World Factbook\ McCray, □Enviro-Economic Imperatives and Agricultural
Production in Uzbekistan: Modem Responses to Emergent Water Management Problems □, 124.
CIA, The World Factbook.
"^Ibid.
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population is either unemployed (ten percent) or underemployed (twenty percent).
Agriculture provides jobs for forty-four percent of the county’s labor force of 11.9
million."^ Of these agricultural jobs, the labor-intensive nature of Uzbekistan’s largely
unmechanized cotton production provides thirty times more jobs than grain production
and three times more than fruit p i c k i n g . T h e r e are no obvious replacement jobs for the
millions of workers who would be displaced by any substantial scaling back of cotton
production. Moreover, Uzbekistan’s rural workforce is expected to increase by eighty
percent in the next five y e a r s . T h i s increase in the rural workforce will make cottonpicking jobs that much more valuable in the rural areas.
Intertwined with cotton’s importance to the national economy, the GOU is also
interested in maintaining cotton production for political reasons. According to Weinthal,
decisions concerning cotton production at the state level have been affected by a desire to
keep people on the farms picking cotton as a means to maintain the state’s social and
political power.

Cotton production sustains the state at the top of the hierarchy, with

regionally based patronages operating underneath it. In this, the strength and stability of
the state is maintained simply by not trying to transform the largest sector of
employment, and the social and political networks that have developed around it.

Ibid.
Ibid.
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The political and economic trends of Uzbekistan’s irrigated agriculture over the
past one hundred years shape and limit future developments in the basin. Reduction of
agriculture, especially cotton, simply is not an option at this time, just as is any attempt to
return to the way things were before the Russians arrived in Central Asia. Despite the
enormity of the problems and obstacles to reform, the years since independence have
seen numerous efforts to improve the social, economic, and, of course, the environmental
health of the region.

Trends in Amelioration Efforts
Since the break up of the Soviet Union, efforts to improve the quantity and quality
of water in the Aral Sea Basin have been largely envisaged through three avenues:
1. The reduction of the irrigated area.
2.

Improved efficiency of agriculture and irrigation.

3. A shift to crops requiring less water.
As explained above, with Uzbekistan’s political and economic reliance on cotton—not to
mention the increased demand for grain production as the country tries to regain its food
self sufficiency—a reduction in irrigated area or a major shift in crops is not realistic at
this time. This has left an improvement in efficiency of water use and agriculture
production as the main way to improve Uzbekistan’s agricultural prospects while
simultaneously limiting its environmental liabilities. These goals are predominantly
pursued through the dissemination of welfare by nongovernmental and foreign assistance
agencies, and economic and land policy reform.

Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia, 37.
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Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and foreign assistance agencies have had
a presence in Uzbekistan since its independence. These agencies focus upon identifying
and then treating many of the country’s agro-liabilities.^^^ Organizations such as USAID,
the Japan Grant Fund, and the European Union finance myriad studies executed both by
international and national experts monitoring key irrigation and other agricultural
problems. Unfortunately, the shift from monitoring to action is a difficult one owing to
the exorbitant costs associated with the improvement in the efficiency of the irrigation
system itself. The Uzbek government estimates costs to improve efficiency through
lining canals and putting in place an adequate drainage system for irrigated fields at
$4,000/ha.^^^ This leaves most efforts to improve irrigated agriculture to the
dissemination of welfare, such as the donation of tractors and other agricultural
equipment with the hope of improving efficiency and productivity on farms, and this, in
turn, leading to a reduction in the use of water. In this, most of the aid contributed to
farms and farmers is superficial at best. While these efforts do little to actually treat the
root causes to the problems facing the irrigated agricultural sector, they do harm in
reinforcing the notion that the international community will fix the Aral Basin.

This

undermines the GOU’s political and financial support for efforts to ameliorate conditions
in the country.
The majority of efforts by international organizations, such as the World Bank,
and the Uzbek government to improve the efficiency of irrigated agriculture involves
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land and economic r e f o r m s . S o m e economists believe a change in land and economic
policies, such as privatization and an end to free water, will increase the personal
involvement and responsibility of the farmers, and this will help facilitate an introduction
of greater technology and agricultural practices.

By imposing more economic

responsibility upon the farmers, the hope is that they will accordingly run their farms in a
more efficient manner.

Despite the potential and promise of such reforms, the

government has been slow in instituting change, as inertia combined with political and
economic risks has prevented the government from being more aggressive in pursuing
reforms.
Despite the expanded understanding of irrigated agriculture by academia during
the past twenty years, this has not carried over to the international community’s nor the
GOU’s response to water and soil problems in Uzbekistan. Thus far, all economic and
land-policy reforms have been instituted in a top-down manner. These policy reforms
assume that the farmers will be rational actors in a Western, free-market sense. The
government and NGOs hope that external, institutional changes will prod the farmers to
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act more efficiently as the theories and Western logic indicate they will. It is this belief
and faith in privatization that has allowed for the singular examination of the economic
factors behind water use in the Aral Sea Basin as a way to revamp irrigation. Focusing
upon economics, the GOU and the organizations involved in the basin have viewed, and
subsequently treated, the farmers and water managers as passive pawns who have no
personal connection to the land and its health, but merely the ability to respond to
economic considerations. This view of the farmers and water managers is unfortunate
given the limited resources of the Uzbek government and its hesitancy in adopting land
and economic policy reforms.
Political and economic changes, as well as the adoption of more adaptive
technologies, are necessary for irrigated agriculture to continue in the Aral Sea Basin, but
these changes are expensive in terms of cost and effort and will take time to be
implemented. New less expensive reforms in terms of capital, investment, time and risk
need to be explored. Less expensive reforms are needed to both serve as a first response
to this water-led environmental disaster and as a way to augment the larger policy
reforms being pursued.
Land and economic reforms need to be supported through an improvement in
the practices of water and land use through an increased understanding and a cultural
shift of the farmers and villagers who directly rely upon the land and water for their
livelihood. In this, a thorough examination of the attitudes and understandings of the
water crisis, water conservation, and management could help bridge the gap between
elites who manage and set up the rules administering water usage and the farmers and
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water managers who asked to respond accordingly. In his 1998 dissertation, McCray
points out the willingness of the farm managers, irrigators, and workers to implement
measures that would promote water conservation and soil health, but indicates that they
seemingly do not do so because they are not told to.^^° O’Hara and Hannan noticed a
lack of understanding by many farm managers of the coimection between over-watering
and soil salinity, and call for on-farm practical training as a first response to the
destructive cultural legacy still present from the Soviet system.

This is echoed by

Usmanova stating that the villagers’ concern and understanding of the water-led
environmental crisis needs to be raised.

Micklin states that increased information such,

as topographic and soil maps, as well as competent advice on proper land and water
management practices, are key to improving land and water use in the Aral Sea Basin.

Conclusion
Lying at the bottom of the Aral Sea Basin, the Aral Sea is where the legacy of
misuse and abuse to the Central Asian landscape concentrates. This concentration of
environmental liabilities is most clearly seen in the desiccation of the sea itself, but it is
important to recognize that the disappearance of the sea, as large of a tragedy it is in its
own right, is merely the most visible of a long list of problems that can all be traced back
to the cotton monoculture instituted by the Soviets on the steppes and in the deserts of
Central Asia. The effects of the water shortage in the basin include, but are not limited
‘^Ibid., 3,192.
Sarah L.and Hannan Tim O'Hara, "Managing Tinkmenistan's Kara Kum Canal: Problems and
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to, the destruction of hydrological regimes; disruption of the climatic regime; degradation
in public health, with a reduced life expectancy; rapid desertification; the complete loss
of fisheries; and a vast expanse of degraded and salinized soils. As grave and dire as the
ejects listed in the literature on the Aral Sea are, these accounts do not and cannot
accurately depict the social, environmental, and economic liabilities of the basin.
Regardless, the depiction of the problems present in the literature effectively
communicates the justification for past and continuing efforts to ameliorate this
destruction.
Although it is obvious and accurate to say that the destruction and problems in the
Aral Sea Basin are from a shortage in water, pinning down a singular cause for the
shortage in water is not so easy. Many scholars and scientists from the Soviet era point to
the economic plan implemented in the late 1950s as the cause of desiccation. This
economic plan failed to consider the local costs of water shortage, but instead focused
upon the benefits to the nation from increased cotton production. Through failing to
consider the limited resources of water in the basin and the associated costs, water
became scarce as more and more water was diverted from the rivers to the fields. The
other predominant causal hypothesis for the basin’s water shortage is that the
abandonment in traditional, sustainable methods led to an irrigation system and culture of
exorbitant water losses. It is important to note that finding a singular explanation is
neither important nor necessary. Instead, scholars, scientists, and workers in the region
must recognize the complexities to the causes of desiccation, and the subsequent
obstacles to ameliorating the social, economic, and environmental damage.
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The complex and layered nature to the causes of desiccation in the Aral Sea Basin
make a quick, simple, or cheap fix elusive. Since independence, serious, ambitious
efforts to improve the health and condition of the basin have been stymied by high costs.
This has left many attempts to be superficial at best, trying to merely put band aids on the
irrigation system and not truly trying to overhaul and improve the system. More
comprehensive attempts at improvement have largely centered upon reforming economic
and land policies. Unfortunately, despite all of their good intentions and rhetoric,
economic and land-policy reforms have been both slow in adoption and in results.
The destruction of the Aral Sea, despite all of the efforts of the past fifteen years,
continues today. The economic and political inertia in the region ensures that unhealthy
and unsustainable amounts of water will continue to be diverted to the fields from the
rivers of the basin. The forced adoption of WUAs in Uzbekistan appears to be yet the
latest attempt to engineer an improvement in the country’s irrigated agriculture.
Although a return to the sustainable and time tested land and water policies and farming
practices found in the region prior to the Soviet period is not possible, a look at the
history of water management can offer insight into what some of the key principles to
developing sustainable water management in the region will be (McKinney 1997, 3).
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CHAPTER THREE
LAND TENURE AND WATER RIGHTS
“The [Soviets] confiscated the land and the water from the rightfiil owners, obliged many
[farmers] to plant cotton and forbade them to plant com, with the result that in many
districts there was no bread to be had, even for as much as three roubles a pound.”
-Ibrahim Beg^^^

Any attempt to understand the social processes at play in water management and
social capital in an arid region must address how farmers, workers and laborers view the
land that they work and the water they use.'^^ This chapter looks at the role land tenure
played in connecting/disconnecting farmers from the land, water, the state, and one
another in the three khanates.^^^ It also briefly covers the major changes to tenure under
the Soviets, and then those made since independence. Accordingly, this chapter will
examine the background, history, and changes to land tenure and water rights in the
region at the time of the arrival of the Russians in the mid-nineteenth century. Although
much attention has been paid to land tenure in the khanates, a clear understanding of
tenure and where and how the farmer related to the land remains elusive.
Part of the reason that a firm understanding has eluded historians thus far is the
failure to set land tenure appropriately in the larger context of Islam within the khanates.
In the literature, Islam and its role in shaping both the legal structure of tenure, as well as
influencing the culture of farmers and villages, has too often been neglected. Historians
and political scientists have invested much energy in examining the role that Islam played

Egon Erwin Kisch, Changing Asia, trans. Rita Reil (New York: Alfted A. Knopf, 1935), 141,
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in determining diplomatic conflict between the khanates and the tsar. Geographers and
travelers, on the other hand, have neglected the khanates’ Islamic legacy. This
disconnect has produced a literature on the history of Turkistan that considers religion
and water management to be completely separate, despite Islam serving as the main
social force in the mid-nineteenth century. For this reason, in addition to focusing upon
land tenure itself, the chapter also looks at the history and role of Islam in relation to the
farmers. This information, as well as the theme of Islam as a social force in irrigated
agriculture and water management, will be brought up and explored further in the
following chapters.
The khanates all shared a tax farming land-tenure system. To better set the
background for the tenure system and the subsequent chapters, this chapter starts with a
brief history of the khanates and their relations to one another. This is followed by a brief
review of Islam, its role in the khanates, and how religion shaped land tenure in the
region. By no means should this examination be thought of as exhaustive. The chapter
then looks at the land-tenure system, as well as the contradictions and problems in
understanding the system. It then concludes with an examination of the changing nature
to the tenure system during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The sources regarding land tenure in this chapter are predominantly Western
travelers to the region and twentieth-century historians. Men like O. Olufsen, Eugene
Schuyler, and Arminius Vambery offer detailed accounts of the tenure system in the
region from the last century. Many Russians did too, but unfortunately these accounts
remain predominantly untranslated in archives in Tashkent and Moscow. Although this
chapter would certainly benefit from accounts by the Russians, the Western travelers.
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who certainly had biases and difficulties comprehending the local tenure systems,
remained more or less free of the political biases that most of the Russians carried with
them. One source this study was not able to use, unfortunately, was V. V. Barthold's A
history o f Irrigation in Turkistan, Given the current interest and importance attached to
water use in the history of Central Asia, it is amazing that this work has yet to be
translated into English. The lack of a translation of this work is especially noteworthy
considering Barthold stands apart in Western academia from his Russian patriots for the
strength and enduring quality to his studies.

Uzbeks and the Development of Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand
To more fully appreciate and understand the land-tenure system and water use
that European and American travelers were observing in Central Asia during the mid
nineteenth century, it is helpful to briefly discuss the history of the Uzbeks and their
move into Transoxiana. In the modem sense, “Uzbek” is thought of as an ethnicity
despite its historical meaning belying such a narrow understanding. Soviet ethnographers
thought of Uzbek as a term of ethnicity. Historically, it is more appropriate to think of
Uzbek as a political term. The name traces back to Uzbek-Khan, a descendent of the
elder son of Genghis Khan. Uzbek-Khan spent his life spreading Islam among the
Turkish nomads of northwestern Turkistan. These newly converted nomads began to
distinguish themselves from the other nomads by calling themselves Uzbeks.*^*
Interestingly, the word Uzbek comes from the words o*z (self) and beg (prince or
Yuri Bregel, "Barthold and Modem Oriental Studies," International Journal of Middle East
Studies 12, no. 3 (1980): 389.
Waldemar Jochelson, Peoples of Asiatic Russia, ed. Weston La Bane, Landmarks in
Anthropology (New York: Johnson Reprint, 1970), 85.
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nobleman), and means self master. At the end of the fifteenth century, Uzbeks began to
move south from the steppe region north and west of Transoxiana, and took control of the
oases from the Persians already located there. Today, Uzbeks consist of a pastiche of
Mongolian, Persian, and Turkish features. This combination results from the legacy of
the Mongolian warrior Genghis Khan in Transoxiana, the conversion of Turkish nomads
from the steppe, and the Persians ruling the oases prior to the arrival of the Uzbeks.
Transoxiana or Transoxania refers to the region that lies between the Amu (Oxus)
and Syr Darya (see Fig. 2). Traditionally though, Transoxiana was referred to by the
Arabs as Ma wara al-nahr, the land beyond the river—referring to the Oxus. Later, this
Arabic title came to refer to all eastern Islamic lands. Even Turks and Persians
themselves living “beyond the river” used the Arabic name for the region. Today,
however, Turkistan—the land of the Turks—is the most common historical name for the
region, as it was the name the Russians used.^"*® Although Transoxiana refers to a more
narrow region than Turkistan, which now can be thought of as the five former Soviet
*Stans in Central Asia,^"^^ at the time of the arrival of the Russians Transoxiana
represented the greatest concentration of people, wealth, and power, and Russian efforts
and presence in Turkistan were concentrated in Transoxiana. Today Turkistan is
considered a colonially given name by the Uzbeks.
The settled population of Transoxiana did not think in terms of ethnicity, and
certainly did not identify themselves as Turks. This was a distinction made by the

Ibid.
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Occidentals. Ethnicity was not used to identify people. Traditionally the people of the
oases of Central Asia identified themselves more by their village than by the region as a
whole.
The arrival of the Uzbeks into Transoxiana saw the continued decline of the
region from its prime several hundred years earlier. At the time of Uzbeks taking control
of Transoxiana, the region—at this time known as Mogholistan^^^—was entering into a
period of cultural, economic, and political decline. At the start of the sixteenth century,
the region was still suffering ftom the damage inflicted by Genghis Khan’s conquest of
the region, and the subsequent wars for control that followed his death. At the same time,
the discovery of the maritime route from Asia to Europe greatly decreased the amount of
trade conducted over the Silk Road. The triumph of Shias in Persia only served to further
isolate Sunni Central Asia from the Arab world.

Finally, constant conflict with

nomads led to the weakening of political states and the degradation of irrigated
agriculture and the region’s economy.
In this period of decline, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the
khanates of Bukhara and Khiva emerged. These two khanates were followed by the
Kokand Khanate in the late seventeenth century. These khanates were constantly
engaged in conflict amongst each other and with nomadic tribes that surrounded them.
Nevertheless, by the end of the eighteenth century, after two hundred years of Uzbeks in
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control, each of the khanates began to strengthen politically and economically and
become more cohesive.
Of the three khanates, Bukhara was the largest and most powerful. Its large
territory consisted primarily of the Zerovshan Valley between the Syr and Amu Darya
rivers. In this valley were the historical cities of Bukhara and Samarqand. The city of
Bukhara served as the capital. The khanate also contained the Kashka Darya and the
Surkhan Darya, as well as the upland regions east of Samarqand. There was no accurate
census taken during the nineteenth century, and accounts of the population vary widely,
but the most popular figure is around 3,000,000 people for Bukhara. Of these, fifty-five
percent were Uzbek, thirty-three percent Tajik, and ten percent Turkmen. Indians, Jews,
and Persians were smaller minority groups in the khanate.
Khiva was located to the west of Bukhara, south of the Aral Sea. The khanate
was centralized around the city of Khiva, and included territory both north and south of
the Amu Darya.

Kokand, on the other hand, consisted of the vast territory between the

Syr Darya and Chinese Xingjian. The heart of the khanate was the rich and fertile
Fergana Valley, and also included Tashkent,^"^ then, and still, the largest city in Central
Asia.
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Problems and Shortcomings in Understanding Land Tenure in Transoxiana
There is no clear consensus in the literature on what the traditional land tenure
system was in the three k h a n a t e s . M y readings of the accounts by travelers, diplomats,
and historians on the region were riddled with inconsistencies, differing definitions, and
huge omissions in the record. Unfortunately, there are no native accounts of land tenure.
This leaves us with only the information collected from foreign visitors to the region
during the past century. Accounts by visitors are normally divided into two camps: those
made by Western travelers to the region and those made by Russians*^ of various sorts—

Gerard O'Neill. "Land and Water ’Reform’ in the 1920s: Agrarian Revolution or Social
Engineering?” in Central Asia: Aspects of Transition, ed. Tom Everett-Healh (New York: Routledge
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including merchants, diplomats, army officers, and spies. The following section
examines the problems facing historians and social scientists in trying to accurately
understand land tenure in the region prior to the Russians.
Many of the problems in the accounts taken by Western travelers and Russians in
Central Asia stem from the fact that they inevitably interpreted what they saw through
their own experiences and their own understandings. Colonialism saw Occidentals
occupying and controlling new lands, and interpreting native customs and laws through
their own biases and understandings. Thus, when the Russians started coming to Central
Asia, they viewed the land as a commodity,^^' something that could be possessed, owned,
and used for personal gain. The Russians, as with most colonialists,*^^ viewed the local
customs and traditions as being primitive and c r u d e . F r o m such a point of view,
Russians tried to comprehend the complex and extensive local laws and tenure system,
and then tried to re-inscribe what they found into terms and concepts that fit into their
understandings of land tenure.*^'* Lands held communally but distributed on an annual
basis—a system found in parts of Turkistan in the nineteenth century—were not easily
comprehended by the colonialists, and were defined and written in terms familiar for the
colonialist. Inevitably in re-inscribing the complex arrangements of property rights.
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tenure was simplified. In addition to the simplification of local laws and tenure into the
legal and cultural framework of the Tsarist Government, the Russians were invested in
interpreting the local tenure system in a light that served the Tsarist Government in its
quest to manipulate and control agricultural production in the Aral Sea Basin.
Travelers to the region faced the same problems as the Russians in trying to
comprehend the complex land tenure system. In addition to trying to re-inscribe the local
system of tenure, travelers to Transoxiana were encountering three different
administrations within which there were many idiosyncrasies.

Besides the three

khanates, there were numerous smaller kingdoms and despots that the travelers were
encountering too.^^^ Relations among the khanates and these smaller kingdoms were
complex, varied, and impacted property rights and irrigation. Also, besides the size and
complexities of the political entities in Turkistan at this time, the landscape itself was
large, varied, and in many places inhospitable. The landscape produced oases that
remained largely separate from others, and this isolation allowed for distinctions as well.
Because of this, the irrigation systems and customs concerning property rights did not
easily fall into absolutes for the region as whole. This led to many travelers’ accounts
conflicting with the experience of others. These conflicts offer insight into both the
complexity of the landscape—physical and political—and the intricate arrangements
concerning land tenure.
One other cause to the confusion over land tenure in the region, unfortunately not
well examined, was the state of flux in Central Asia in the nineteenth century. Even prior
to the arrival of the Russians, markets and the government were both changing. These
Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924,1.
Zenkovsky, "Kulturicampf in Pre-Revolutionary Central Asia," 17.
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changes affected operations, the size of farms, and state of the peasant.

So in addition

to the variances that existed spatially regarding land tenure, there were also huge changes
occurring during the nineteenth century. These temporal changes thus led visitors to the
same villages at different times in the nineteenth century seeing differences of who
owned and worked the land. The flux found in the cultures, governments, and markets in
Central Asia in the nineteenth century receives a thorough examination later in this
chapter.

Shari^a, Odat and Land Tenure
It is impossible to comprehend sedentary culture in the Transoxiana without
appreciating the impact that Islam had upon the people. Qutayib warriors brought Islam
to the oases of Central Asia in the eighth century, and since that time it has remained the
primary religion of the region. Serving as the main religion, Islam played a huge role in
shaping and directing all aspects of sedentary life, including irrigated agriculture and
water management. Thus, at the time that the Russians arrived in the region, Islam was
not only the main ideology, but also the main social regulator in the khanates.
Religion served to shape the feelings and individual relationships within a collective
framework, “providing loyalties similar^to those of ethnicity.”^^ Central Asians took

Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Islam and the Russian Empire, trans. Quintin Hoare (London: LB.
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much pride in their history and identity as the true “support of Islam,”^^* and despite
centuries of decline, Holdsworth considered Bukhara still the center of theological culture
in the nineteenth century.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the khanates were considered

very orthodox followers of Islam, and as such, strict followers of Shari’a}^^ Incidentally,
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, this pride and connection between identity and
Islam has been re-emerging in the Central Asian states, and this development has drawn
much attention and concern from Western interests.
Islam managed to create unique social and spiritual bonds among farmers,
tenants, and landholders.

Before discussing tenure outright, it is necessary to review

sacred law and its role as a social force in Islamic lands. SharVa literally means the path
to a watering place. Shari’a is the sacred law that instructs how one should conduct
oneself. It covers every aspect of life and every field of law: international relations,
constitutional powers, and administrative authority.

The sacred law is understood by

scholars to serve as the practical aspect of religious and social doctrine preached by
M u h a m m a d . T h e law is divine, and, as such, is thought of as being incapable of being
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deduced, let alone understood. In principle, owing its divine nature, Shari’a does not
respond to societal changes. Instead, it was Islamic society that was shaped by sacred
law.^^® However, Anderson points out that Shari’a was always melded to local customs
and traditions, and in this way the rigid theory of Shari’a was not applied in the Islamic
world, as the cultures had much ability to shape and influence how Shari’a was
interpreted and applied.

Gibb adds to this that although local customs were adapted to

Quranic law, Shari’a always had the last say.^^°
Concerning the nature of the Shari’a, it gave the people duties but not rights.
In this, the sacred law concerned itself with seemly and unseemly acts with the people
bound to act in a seemly way. Each Muslim had the duty to perform seemly acts, those in
accord with one’s peers. Thus by acting in a seemly manner, each Muslim behaved in a
way that was beneficial for the collective good. This is a key distinction in determining
how and why the Muslims of Transoxiana acted the way they did; the point of behaving
for the collective good will come up in all aspects of the water-management system. The
Russians, on the other hand, highlighted the oppressive nature of the khanates through
their use of Shari’a, without regards to its role in facilitating collective behavior.
Attempts by Soviet and Western scholars to interpret and appreciate the Shari’a
are riddled with problems and shortcomings. At the very base of these problems lies the
differences between how Occidentals and the Muslims view the world. Islam is theistic,
H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey (London: Oxford University Press,
1970), 61.
Anderson, "Law as Social Force in Islamic Culture and History," 17,
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and in being so attaches value to the divinity and sacredness of customs and laws.
Westerners, on the other hand, view and evaluate things in humanistic and materialistic
t erms. Cri t i ci zi ng SharVa because it restricted the rights of individual farmers, which
the Russians did, is lost upon Muslims who are not interested in personal rights so much
as living in accordance with the law and in harmony with their cohabitants.
SharVa, although in theory a constant, was different from place to place as each
location melded its own customs to the sacred law. Because of this, Shari *a and land
tenure had uniqueness based upon location, and this partly explains Barthold’s famous
quote that the political and cultural history of Muslim peoples cannot simply be found in
“the dogmas of Islam.”^^^
The differences between the Islamic theory of land tenure and the reality of land
tenure in the khanates also caused confusion for travelers to, and historians of, the
region.

For not only were Occidentals trying to appreciate Islamic law and theory,

they were also having to ignore the parts of sacred law that were ignored by local custom.
This led to many differences between what the travelers and historians have determined
to be the land-tenure system for the khanates. Thus the failure of travelers and historians
to appropriately connect Islamic theory with empirical observation serves as yet another
partial explication for the differences in the accounts of land tenure in Transoxiana.
Odat (customs and traditions) played a large role in distinguishing the tenure
system of the khanates from the system laid out in SharVa. The tenure system of Islam is
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largely based upon the Agrarian Law of Medina that predates Muhammad.

This

system of law, in tow with Islam, was brought to Transoxiana in 705 by al-Hadjdjadj.^^^
Persians would later take over the region from the Arabs, and as described already, the
Uzbeks would take over from them. Thus the khanates in the mid-nineteenth century had
a blend of Arabic and Persian features in government and law, in addition to the local
customs that the Uzbeks brought to the system.

Traditional Land Tenure in the Khanates
Reliable and consistent statistics, terms and definitions for land tenure in the
khanates simply do not exist. Thus, a clear and transparent window into how land was
held is not available. Despite all of the problems and obstacles to reconstructing the
traditional land tenure of the khanates, some interesting patterns emerge that offer insight
into how the land was worked and understood by the farmers. The land tenure found in
the khanates dates to the sixteenth century, after the Uzbeks first took over the oases.
The single largest contradiction seen in accounts of land tenure revolves around whether
private land existed. Strictly speaking, Shari’a does not allow for private land. Under
the scared law, all land is held by the khan, and farmers are merely “tenants.” The khan
holds the land for the good of the people, and, in theory, the land is lent to the farmers to
work and then pay taxes to the khan for access to the land. Thus, in this tax-based land
tenure, the farmer is thought of as a tenant. Despite the word tenant being prominently
used in accounts of the tenure system, tenant is a problematic term, for the word does not
175
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convey the rights that the farmers had with regards to the land. Land held by a tenant
could be held in perpetuity so long as taxes were paid and it was not abandoned. The
land could be sold or sown as the farmer saw fit, and inherited by his male children.
Based upon these rights, the tenants of the nineteenth century, although in theory not
private landholders, did hold land and not merely serve as tenants on the khan's land.
Russian accounts, however, stressed the theoretical absence of private property.
These accounts would later be used to justify the tsar taking over the lands once the
khanates were taken over by the Russians. Schuyler rebuts Russian categorization of
land tenure, considering it simplistic. According to Schuyler, there was no evidence of
communal ownership headed by the khan, and instead the tenure of land was “governed
theoretically by the same rules that prevail in all Mussulman countries, although in
practice perhaps changed by certain local conditions.”
To give an idea of who held the land, d’Encausse offers the follow percentages
that she took from Gafurov.

Gafurov estimated twelve percent of the land of Central

Asia to be personal holdings of the khans. Fifty-six percent of the land was classified as
land not in use, and held as state property. Twenty-five percent was vaqf{waqj) lands
held by a charitable trust. Only eight percent of the land was held by the general
population. Of these lands held by the general population, Eckert and Elwert assert that
because of Muslim inheritance laws, which stipulated that a father’s land be divided
amongst his sons, plots of land were traditionally small, and that great and powerful
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landholders were uncommon.

It is important to keep this in mind, as much of the

literature indicates the land was held by a few, powerful begs. Land held primarily by an
elite few, however, happened only after the introduction of cotton, and much interference
to the traditional land-tenure system.
Much attention was paid to the large amount of land not in use. Gafurov
estimated this to consist of fifty-six percent of the land. This was often pointed to as
evidence of the inefficient and decadent nature of the khanates, and one of the main
things that the Russians, and then the Soviets, tried to change when they came into
control of the region. The Russians and Soviets saw these empty lands as an untapped
commodity, and were interested in opening the lands for cotton p r o d u c t i o n . I n defense
of the khanates and their letting half of the land fallow, they limited agricultural activity
to the meadow soils of the region, avoiding the naturally saline s o i l s . T h e Soviets were
not so wise when they began their extensive development of the region’s lands, and this
has led to many of the current problems of salinization and decreasing yields.
Under SharVa, all land is held in trust by the khan, and is divided into two
classes: untilled territory (unfertile land) and arable land.^*^ The arable land, which only
constituted two percent

of Russian Turkistan, is then classified into two categories

based on how it is watered. The first category is called lalmi, and applies to lands located
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in the foothills that received their water solely from the spring and fall rains. Obi, on the
other hand, refers to lands situated in the valleys and relied upon irrigation for their crops.
Owing to the arid nature of Central Asia, the vast majority of the arable land was
classified as obi, and this was exemplified by the fact that all three khanates were based
in major valleys of the region. There is no exact figure given for the percentage of the
cultivated land that was irrigated, but Park estimates it to be around seventy-five
percent
Obi lands theoretically can be classified into four categories. These categories do
a fair job of explaining the tenure situation in the khanates. The four categories of land
were miriie (public domain), miurk (proprietary lands), amaliak (reclaimed lands), and
vo^(lands held by a charitable trust).

Miriie
Although in theory all lands belonged to the khan, miriie referred to all lands
under the direct control of the khan himself. These lands included the khan's personal
holdings, his cultivated fields, orchards, and palace gardens. It also included all
abandoned, uncultivated, and waste lands. Waste lands were called mevat. According to
SharVa, mevat can be turned into a private holding simply by someone who “vivifies the
land.”^*^ It is not clear though if this was allowed by the khans, and there is much debate
over this portion of miriie in the literature. This debate is more fully discussed under
amaliak lands. Much of the miriie lands were made up of lands that no longer were
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productive, and those lands whose owners had no inheritors when they died. Under
Muslim custom, all inheritances were to be divided amongst the male children, and when
there were no inheritors, the land returned to public domain.

MiuVk
MiuVk lands were the private holdings of the general public. MiuVk lands were at
the disposition of the holder, and were “the property in the most absolute manner of
private persons.”^*^ The land could be sold, bequeathed, given away or turned into
mortmain as the holder saw fit. D’Encausse describes most of these farms being
extremely small, on average between one and one-tenth and three and three-tenths
hectares.

Matley, on the other hand, refers to miuVk holdings averaging between six

and eight hectares.

No explanation is readily discernible for these widely differing

figures, other than the complexity of land tenure and the dearth of accurate information
on land holdings from this time.^^^ Despite this inconsistency, it is fair to conclude that
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farmers did have land, and enjoyed rights of ownership over this land, and that most
farmers did not have extensive holdings.
Of miul’k holdings, they were broken down into three classes based on taxes. The
first of these classes was miuVk-i ushri. On these lands, the holders paid a tax on the size
of their harvest. In theory, these are the lands that have been held in perpetuity since the
Arabs first conquered them.^^^ Accordingly, holders of these lands paid a tax of onetenth of the harvest to the government. Lands retained by the infidels at the time of the
conquest were called miuVk-i khiraj. The conquerors let the infidels retain their land and
faith, but charged them an increased tax on their harvest. The tax ratio for the harvest on
khiraj lands varies widely in the literature. Taxes ranged from between one-tenth to onehalf of the h a r v e s t . T h e third class of miul’k lands was hurri khalis. These were lands
sanctioned by the khan to be firee of taxes. These were the most sought-after lands, and
were given to only large landholders who had much power and sway in the political
system.

Unfortunately, not much information is given to explain the existence of these

lands. Schuyler simply refers to their existence, and questions whether they were created
by a legal fiction.
Despite the three classifications of miul’k lands, Schuyler contends that miul’k-i
ushri holdings did not actually exist in Central Asia. According to Schuyler, the private
holdings were in fact miul’k-i khiraj because the lands were never divided up by the
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conquerors.

Schuyler attributes this mistaken conception of there being miuVk-i ushri

to the Russians. Schuyler refers to legal scholars asserting the complete absence of
miurk-i ushri lands watered by the Syr Darya and Amu Darya, but this claim is not
repeated by more modem historians. In this question over the types of miuVk lands that
existed in the khanates, it is clear how theory and observations in the region often
clashed. Twentieth-century historians appear more apt to follow the more clearly defined
theoretical laws concerning land tenure, whereas Schuyler and Vambery^^* relied more
upon firsthand observations than the theory concerning Islamic land tenure.

Amaliak
Of the different types of land, a clear definition and understanding of amaliak is
the most difficult. To begin with, amaliak lands are not mentioned by either Vambery or
Skrine and Ross.^^^ Schuyler defines amaliak lands as those lands held by the khan, and
indicates that the taxes from these lands went straight to the khan and not to the treasury
of the beg. The begs were the leaders of the khanate’s provinces, and traditionally the
beg collected taxes on all miul’k lands, and then made an offering from the province to
the khan.^°° Schuyler, however, refers to a debate as to whether the money, which went
to the khan, was a tax or rent. Schuyler concludes that because the lands could be “sold,
given away, bequeathed, and turned into vaqfas freely as other lands, without any
recourse to the government,” they should be thought of, regardless of what theory might
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dictate, as property of the persons cultivating them.^°* In other words, the money paid
was a tax based upon the harvest and for all intents and purposes amaliak lands were
miuVky the only difference being to whom the tax was paid.
Pierce, on the other hand, defines amaliak as previously unirrigated land
reclaimed by working it. Under SharVa, once someone “revivified” a formerly unused
tract of land it became their property. Despite this property status. Pierce stated that
amaliak lands were taxed more heavily than miuVk holdings because the farmer was
paying for not only access to water but also to access the land. Pierce also, in direct
contradiction with Schuyler, states that amaliak land could not be transferred or turned
into a vaqf?^
Adding further to the confusion, d’Encausse refers to amaliak as all state land—
any land not in use,^®^ which would equate amaliak with miriie. These state lands were at
the complete discretion of the khan, and he could do with them what he willed. She
speaks of the khans often making gifts from amaliak lands to the begs. These gifts were
called tankvah^^ and were used more and more in the nineteenth century by the khans to
help shore up loyalty from the provinces and ensure a contribution of troops by the
begs?^^ Interestingly, according to d’Encausse, once the tankvah was given to the beg.
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he was free to administer the land however he saw A t/^ Thus, no taxes had to be given
to the khan. Despite the lack of a clear definition of amaliak, it is fair to conclude that
there were, again, rights of property enjoyed by those who worked these lands.

Vaqf
lands have a very clear theoretical definition in Islamic law. They are lands
held in trust with the yield going to beneficiaries.^^ Although the creation of a vaqf was
for charity, the purpose was often more self-serving than that. Under inheritance laws of
Islam, property was to be divided in an agnatic manner. This meant that miuVk land
would be divided and subdivided to each male heir and made smaller and smaller over
the generations. But by converting their holdings into vaqf, the land could remain
undivided through inheritance.^®* This tradition of converting property into charitable
trusts is based upon numerous hadiths—teachings of Muhammad. Hooker gives the
following example of the creation of a

based on the authority of Ibn ‘Umar:

“Umar had acquired land in Khaybar and came to the Prophet to consult him in
the matter saying: ‘O Messenger of God, I have acquired land in Khaybar which
is more precious to me than any property I have ever acquired.” He [Mu-hammad]
said: ‘If you want, make the land itself unalienable and give [the yield] away as
alms.” He (Ibn ‘Umar) said: Thereupon Umar gave it away as alms [in the
sense] that the land itself was not to be sold, inherited or donated. He gave it
away as alms for the poor, the relatives, the slaves, the djihad, the travelers and
the guests. And it will not be held against him who administers it if he consumes
some of it(s yield) in an Mpropriate manner or feeds a friend who does not enrich
himself by means of if.”^
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As alluded to in the above quotation, vaqfs could be used to support a variety of
organizations. Pierce, however, lists madrasas^ mosques and charities as the main
beneficiaries of v a q f s Schuyler describes the recipients of vaqfs as religious,
educational, and benevolent institutions.^^^ Each of the khanates had many large and
famous madrasas (religious schools) and mosques. Today these structures, such as the
Shir Dar madrasa in Samarqand, are famous historical structures maintained by the
government. Historically though, they were not supported by the khan, but through
vaqfs.
Pierce described four types of vaqfs. The first was the pure vaqf. These lands
were free from all taxes and obligations. In other words, the state had no power to tax or
control these lands. The next were conditional vaqfs. On these lands, only the portion of
the harvest allocated for charitable purposes was granted a tax free status. The rest of the
harvest was taxed. The third type of vaqf was the hereditary-property vaqf. These were
lands that were set up purely to allow children to continue to work the land outside of
Shari'a inheritance laws. Unfortunately, Pierce does not explain how taxes worked on
these lands, and what it took for a farmer to be able to change his miuVk into a hereditary
vaqf. The final type was the fictional vaqf. These lands were created by a landholder
who had an institution serve as the symbolic holder of the land for a small annual
allowance. The true land holder would then receive tax breaks and protection from
government seizure of land.^*^
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Most of the vaqfs were worked by sharecroppers who gave about half of the
harvest to the holder or beneficiary of the land. With the vaqfs accounting for nearly
twenty-five percent of all land holdings, this led to the prevalence of sharecropping in the
region. The Russians highlighted the feudal nature of sharecropping. To the Russians,
the large amount of land held in mortmain was a burden on the inhabitants and supported
a “large” and “fanatical clerical class.”^^^ Islam was a problem for the Russians in the
region. It united the khanates and was a cohesive force in the region.^^'* So, of course,
the Russians objected to the aspect of land tenure that supported the strong clerical class.
Unfortunately there are no references in the literature as to the differences in efficiency
and the health of farms between vaqfs and miuVks.
Despite the Russian bias against vaqfs, this is not to say that these types of lands
were not misused and taken advantage of. During the nineteenth century, more and more
lands were converted into vaqfs. Wheeler contends that the conversion of lands to vaqf
was most pronounced in Khiva,^^^ but Holdsworth asserts that no numbers were ever
given to support this, and considers it a generalization by the Soviets.^^^ Regardless, the
question of

lands being used as a way to avoid taxes by large landholders cannot be

discussed outside of the context of changes to the economy and land tenure in the region
as whole during the nineteenth century.
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Water Rights
Unfortunately, there is not nearly as much written on water rights in the khanates
as there is on tenure. Regardless, there are some clear patterns that can be discerned.
Under Shari’a, the use and ownership of water depends on the source of water.^*^ In the
khanates, the vast majority of water sources relied upon damming and the allocation of
the water at fixed times. The water was needed by all of the farmers at the same time,
and thus the resource was deemed exhaustible. For this reason, the ownership of water
was not permitted. Instead, as with the land, water was considered God’s gift and held in
trust by the khan for the good of the people.
The right to water was closely linked to the ownership of land,^’^ but water was
not an automatic right of ownership of land.^*^ The khan, as holder of all water for the
khanate, ensured that each farmer could receive an equitable share of the water,^^® but in
order for a farmer to receive water they had to contribute to the overall maintenance of
the irrigation system. Thus, farmers were expected to contribute supplies, animals, and
labor to the upkeep of the irrigation system. In this system, water rights were based
upon labor, which served to benefit the community at large, and not just the individual
farmer. Although, according to custom, water could not be bought or sold,^^^ those with
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power and wealth were able to secure extra water^^^ or exempt themselves from
contributing to the overall upkeep of the system 223
Schuyler offers an interesting insight to the connections between the right to land
and the right to water in regard to the location of property on the canal. Owners of land
at the head of a canal had the right to no more water than those at the end of the canal.
Recognizing that the administrative system could not accurately account for all water
delivered, and that rice can handle as much water as it can possibly receive, custom
forbid the planting of rice at the top of canals. The Russians considered such a restriction
to be a limit to the right of property. Schuyler contends that instead of this being a
limitation of right of property, it was instead a limitation of “right of enjoyment.” The
khan’s administration would not allow one’s right to an equitable portion of the water be
threatened by one’s desire to grow rice, and thus, rice was forbidden to be grown at the
head of canal for the good of the public

Effects of Cotton and the Emergence of a Cash Economy
Accounts of the land-tenure system of the khanates are complicated by the
amount of change that occurred in the region during the nineteenth century. The
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Russians at first did not deliberately try to alter land tenure in the region?^ At the same
time, Russian interest in encouraging cotton production in the region did greatly impact
traditional land tenure, amongst other things

Because of the American Civil War

diminishing the cotton crop, and thus the Russian's ability to import cotton, the Russians
began to look to Central Asia as a source for their cotton.^^’ The Russians never forced
the production of cotton, but instead encouraged lands to be sown with cotton through
tariffs and tax breaks. The Russians began to tax cotton imports while offering tax breaks
on cotton in Central Asia.^^* These policies had the desired effect. In 1886, only 13,200
ha were sown with cotton. By 1914, there were 597,200 ha.^^^ This tax policy,
combined with the Trans-Caspian Railroad reaching Samarqand by 1888,^^° precipitated
a switch in the region from a natural, self-reliant economy to a market-based one. 231

^ The Russians, although they viewed the locals as barbarians, did appreciate the value of the
traditional culture, and its interrelationship with the environment. Brower quotes a memo from the Tsar's
Ministry of Foreign affairs that complains of the General Governor of Turkistan of meddling in the
"conditions of life of people alien to us by their religion, language and history”. Despite how poorly the
Russians' efforts in Central Asia have been reviewed by both Soviet and Western scholars, the Russians did
appreciate the fact that the culture was adapted to and for its location, and because of this, despite how
backwards and primitive at times the Russians thought it, that they were best off to just let customary
practices continue. Daniel Brower, Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire (New York: Routledge
Curzon, 2003), 43.
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As capitalism became more pervasive in Central Asia, land ownership evolved
with land use and ownership becoming more concentrated.^^ This shift in the economy
served to displace many farmers. Growing cotton required a major investment in capital
and labor. Although Russian merchants and bankers were willing to lend money for local
farmers to grow cotton, usury was banned by Islam and the concept was not readily
understood by the rural farmers.^^^ Owing to poor borrowing practices and bad years
wiping out many of the local farmers, the traditional rural ownership of land quickly
dissipated as more and more Russians and other Europeans moved into the region,
forming large plantations. As traditional farmers were losing their farms in the new
market economy, nomads were losing their lands to the Russians. In 1893,200,000
Russians seized traditional nomadic pasture lands for agricultural production.^^"^ They
justified such actions through the Islamic law that all lands belonged to the khan, and the
tsar was the new khan.^^^ The Russians also assumed that the settling of the nomads
would be to their own benefit, as well as the region as a whole.^^
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Fanners who lost their land combined with the nomads who lost their pastures in
forming a new class of landless laborers—mard’i-kar—in Turkistan?^^ Many of these
landless laborers were put to work on the large cotton plantations. Not surprisingly
though, the combination of plantations being managed by colonizers with little
understanding of the land and fanning practices, and these plantations being worked by
former nomads with little knowledge of the traditional irrigation systems, led to low
yields and the abandonment of lands as canals clogged with silt and soils quickly became
salinized.^^* Under these conditions, many of the large plantations went bankrupt.^^^
Although many lost their land during this time, many others became rich. As
many traditional farmers faltered in the newly emerged cotton market, many local
farmers succeeded. As these farmers succeeded, they continued to buy more and more
land. This led to a shift in the size of farms, and these farms were worked by
sharecroppers.
Concentration of land and power did happen as the region took on a market
economy, but reports of the concentration of land and the gross inequities in landholdings
have certainly been exaggerated by the Soviets. The Soviets were interested in showing a
class discrepancy between a wealthy land owning elite and the landless laborers.

through religion and blood. This served to make the Turks' a more united people for the Russians to
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Thurman sums up Soviet representation of the inequities in landholding by saying the
Soviets’ motives in presenting the inequity, unlike their evidence, was clear.^^
Nevertheless, sharecropping did become a feature in Central Asia in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Although there were many variations to
sharecropping, the crop was always divided based upon who supplied what: land, water,
seed, draught animals, and labor. A common sharecropping scenario entailed the
landowner supplying animals, seed, and food. The land owner then retained between
three-fourths and four-fifths of the harvest. It was also during this time that shirkats
(collective societies) began to emerge. These consisted of a group of households sharing
draught animals and feeding themselves. These collective societies would then work the
land as sharecroppers, only receiving land, water, and seed from the land owner. The
shirkats would then retain one-half of the harvest.^"^^

Changes to Tenure under the Bolsheviks
After the October Revolution, Central Asia fell under the control of the Turkistan
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.^^^ At this time, Turkistan was in the midst of a
famine. The agricultural sector, which had shifted to cotton production under the tsar,
was no longer able to feed the local population. Central Asia was reliant on wheat
imports from the north, which during the revolution had stopped. At the same time, the
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Soviets were battling with the local Basmachi^^^ forces who rejected the Soviets as rulers
of Turkistan. The revolution, combined with the local conflicts, served to devastate the
,

region s economy.
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In an attempt to create a class warfare that would benefit the Bolsheviks, the
Tashkent government nationalized all lands in 1918.^"^^ The Bolsheviks had nationalized
lands elsewhere in the Republic, and these efforts were met with the peasants taking over
the land from powerful landowners. This did not happen in Turkistan. The Soviets, it
seems, had failed to appreciate the social and spiritual bonds created by Islam in the
region. According to Park, the religious, communal, and economic ties between the
landholders and the peasants prevented them from seizing the newly nationalized
lands.^"^ The reasons that the peasants failed to act as the Bolsheviks hoped they would
are complex, but at the heart of the matter lays the impact of Islam and sacred law. In
Turkistan, where SharVa dictated social organization, to take what was not yours was not
only socially forbidden but was a mandate from God.^'^^ Thus, seizing land that was not
yours was a sin to the Muslim peasants. This led to Europeans, and not the local
population, seizing most of the land in Central Asia after the revolution.^^*

The Basmachis were fighting for the right to retain private property and the preservation of
Shari’a. The fact that the Basmachis were fighting for the preservation of private property, here miul’k
lands, highlights the inaccuracy of the Russians who thirty years prior to the Basmachi uprising claimed
private property did not exist under the khans. For more detail see Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei
Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia (Reading, U.K.: Ithaca Press, 1994).
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The Bolsheviks, in order to both rid Central Asia of the large landholders that
developed with the introduction of cotton to the region and to maximize their control over
the farmers, wanted to “atomize” the rural units of land.^^® The Bolsheviks wanted to
break up all large land holdings. By doing so, they would disenfranchise the elites of the
region, and would also set the rural villages up to be quickly converted into the
collectivized farms that the Soviets believed would lead to increased agricultural
productivity.^^
The Soviets began to realize that control of the region—both politically and
economically—was not possible so long as the historical social ties of Islam and tenure
under the khanates remained. Land reform could only happen after the Bolsheviks drove
wedges among the peasants, mullahs and begs, and after the lateral ties among farmers,
the villages, and the tribes were broken.^^^ In 1922, all vaqfs were to be at the disposition
of the rural peasants and regulated by Soviet agrarian law."^^ The hope was to
undermine the financial support of Islam in the region, as well as pit the peasants against
the religious elite supported by the land trusts. At the same time, the Soviets also
dissolved all miuVk holdings.^^^ The intent was to slowly undermine the traditional
tenure system.

O'Neill, "Land and Water 'Reform' in the 1920s: Agrarian Revolution or Social Engineering?"
71.
Thurman, The "Command-Administrative System" in Cotton Farming in Uzbekistan 1920s to
Present, 10.
O'Neill, "Land and Water 'Reform' in the 1920s: Agrarian Revolution or Social Engineering?"
71; Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927, 330.
Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927, 333.
O'Neill, "Land and Water 'Reform' in the 1920s: Agrarian Revolution or Social Engineering? "
72.

76
In 1925, the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian
Communist Party adopted a decision to confiscate all land, cattle, and agricultural
implements. The goal was then to redistribute them to the peasants. Again, the peasants
did not cooperate, refusing to take property that was not theirs.^^'* So instead, the
Bolsheviks initiated land reform in stages. The Bolsheviks required all landholdings
greater than seven hectares of irrigated land to be confiscated.^^ The Bolsheviks used
educational programs to try to create favor for land seizures in the villages.^^^ They also
relied upon the secret police and the koschi, a Bolshevik organization that oversaw the
interests of local farmers, to use intimidation and coercion on any and all peasants who
did not actively support the seizure of lands by the state.^^^ As a final blow for Islam in
the region, in 1928 the religious courts and schools of Turkistan were officially closed.^^^
The intent of seizing the land was to increase the state’s power and control over
the region. Whereas cotton cultivation was encouraged under the tsar through economic
incentives, under the Bolsheviks it was coerced through administrative control. The
traditional system based upon Shari'a and odat, which saw the common good as the
intent of land tenure, was replaced by a land-tenure system inspired by political control
and an interest in cotton production. The ultimate result of the land reform was the state
owning all land and water rights, and the land ultimately being worked by either state
Polonskaya and Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia, 90.
Thurman, The "Command-Administrative System" in Cotton Farming in Uzbekistan 1920s to
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farms or kolhozes—collective farms. These farms were huge operations, normally
consisting of 3000 hectares that were worked by 1000 farmers.^^^ Collective farms were
producer cooperatives. The farm was assigned land in perpetuity, and then instructed
what to grow. The farm then sold its output to the state.^^ State farms were worked by
workers who received a wage. These farms were directed and operated by the goals of
the state, and the farmers received a wage for their efforts.^^^ The water was completely
controlled by the state, and use of water was not charged.
In addition to these large farms were quasi-private household plots of land. These
plots were worked by the family, and were private in the sense that the family was free to
choose the crops planted and to work the land themselves. Although these lands were
only about three percent of all arable land, they accounted for up to twenty-five percent
of the total agricultural output.^®^ The farmers had lost all their rights and privileges they
had under the traditional tenure system, as well as the social network that connected the
workers to the land and to one another. The operation and management of these farms
will be discussed in the following chapters.
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Land Tenure since Independence
Radical transformations of land tenure are rare, and Uzbekistan has experienced
such changes twice in the twentieth century—first with the October revolution, and then
with the collapse of the Soviet state?^^ The former Soviet states other than Uzbekistan
have reacted in a variety of ways in terms of reform since 1991, many in a not-socautious manner. States like Slovenia and Bulgaria have returned land to the owners of
the land prior to the revolution. Equally aggressive in pursuing reform, Albania and
Armenia have completely dismantled the land-tenure system of the Soviet era.^^ More
moderately, Russia and the Ukraine legalized private land to exist simultaneously with
state ownership. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan’s neighbor to the north, now recognizes the
private ownership of household plots.^^^ The GOU, on the other hand, has started down a
path of reform best described as “step by step.”^^
The GOU’s constitution, adopted in 1992, retained Soviet land policy in that all
land remains under state control.^^^ Although private land exists in theory in Uzbekistan,
the right to buy or sell land is forbidden.^^* This decision was rationalized by the state for
two reasons. The first was that the state wanted to avoid speculation on the land, and the
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land accumulating in the hands of the powerful. The second reason, offered by Karimov
himself, is that land in Uzbekistan is useless without water, and the water is a national
resource managed and delivered by the state.^^^ One other reason, though not offered by
the state, is that by continuing to control the land, the state retains power over the
peasants.^^® Much as the Soviets wanted to completely control the land in order to
facilitate the production of cotton, the same thing can safely be assumed of the GOU.
Despite the lack of private land, the right to land has slowly changed during the
time of the GOU. The primary land-tenure system of the Soviets has been transformed
into four forms of land rights: shareholding, the lease, the private farm, and the garden
plot. The sovkhozes—state farms—of the Soviet era have been phased out by the GOU,
with most converted into kolhozes. This transformation is clearly represented by the
increase in number of kolhozes during Uzbekistan’s first five years of independence. In
1991, Uzbekistan had 971 kolhozes and 1137 sovkhozes. By 1996, Uzbekistan had 1374
kolhozes and only fifty-five s o v k h o z e s .The kolhozes, however, in an attempt to give
more incentive to the farmers to improve efficiency, have been transformed. Most
kolhozes are operated by either shareholders or a shirkat. In the shareholding system,
shares are distributed to the workers of the farm. The workers are expected to pay for
these shares when they have the means to. Profits are then distributed to the shareholders
based upon how many shares they hold. Unfortunately, shareholders often feel that
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shares are worthless pieces of paper, and that the operations and management are the
same under the shareholder system as they were under the traditional kolhoz^^^
The shirkat is a lease system, where the chairman of the kolhoz leases land to the
members. Normally, these leases are one to five hectares in size, and vary in length of
time. Eckert and Elwert cormect the longer the lease to the greater the investment made
by the farmers to improve o p e r a t i o n s I t is unclear, though, how much this statement is
based upon observation and how much upon theory.
Private holdings consist of farm enterprises and the traditional household plot.^^"^
The farm enterprises consist of individuals holding land in leases of between ten and fifty
years that used to belong to kolhozes. These leases normally consist of lands between
three and five hectares.^^^ The land itself is free, but the farmer must pay for water.
Although these farmers are free to control operations and management as they see fit,
they are still reliant upon the kolhozes for their water, machinery, and inputs. To the
detriment of the success of the private farms, water goes first to the collective farms, and
then to the private farms. With water shortages common, this arrangement limits the
success of private farms.^^^ One more thing worth noting is that private farms are
allotted, in theory, to those who can prove that they are capable of running a private farm.
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But since the farms are allocated by the authorities of the kolhoz and local government,
cronyism plays a large part in who gets land and who does not?^*
The traditional household plot continues to play a major role in agriculture. Each
family is entitled to a personal plot of land to work. In 1992, rural dwellers were allotted
a quarter hectare of irrigated land for personal use. In 1997, these lands accounted for
fifteen percent of all arable land, up from three percent during Soviet rule.^^^ Most of
these holdings produce more than is needed by the family, and the excess is sold in the
local markets.^^ These holdings are thought of as quasi-private holdings where the
family is free to operate them as they see fit, but the land cannot be sold, and the family
must rely upon the state for water.
Despite the move toward more private holdings of land, the state still controls
water, and thus holds power over the land. The recent move to WUAs is a way to help
put more power in the hands of the farmers, but so long as crop prices are set by the state,
the substance of the land reform remains limited.

Conclusion
Unfortunately, there is no firm and definitive understanding of the land-tenure
system under the khanates prior to the arrival of the Russians. Even a full understanding
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of land tenure during Russian rule eludes us. The lack of a native record, combined with
foreigners’ limited exposure to the region, leaves us with only a partial view of the
distribution of land and water. Nevertheless, some interesting and important patterns do
emerge. Under the khanates, private property, in the sense that farmers had the ability to
work the land and sell it if they saw fit, did exist. The ability of the peasant farmer to
hold private land helped keep farmers invested in the operation of their farms, as well as
the health of the land and quality of the water. The Central Asian farmers of the
nineteenth century were not simple tenants without a vested interest in the land’s health
and productivity.
At the same time, Islam, which largely shaped not only the tenure system but also
was the main social regulator in the khanates, fostered a culture of water rights for all.
One way it did this was to limit farmers from practices that negatively restricted one’s
peers from their rights to land and water. SharVa, and its role in shaping how the farmers
viewed one another and their rights, was sadly misunderstood by the Russians. They saw
limits to what the peasant farmer was allowed to do on his land as limitations to their
private property. It must be remembered that Russians were colonialists and saw the land
as a commodity to be exploited. Thus, they viewed limitations with a very narrow frame
of reference. As such, the extent to which such limitations operated to keep the water and
land available for the good of all was not considered.
Although the land was not communal under the khanates, the property rights did
instill a sense of not only entitlement to one’s own land, but also the land of the others.
In this, Islam served to use social capital to help manage, operate, and maintain the
irrigation system and the agricultural economy that it supported. The management of the
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irrigation system, and the khanates as a whole, cannot be appreciated outside of the scope
of Islam, and thus religion will continue to be a focus in the next chapter.
SharVa, and the concept of the land being held for the common good, served to
ensure that water was available to all, as was land. In this, land as property not only
existed in the khanates, but existed in terms of a social relationship between the people
who worked the land. The land held value to and for the farmers, and they had reason to
try to maintain this value through investment and respect for each other.
Although the Russians never deliberately set out to overhaul traditional land
tenure, through their attempts to convert the region into a cotton producing one, they did,
in fact, completely change how land was viewed and owned (not to say anything about
how it was worked). The fragility of the traditional tenure system should not be
forgotten, nor its impact upon the health of agriculture and the life of the peasants.
Subsidies, tariffs, and usury managed to dispossess farmers of their lands, making them
landless laborers. The market economy effectively destroyed the long-evolved
connections and rights of the farmers to land. At the same time, the very lands that they
lost were not succeeding as cotton plantations.
Where the Russians feared to deliberately interfere with tenure, the Soviets did
not. They calculatingly set about to ‘reform’ land tenure. The goals of this reform are
questionable and much debated. Regardless, it is important to remember how difficult it
was for them to get the peasants to act as the Bolsheviks wanted them to. Islam served as
a major obstacle between the intent of the Bolsheviks and the local peasants. Land was
not seized by the peasants as the Bolsheviks had hoped, even though the tradition of the
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small, private farmer had already been banished from the landscape by the Russians. The
farmers still felt that taking what did not belong to one was wrong, and “reform” only
happened through much coercion, intimidation, and re-education programs. As the GOU
and the international community set about to reform the land yet again, it is important
that they heed the history lesson of the Bolsheviks in their efforts to do so.
The Bolsheviks, however, did succeed in their efforts to “reform” land. Water
and land both became state property, and farmers became workers on large, collective
farms. In this reform, the farmers became separated from the land, and lost their
connection to the land and water, as both were distributed in relation to the state’s interest
in the good of all. Although similar to the rhetoric that describes land under the khanates,
the effects were vastly different.
Currently, as the GOU continues to engineer land reform, it is important that the
needs and interests of the farmers themselves be considered, and not simply assumed.
Under the Bolsheviks, land was reformed to save the peasants from their patriarchal,
feudalistic system. Never mind that the farmers had little interest in such reform. Now,
as the state continues down the path of reform, it is important that the farmers are brought
into the discussion and not merely seen as a means (or hindrance) to successful reform.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CHANGES AND PERCEPTIONS TO THE MANAGEMENT
OF WATER IN UZBEKISTAN

The Aral Sea crisis is thought of as a water-shortage issue. Although technically
correct, thinking of Uzbekistan and the Aral Sea Basin as being water scarce is
misleading. Water scarcity is normally defined as when more than two thousand people
are sharing one million cubic meters of water.^®^ Yet Uzbekistan, the country with the
worst human to water ratio in Central Asia, has only 192 people per one million cubic
meters of water.^*^ This distinction exemplifies the role that human agency has played in
causing the current situation in the basin. Thus the current desiccation of the basin and
problems in the agricultural sector need to be understood as being anthropogenic in
origin. From such a vantage, it is important that the organization and management of the
irrigation system be considered. L. M. Cantor sums up the role humans play in an
irrigation system best when he said an irrigation system must be understood and
examined not only as a technical achievement, but also as an expression of “human
organization and its adaptation to the physical environment.”^*^
Unfortunately, historians and Soviet scholars have not given much credit to the
human organization of the water-management system or the leadership of the khans.
Instead, the traditional organization of water management has simply been viewed as
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despotic, inefficient, and backwards/^ This poor view of the native governments in the
region is typified by William Curtis when he wrote the restless natives of Bukhara were
“a great deal better off under the broad, tolerant policy of Russia than they [were] under
the non-progressive, narrow, and corrupt rule of the native khans.”^®^ There are two main
reasons for the disparaging view of water management in Central Asia. First, the
colonials viewed the local traditions and knowledge of the region as being poor, barbaric,
and crude.^®^ Colonial arrogance was exacerbated by political interests when the Soviets
took power. Similar to what was seen with regard to land tenure, Soviet policy was to
downplay any and all achievements of the Central Asians prior to the revolution.^*^ The
Soviets never recorded or acknowledged the positive aspects of water management. At
the same time, what the Soviets did acknowledge, they tried to cast in the most negative
light possible to facilitate the goals of the Bolshevik Revolution. This involved
describing the khans as despots, and the Soviets, themselves, as liberators. As the Soviets
saw it, they swooped in and saved the local population from the inefficient and cruel
rulers of the land.^^*
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Unfortunately, during much of the twentieth century European and American
attempts to appraise water management in Central Asia were largely shaped by
Wittfogel’s controversial, and now dated, theory of the hydraulic society. As an
historian, Wittfogel noticed that arid landscapes led to the development of large,
centralized states. In this linear pattern, Wittfogel noticed a nexus between irrigation,
centralization, and despotism.^®^ This observation led to the hypothesis that as irrigation
technologies increase and their systems expand, they require strong and centralized
operations. The hydraulic theory states that in arid environments, such as Central Asia,
irrigation is limited by the organization of labor, and whoever manages to control the
labor and thus water will have complete control of the region.^^ Hence, centralized
control in arid regions produces totalitarian regimes that operate through a bureaucracy of
secular and religious specialists."^^ Although the hydraulic theory has been attacked for
its simplistic and linear conclusions between the development of irrigation systems and a
totalitarian state, its impact remains in the assumptions and attitudes of scholars toward
water management in the region.^^^
The Soviet bias combined with Wittfogel’s legacy has limited understandings of
the nature of water management in the khanates. Rivaling the controversy over the
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nature and extent of property rights seen in chapter three, the general and unfortunately
unfair assumption is that the pre-Soviet khanates were indeed despotic, hydraulic
societies.^^^ Soviet and Western historians alike have contended that operations,
maintenance, and distribution of water were accomplished by the khan*s total and
“despotic” power.^^^ From such a view, there was no social capital involved in the
successful operation of the irrigation system. Instead, water management and the
economy survived only through the totalitarian control of the khans, all at the expense of
the farmers. More recent studies,^^^ however, have suggested that water management in
the khanates was a clever and intricate system that allowed for the successful operation of
the systems.^^
In order to more fully understand the irrigation systems of Central Asia, this
chapter examines the management of the systems, as well as the structure and nature of
the governments at that time. Following this, the subsequent changes that took place
under the Russians and Soviets are also explored. The hope is to break free from the
Soviet and Wittfogel-inspired understandings of the khanates in regards to irrigation, and
to offer a more accurate understanding of how the irrigation systems were managed.
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The Administration and Power of the Khan
To better frame the nature and power of the water management system, it is
necessary to look at the administration of the khanates themselves. Whereas the land
tenure was more distinctly Arabic, the administration of Transoxiana was Perso-Arabic in
nature. The system traces back to the eighth century Abbasid Caliphate,^^^ but was
altered by Persia’s control of the region after the Arabs.^^® Each khanate was run by the
khan. Traditionally, the khan was elected, a part of the Uzbeks’ nomadic legacy, but by
the nineteenth century this tradition had disappeared.^^ The khan served as the supreme
secular and religious leader. As with most Islamic states, the separation between the
secular and the sacred was minimal, and thus not only did the khan represent the people’s
as well as Allah’s interest, but the very structure of the state was intertwined with
religious authority. This was clearly seen by the majority of government posts being held
by ulamas—well educated religious scholars.^^
Because they ruled as both a secular and religious leader, the khans are normally
viewed as despots who were responsible to no one.^°' Although the khan was an
autocratic leader, he did not rule with an all-powerful hand.^^ Islam as well as odat
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(customs) served to check the powers of the khan. Shari'a was divine and beyond
question.^®^ Although this served to give the khan a seemingly unquestionable reign over
his domain, sacred law also instilled prescriptions to his duties and powers as head of the
state.^ Just as Shari'a served to limit the rights of individuals for the social organism,
it also served to ensure that the khan acted with the best interests of the community. In
this, Islam created a trust between the khan and the people. The people would trust the
khan and the khan would trust in Allah’s w isdom .^ Through religion, the Uzbeks
related to the leader with a reciprocal set of obligations. Edward Allworth offers the
following quote from Al-Ghazali as an example of how Islamic prescriptions limited the
powers of the khan: “One day of just rule by an equitable Sultan is more méritons then
sixty (or seventy) years of continual worship.”^^^
In addition to the limits instilled by Islam, Allworth considered the khan to be a
totalitarian ruler whose powers were ameliorated by traditional qualities.^®*
Traditionally, the khan served as a ruler-scholar to his people. In this, the khan was
expected not only to be learned in the ways of Allah, but to also be learned in the oral and
written traditions of strong leadership. Leaders such as Alexander, Anushrman, and
Amir Temur shaped the way the khan understood his power. From these leaders.
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traditional codes and princely values set prescriptions and morals to guide leadership. At
the heart of these values were justice and fairness as exemplified in the following quote
attributed to the most famous of all Uzbek leaders, Amir Temur: “It is necessary to the
king that he adheres to justice in all his actions.”^
Despite the ameliorating influence of both Islam and odat, the khans still retained
strong control over their domains. The leader of Kokand, for instance, was described as a
complete tyrant whose ability to hold on to power was only possible through the presence
of Russian t r o o p s / W h e n discussing the power and rule of the khans, it is important to
acknowledge that this was a time of flux and change in the region. So just as traditional
qualities in the region such as the economy were changing, so too might have the use of
power by the khans. Still, the traditional view of the khans as despots without
mentioning the role of religion, customs and obligations needs to be questioned, as does
the overall view of the khanates as being highly centralized operations under the khan’s
control. As will be seen later in this chapter, the khanates were large territories through
which communications and authority traveled slowly. Thus the khanates were not as
centralized and despotic as often assumed. This will be seen in descriptions of the
fractured nature of the tax system, and the authority of the local provincial leaders and
water managers.
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Hierarchy of the Administration
With water being held in trust by the khan, water management was officially part
of the khan's administration. The government in the khanates was a mix between a
representative, democratic system where power flowed in an upward direction, and a
totalitarian system where power was seated in the khan and used to run the state.^^^
Centralization was built upon a system to regulate and deliver taxes from the farmers to
the khan.^^^ In return, the khan ensured the health of the land and water, as well as
supply protection from attacks. This system was extremely hierarchal in nature with the
khan, of course sitting at the top.
The khan served as the supreme leader of the state, but his actual involvement in
the day to day operations appears to have been hmited. Under the khan was the qushbegi (chief minister), who was in charge of overseeing the operations of the state.^^^ The
khanates were divided into regions, viloyats, and run by the hakim. When a new viloyat
was captured, the khan always appointed a new viloyat who would ensure that his
interests and authority were respected.^How much authority and independence the
hakims had is not clear. According to d’Encausse, the amount of autonomy in the
viloyats was inversely related to the region’s distance from the khan.^^^ For instance, the
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smallest of all the khanates was Khiva, and accordingly, Khiva was the most centralized
of the khanates with the viloyats having little autonomy/^^ Interestingly, Mary
Holdsworth asserts that many viloyats—she offers Shahribsabz as an example—were
added to Bukhara without being fully implemented. Such viloyats did not regularly
contribute either taxes or troops to the khanate, but would instead occasionally give gifts
to the khan. She goes on to suggest that the khan would send clergy to such peripheral
viloyats to make capital out of the religious pre-eminence of Bukhara.^
Viloyats were then divided into tumens. In Kokand, tumens were also called
begliks, but the difference between the two appears to have been in name only name.^^^
The tumens were run by a beg who was appointed by the khan.^^^ The begs were chosen
from the local ruling family to help ensure the assuagement of the people.^^^ The beg had
to contribute troops to the khan's army as well as ensure the collection and delivery of
taxes to the khan.^^* In this sense, the beg served as the chief tax collector for the tumen,
and was responsible for the tax money reaching the hakim. The independence of the
tumens is not clearly understood, but as with the viloyats themselves, it appears the
further from the khan, the more independent the beg. O. Olufsen, however, makes a
much stronger statement about the independence of the beg. He purports that the begs
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were allowed to operate independently so long as the taxes were collected and reached
the khan.^^^
The tumens were then divided into amlakdarstvas. These areas served
simultaneously as tax collecting and water administrative districts/^^ The amlakdarstva
was headed by the amlakdar who was appointed by the beg. The amlakdar was in charge
of the actual collecting of taxes, and then delivering the money to the beg.
Amlakdarstvas were then divided into qishlaqs (villages). Qishlaqs were directed by an
elected elder called the aqsaqal?^^ Villages were normally grouped together and headed
by a min-boshi?^^ The collection of villages often served as the mouth piece for the
individual aqsaqals, who in turned represented the villagers.^^^
This administrative hierarchy was similar in all three khanates. The only real
deviation from this structure was in Khiva, which was much more centralized and
regimented than the other two khanates. Seymour Becker contends that the size of the
khanate was the main variable in the amount of centralization.^^^ Khiva, the smallest of
the three khanates, was the most centralized. Although it is worth pointing out that Khiva
was different than the other khanates in terms of the large amount of gift lands, tankvah,
given. Geoffrey Wheeler suggests that nearly half of all lands in the khanate were given
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as gifts to the begs?^ The large portion of the lands remaining directly in the control of
the begs served both to increase the begs' power and to win their loyalty to the khan.
Bukhara, although the largest of the khanates, was considered a more centralized state
than Kokand.^^^ This can be attributed to the khan of Bukhara, NasruUah, making great
strides to increase institutional cohesion in the nineteenth century.
Although differences and discrepancies to the structure of the khanates exist,
some clear patterns can be seen. The khan did not have total control or authority over the
hakims or begs. To the contrary, it seems in many places that the khan’s influence was
subservient to provincial authority. It appears that these provincial officials were left to
act as they pleased so long as the flow of money and troops to the capital continued. In
this, provincial power controlled much of the operations of the state. The structure of the
government was based upon the collection and delivery of taxes. Thus in order to more
fully comprehend not only the administration but also the land tenure and the farmers’
interests in the successful operation of irrigated agriculture in the khanates, the next
section briefly reviews taxes in the khanates.

Land and Water Taxes in the Khanates
Taxes in the khanates consisted of two main types: the zekat, a tax on trade, and
taxes deriving from the use of land and water. The traditional land-tenure system of
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Transoxiana offered a mechanism for the taxing of agriculture. Lands and water were
held in trust by the khan, who then “leased” the lands to the farmers. In return, the
farmers paid taxes on the land and water and performed labor on the irrigation system in
return. Taxes were levied based upon the amount of water used and the size of the
harvest. With the bulk of the state’s wealth deriving fix>m these t a x e s , t h e khan was
interested and invested in the holding and use of the lands by the farmers. This interest is
clearly seen by the entire structure and centralization of the state being based upon the
collection of taxes. At the same time, by connecting taxes to the use of land and water,
the traditional system—contrary to the view of the taxes solely being a burden to the
farmers^^^—served to increase efficiency, as the farmers felt invested to minimize their
use of inputs.
Of the land taxes, there were two kinds: the haradj and the tanap. The haradj tax
was a proportional tax on the yield of the harvest. According to Michael Thurman, the
proportional tax system was used because of the varying levels of soil and water quality
to which the different farmers had access.^^^ There is much confusion over what this
proportion was. Part of this confusion derives from the lack of a clear understanding of
the land tenure system. Some historians suggest that the ratio of the haradj depended on
what type of miul’k land the harvest was coming from, khiraj or ushri (lands held by non
believers) with the ratio being higher on the ushri holdings.^^^ Schuyler, however.
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contends that all miuVk lands in Turkistan were ushri holdings, as the conquerors never
retained property in the region. Regardless, harvests were taxed between one-tenth and
one-half.^^^ Although the confusion over the different types of land holdings in the
region partially explains the discrepancy in the ratios of the proportional land tax, the
level of provincial authority and regional differences also serves to explain the varying
figures.
The taxes for all lands were not, however, based upon a proportion of the harvest.
On lands where it was difficult or inappropriate to estimate a harvest—such as orchards,
meadows and gardens—a mudazer (fixed tax) was levied.^^^ This fixed tax was based
upon the amount of land, the tanap, and was often simply referred to as the tanap tax.
The tanap varied in size across Central Asia from between two-fifths and one and onequarter of an acre.^^^ Schuyler contends that the tanap tax varied from forty kopeks to
three rubles and sixty kopeks per tanapP^ Thurman claims that the exact rate of the
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tanap tax depended upon the type of land and what was grown on it, with orchards and
vineyards taxed the highest and cotton and alfalfa taxed the lowest?^^
In addition to the land tax, farmers paid taxes and contributed labor based upon
the amount of water that they used. The tax was called the kosh pul. In theory, it was
supposed to be used solely for financing the construction and maintenance of canals, but
Schuyler suggests that the money also began to be used for other purposes during the
nineteenth c e n t u r y E s t i m a t e s ^ were made on how much water a farmer used, and
taxes were then accordingly levied.^"^^ Not only were farmers expected to contribute
financially to the irrigation system, they were also expected to perform upkeep and
maintenance on the irrigation system in order to gain access to water. Many considered
the corvee to be forced labor.^^^ Viewing the need to perform upkeep on the system as
forced labor, however, misses the connection between the right to water and the
contribution to the upkeep of the system. The annual corvée produced exclusivity to the
rights of water, in that only those who helped maintain the system could receive benefits
from it. Considering such an arrangement as forced labor is not only unfair to the
organization of the irrigation system and water rights in the khanates, it undermines the
strengths of the common property system put in place by the khans.
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The above taxes, as well as the corvée, were prescribed by the khan. The
structure of the state was set up to ensure that taxes were collected and delivered to the
khan. Schuyler describes the collection of taxes for Bukhara as follows: The
amaklakdar were serkers. These were the officers who collected the taxes. Under the
serkers were scribes and land measurers who inspected fields during the summer and
collected the haradj on the threshing floor come the harvest. The tax collectors were paid
directly from the taxes collected. Schuyler estimates that about one-tenth of all taxes
collected were used to pay for the tax collecting process. The taxes then flowed from the
serkers to the amakladar to the beg to the hakim^ and finally reached the khan.^"*^
Developed over many centuries, this system of taxing harvests and water use was
well adapted for the soils and conditions of Transoxiana. Taxes on the harvests
encouraged the farmers to make the most of the land that they had. At the same time,
taxing water use encouraged the farmers to maximize the efficiency of the water that they
used, and tying water rights to the corvée created a sense of exclusivity. With the
distribution of water linked to responsibilities, the farmers were invested to use the water
appropriately, and in this the taxes helped ensure that the resource was successfully
managed. One other thing about the traditional tax system is that, according to Thurman,
the farmers understood the system, knew what was expected from them, and knew how
they could behave so as to conserve and maximize the use of inputs such as water.^'^
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This is not to say that the tax system did not have its weaknesses. Owing to the
provincial authority, it appears that taxes could be raised and lowered as the officials saw
fit. Also, corruption was rampant. Schuyler states that bribery was common, with the
rich able to bribe officials to avoid paying taxes^^—and this says nothing of the fictional
vaqfs chartered as a way to avoid paying taxes. This corruption led to the taxes being
collected by village authorities under the Russians, which led to an improvement. In this
particular example, it is clear how the village, with its network of connections and trust,
permitted a more just collection of taxes. Balancing these abuses of the tax system was
the tradition of lessening or forgiving taxes during bad spells. Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn
Ja'far Narshakhi wrote that taxes were not collected from lands that were either inundated
or ruined by water.^'^ This traditional practice in the region continued into the nineteenth
century. Mordvinov recounts how farmers who experienced total crop failure were
excused from taxes, while those who suffered from poor yields were taxed at a lower

rate.^'

Water Management in the Khanates
As discussed in the previous chapter, the farmers were able to posses land and
work it, but under Shari*a water was considered to be God’s gift and could not be owned
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or controlled by a private individual. Water was instead under the dominion of the khan,
who held the water in trust for the people. The khan had the final say on how water was
managed and distributed, and served as the final decision maker in all disputes and
conflicts. Despite this power, the khan was largely not involved with the normal
operations and maintenance of water. This was handled by a special branch of the state.
For instance, Bukhara had a secretary for the Irrigation Department.^"^ It should be
noted, however, that owing to the arid landscape and necessity of irrigation for
agricultural production, the khan had an incentive to make sure that the irrigation system
operated in a fair and effective manner in order to ensure a bountiful harvest and the
subsequent payment of taxes. At the same time, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the
khan did not have a “boundless tyranny,” and thus he had to reconcile his interests in
receiving taxes from the harvests with those of the f a r m e r s . T h i s was accomplished
through the clever management of water, which ensured the rights of the collective good
without sacrificing individual involvement in the process.
The management of water resources for the collective good was not merely an
empty expression in the khanates. Tied with the land rights, each farmer was guaranteed
an equitable share of the water. As seen in Bukhara, the equitable distribution of water
was conducted at the watershed level. The Zeravshan Valley, which made up the bulk of
the Bukharan Khanate, had over eighty-five main canals that extended over 1570 miles in
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the mid-nineteenth c e n t u r y T h i s length did not include second or third-order canals.
Despite the enormity of the system, under the khan the entire valley was administered to
ensure that water was available for the whole valley, and not just for those at the head of
the valley. According to Schuyler, this involved a system of classifying the river as high,
low or “middling.” Water in the river was monitored, and when the river was middling,
dams were put in place to ensure that water would reach the lower end of the valley in the
spring and autumn when water was both at its lowest and most precious.^^*
The above example does an excellent job of showing how water was managed on
a watershed basis, and in this, was a complex system. Brian Spooner defines a complex
irrigation system as one where the engineering and management of the system is beyond
the capabilities of individuals or small groups of f a r m e r s . T h e management of
irrigation under the khans was stratified, with centralized decisions made for the good of
the khanate (as seen with monitoring water levels at the scale of the watershed). As will
be seen in the next chapter, however, the technologies employed in the khanates were not
overly advanced, but were well suited for the local conditions. The same can be said for
the management. The management used in the khanates was based upon long standing
customs and “folk” knowledge. This system allowed for site-specific knowledge to be
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employed by the farmers, while the state ensured that the rights of the collective good
were protected.^^^
Whereas the structure of the state itself is well documented, detailed accounts of
the structure and duties of the water management organization prior to the arrival of the
Russians are not abundant. Thurman, however, has made a detailed examination of
Russian and Soviet records in order to offer insight into water management in Kokand.
Olufsen, at the same time, gives a fair account of water management in Bukhara. What
follows is a synopsis of Thurman’s findings for Kokand. This synopsis is intermittently
interspersed with differences between water management in Kokand and Bukhara.
With the khan serving as the steward of water rights for Allah, the irrigation
system was divided into tumens/begliks based upon “local water sources and natural
streams.”^^^ In this arrangement, each tumen consisted of a group of villages that shared
a source of water and system of canals and diversions that distributed water to the
different villages. At the tumen level, the irrigation system was managed by the mirab
bashi, which loosely translates to “chief water prince.” It seems sometimes that the
mirab bashi was also referred to as the ariq aqsaqal, or canal elder. The mirab bashi
normally lived at the head of the canal supplying water to the beglik. The mirab bashi
was in charge of the capture of the water for the first order canal, and the allocation of
water to the secondary canals. He also supervised the maintenance and construction of
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the main canals/^^ Under the mirab bashi served an assortment of junior officials. At
times, the mirab bashi also served as the head tax collector in addition to managing the
region’s irrigation system.
The management of the irrigation system at the regional level was based upon
custom and tradidon.^^^ In this, it appears that the khanate made few demands from the
top with regard to how the system was operated at the local level. The local nature of the
management of the system was reinforced by the fact that the mirab bashi was elected by
the junior administrators of the beglik. This allowed for most of the mirab bashis to
come from the ranks of the local mirabs—water managers at the village level. In
addition to managing the main canals of the tumen, the mirab bashis also provided the
interface between the state and the water users. The mirab bashi could be sanctioned by
the beg if he failed to appease either the wishes of the farmers beneath him or the beg or
khan above him. In this, the mirab bashi had to strike a balance between his clientele—
the water users—at the regional level and the khan at the state level.^^^ Increasing their
power in the management system, farmers paid the mirab bashi according to how well
they felt the elder was doing. This provided great incentive for the mirab bashi to
distribute the water efficiently and fairly at the regional level.
The above statement that the mirab bashi was elected is not without
disagreement. Mordvinov claims the mirab bashi was appointed by either the hakim or
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beg^ not elected/^^ Olufsen’s account also differs. He reports that the mirab bashis of
Bukhara were appointed by the khan himself.^^^ However, Thurman states that
Mordinov’s claim of the mirab bashi being appointed is contradicted by all other
accounts. Thurman takes a conciliatory stance between the two views. He suggests that
most likely the farmers and junior administrators in the tumen, as well as the beg, had a
role in the decision process.^^ The farmers were allowed to vote and express who they
thought should be the mirab bashi, but the beg made the final decision. Although such a
consultative process is logical, Thurman does not explain why Russians and Soviets, who
were so invested in showing the worst side of water management in the khanates, would
nearly unanimously interpret such a process to be a democratic one. It contradicts their
view of the traditional system being despotic. It seems that they would have chosen to
focus on the supposed tyranny of the begs over all aspects of the farmers lives.
At the secondary-canal level, the water was managed by the mirab. The mirab
lived within the area of his jurisdiction. The mirab supposedly knew “his district in
minute detail,” and served to manage construction, maintenance, and operations of his
d i s t r i c t . H e was voted into office by the farmers under him. The mirab also served as
the interface between the farmers, whom he knew well, and the mirab bashi above him.
Not only did the mirab serve as the mouthpiece of the water users, the water users were
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also his clientele. Same as with the mirab bashi above him, the mirab was paid by the
farmers, thus giving the water users some leverage in how the system was managed.^®^
Beneath the mirab were the villages themselves, who received their water from
distributary canals. Up to ten villages could be fed by one distributary canal.^^^ Each
village was headed by an aqsaqal (elder). The village elder served to represent the
interests of the village. There were two types of organizations associated with the
villages: In one, villages pooled their labor resources in order to maximize their
resources and profits. This association of villages was called a ketmen^ and acted as a
WUA, and was headed by one of the aqsaqals. This leader was the ellik bashi (leader of
fifty), and both served to represent the interests of the villages to the mirab, as well as
oversee the construction, maintenance, and operations at the village level. In the ketmen,
decisions were made by the ellik bashi, but only after consultation with the elders. Also,
the farmers often met and voted on decisions. In the second organization, within the
villages, tops—small collections of farmers—were formed to pool resources. The tops
were normally based on familial ties, and they would often maintain intra-farm canals
collectively.^^
In terms of conflict resolution over water issues, the mirab bashi made the
decisions for the khan. This power was not without a check. Olufsen states that when
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there were doubts or concerns over water rights the farmers would assemble with the
mirab bashi, and the farmers and the official would “mutually” settle the affair
Despite the clear picture presented by Thurman, many questions concerning the
nature of water management still exist. According to Olufsen, the mirab bashi, as with
all positions of power, did not actually do much. Instead, the mahrem, serving under the
mirab bashi, actually conducted the day to day operations and oversaw the irrigation
system.^^ It is difficult to determine how accurate or applicable such a statement is, but
most likely there is some truth to the statement in that in some tumens the officials did
little work, while in others this was not the case. One other thing Olufsen mentioned was
the selling of surplus water. He states that after the water was distributed the official had
the light to sell the surplus at a fixed price.^^^ While others^^* make mention of bribes
being paid and power being used to secure excess water, the selling of water by the
management was not seen in any other report. Unfortunately, the role and duties of
junior officials is not as clearly laid out as one might wish. This limits present
assessments of the actual operation of the water-management system. Despite the lack of
a thorough discussion of junior officials, Williams relates the lack of junior officials
during Russian rule to the inequitable allocation of water. Those with power took the
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water without repercussions (1967,44). Williams also mentions the lack of the
mechanisms that traditionally existed to resolve water disputes during the Russian rule.^^^
Thurman makes an interesting comment on the role that water scarcity played in
the Kokand Khanate. According to Thurman, regions in the khanate where water was
scarce had greater social cohesion and cooperation. He goes on to state that it seems the
farmers recognized that cooperation and group management brought greater returns to the
community than competition for scarce water.^’° Where water was abundant, such strong
social cohesion was not necessary and thus not found. To further his point, Thurman
quotes A. F. von Middendorf as saying the indigenous water management represented an
“unexpected example” of “successful self-administration.”^^' Although this is a
fascinating and powerful observation on the nature of water management in Kokand, it is
a bit suspicious owing to how closely it follows common-property theory. In commonproperty theory, competition for scarce water is displaced by “compliance in that each
irrigator cooperates by complying with the internal rules of water allocation among
competing interests. Farmers cooperate for the simple reason that in the absence of this
shared structure of rights and duties there would be a n a r c h y I t is difficult to
accurately gauge how much Thurman is simply taking modem theory and attributing
such practices to the farmers of Central Asia.
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Still, there are a few key aspects of this managerial organization that need to be
highlighted. First and most important was that elites within the system came from the
communities that they served. In this, local traditions and customs, both in terms of
management and O&M, were retained. This also undermines the simplistic view of
water management in the khanates as being despotic; there was much local autonomy to
water management. At the same time, with the elites coming from within the local
communities, this minimized the gap in the knowledge and understanding of the
irrigation system between the farmers who worked the fields and maintained the
irrigation system and the mirab bashi and mirabs managing the system.
Although the managerial system had a distinct and hierarchal nature, the system
allowed for communications to flow easily in both top-down and bottom-up directions.
Water users had a say in the management and maintenance of the irrigation system, and
were able to influence the managers through complaints and by withholding payment.
Succession to elite roles was not overly restricted and had a democratic component. This
fostered a sense of belonging and trust. Finally, exclusivity—only those who contributed
to the good of the system received benefits—helped establish horizontal connections
between farmers. Farmers and villages would come together to minimize their costs, and
in doing so established lateral ties. This allowed for increased investment in the
irrigation system itself, and an incentive for the members to behave in a way that was for
the good of the community.^^^
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Redrawing the Boundaries to Water Management under the Soviets
When the Soviets took over the region, they had the same plans as the Russians
did for Central Asia; they wanted it to become a cotton monoculture to secure
independence from foreign markets. This desire for increased cotton production in the
region drove them to completely change the landscape—to expand the irrigation system
and irrigate the deserts and steppes of the region. Concerning the intentions of the
Soviets with regard to Central Asia after the revolution, W. P. Coates and Zelda K.
Coates offer the following observation: “All the scientists and Ministers whom we
interviewed in Central Asian Republics answered with an emphatic ‘yes’, the desert as
such is doomed.”^^"^ In this quote, the dramatic changes to the water-management system
are captured in two different yet pivotal ways. First, water management, linked with the
intentions for the development of the region, became controlled by the Soviet scientists
and politicians, displacing the farmers and mirabs who traditionally managed the system.
Secondly, the system was to become larger, more centralized, and controlled by the
engineers. These changes saw the knowledge of the farmers who traditionally oversaw
management being replaced by the intentions of the state.
In order to more fully comprehend the changes to water management under Soviet
control, it is necessary to briefly examine the change in culture and goals to resource
management under the Soviets. Soviet natural resource management was driven by a
philosophy of resource exploitation. The Soviets thought that the peripheral and
underdeveloped regions, such as Uzbekistan, could and should be developed by
exploiting their natural resources.^^^ The region’s natural capital was assumed to be
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inexhaustible, and the costs of pollution were underestimated.^’^ This natural capital was
to be transformed and used for developments in physical and human capital. In this
manner, the soils and waters of Central Asia were the means by which the Central Asians
would acquire a more prosperous life (not to mention the way that Soviets would supply
cheap cotton for its industries in the north). The ecological and social costs to developing
these resources were therefore not considered. In fairness to Soviet policies, however,
education and standards of living in the Central Asian republics did improve under the
Soviets.
From such a view of resource exploitation for the benefit of the region, the
Soviets wanted to expand the irrigation system to increase cotton production. Prior to
any substantial changes to the irrigation system, however, the Bolsheviks first overhauled
the traditional water-management regime, which they considered to be cruel and
barbaric.^” Land and water became the property of the state. In 1923, the control and
maintenance of the irrigation system was handed over to the Central Asiatic Water
Department. The traditional management of water resources defined by local,
hydrological boundaries gave way to a large-scale, centralized management system.^’*
Water-management boundaries were no longer defined by watersheds, as they had been
traditionally. Instead, the boundaries were based upon the arbitrary boundaries of the
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new Central Asian states, which many have felt were based more upon a desire to divide
the region in order to keep it weak.^’^ In redrawing the boundaries for management,
oversight of the water resources was officially moved from the villages where the water
was used to Tashkent.
Later, water management shifted again to Moscow. The maintenance of the
system along with the control and distribution of water fell under the Regional
Directorates of the Ministry of Land Reclamation (MLRWM). The MLRWM sat at the
top of a complex and hierarchal management system, with numerous departments
operating under the ministry. Sarah O’Hara and Tim Hannan comment that this complex
system led to a very regimented system of communication. They describe departments
with overlapping duties in water management. Despite operating out of the same
building, they would not talk directly to one another, but instead through Moscow. This
led to not only a lack of discourse regarding what needed to be done, but affirmed
Moscow’s role as the principal decision-maker. All communications and decisions were
filtered and controlled by technocrats and politicians thousands of miles from the canals
and farms.
In this major shift from a more organic management system with the farmers and
officials directly interacting to the strictly regimented and hierarchal system of the
Soviets, knowledge and attitudes toward management and water resources also shifted.
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Traditionally, irrigation officials relied upon site-specific knowledge to ensure that the
farmers received the water they needed. Under the Soviets, with the power transferred
away from the villages to Moscow, and from the farmers to the technocrats, irrigation
officials made decisions based upon nomothetic understandings of water management.^®*
The farmers’ and local managers’ understandings of water use and needs were no longer
considered. Decisions concerning the allocation and distribution of water were now
made by technocrats in Moscow, thousands of miles away from the fields of
Uzbekistan.^®^ This change in the legitimate types of knowledge regarding irrigation
systems is more clearly seen in the review of changes in operations and maintenance
(chapter five).
The negative impacts from the shift in water management to Moscow cannot be
underestimated. When the Soviets took control, management and decisions concerning
water shifted from local interests to national ones.^®^ Control of the water was placed
exclusively in the hands of the elites (engineers and politicians), and the water users
themselves had no ability to provide oversight. In this, water management became closed
to public participation. The farmers were disenfranchised and became reliant on the state
for the water.^®"* Although as the irrigation system expanded the water users were more
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linked under the Soviets than they had been in the past, they were solely dependent upon
the state for the allocation and delivery of water. This ultimately helped break down the
lateral ties that existed in traditional water management, as well as instill a culture of
passivity and dependency in the water users. With this culture of passivity and disinterest
in water management by the farmers and local managers, they became removed from the
successful operation of the system itself. Unfortunately, the role that centralized water
management played in Uzbekistan to undermine both social capital and the successful
management of water resources was only exacerbated by changes in the operation and
maintenance of the irrigation system and agriculture. As a whole, these changes are
examined in the following chapter.

Changes to Management since Independence
The water management system in place in Uzbekistan is very similar to the one
the GOU inherited from the Soviets. It remains hierarchal and centralized, and
management still flows in a top-down direction.^*^ In Uzbekistan, water management is
headed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Management (MAWM). The MAWM
controls water research, development, planning, and distribution. It is also responsible
for both the construction and maintenance of the irrigation and drainage systems.^®^
Under this ministry sit regional (oblasts) administrative offices. Yet, as with before,
decisions of allocation, maintenance, and management remain in the central office. The
Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia, 61.
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Prospects, Erd Working Paper No. 36 (Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2003), 39.
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central office makes all of the decisions, and communicates these to the regional offices.
These offices then carry out the directives.^®^ However, as discussed in the first chapter,
Uzbekistan is trying to reform management by placing more responsibilities on the
farmers and local managers through the adoption of WUAs.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, one major change to water management in
the basin emerged. The irrigation systems, as well as their management under the
Soviets, were designed without regard for either hydrological or state boundaries. All
decisions were made in Moscow, and thus conflict over water between various interests
was not a problem. Unfortunately, the collapse of the Soviet Union has changed this, and
since 1991 there has been an increase in the emergence of interstate conflicts over water
quantity and quality.^®*
At the heart of these conflicts is the differing interests between upstream states
(Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and downstream states (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). The
upstream states see water as something to run their hydroelectric power plants and
provide heat during the winter. To do this, the upper-basin states must store the high
flows of spring and summer and release them during the cold winter months. The lowerbasin states, on the other hand, require the water to irrigate their fields. Thus they want
the water to be released in the spring and summer for the production of their crops. This
newly formed source of conflict in water management has been met with the
development and signing of numerous international water-management agreements.
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Formed in 1992, the International Coordinating Water Committee (ICWC) is the most
important of these agreements. Under this system, the legacy of the allocation of water
under the Soviets is to be used for future allocations within the basin.^*^ Although water
is currently distributed throughout the basin without overt conflict, as water becomes
scarcer and more polluted such agreements might not last. D. P. Bedford refers to the
state of international cooperation in the basin as an “illusion of unity.”^^ This fracturing
of the irrigation and management system across different states only serves to complicate
the difficult nature of reform.

Conclusion
The water-management system in the khanates was complex, stratified, and
hierarchal. The khan served as the supreme leader of this system in order to ensure that
water was available for all of the farmers. Because the wealth of the state derived mainly
from taxes upon agricultural production, and agricultural production was dependent upon
timely delivery of water, the khan was invested in ensuring that water was, in fact,
managed for the good of the state.
Despite the centralized and hierarchal nature of water management in the
khanates, the Soviets misrepresented these states as being overly despotic and tyrannical.
Soviets and historians have unfairly and simplistically interpreted the khans as being
tyrants who managed the water accordingly, all at the expense of the farmers. Such
Bedford, "International Water Management in the Aral Sea Basin," 66.
^^Ibid.: 68.
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views fail to acknowledge the roles that religion and the traditional understandings of
leadership played in ameliorating the khans’ power. At the same time, the large size of
the khanates made an overly centralized state not only impractical but impossible. Thus
provincial powers played a major role in the operations of the state, with tumens free to
operate largely independent of the khans.
This local authority had its parallel in the administration of water. The
management system in the khanates evolved over hundreds of years and served to
maximize the operations of the irrigation system. Water was managed with an
understanding of local water sources. Although the administration was hierarchal, the
farmers and junior officials were able to influence higher officials. They also had the
ability to communicate with the begs. The water-administrative system incorporated the
knowledge and understanding of the farmers. In this, local knowledge and an
appreciation of site-specific concerns were valued in the administrative system. The
khan, it seems, rarely made major top-down judgments that dictated how water was
delivered or allocated in the various regions of the khanate. Thus the farmers retained a
voice in the system and were invested in the successful management of water.
Under the Soviets, the system became overly centralized, with ultimately all
decisions for management and maintenance made in Moscow. In this, the farmers
became completely subordinate to the interests of the state, and were unable to influence
management decisions. This system ultimately disenfranchised local forms of
knowledge, as engineers and politicians increasingly decided the best way to manage
water. Public participation was completely removed from the system. Remnants of this
can still be detected in the apathy of Uzbeks with regards to problems concerning water
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resources and management.^^* Thus far, this overly centralized system has continued
under the GOU. Water management in the basin, however, has been complicated by the
emergence of interstate conflicts over water that did not exist when all decisions and
authority were based in Moscow.
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CHAPTER FIVE
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE IRRIGATION
SYSTEM AND AGRICULTURE

Irrigation has a long and successful history in Transoxiana. Many of the canals in
use when the Russians first arrived in the region had been in use for at least the previous
500 years.^^^ This longevity is a testament to the system being both well-adapted for the
region and well maintained. Despite this history of success, the Western view of the
irrigation systems, by both Russians and European visitors, was that the systems were
primitive and inefficient.
As seen in the previous chapters, the Russians and Soviets presented the
traditional land tenure and water-management regimes of Central Asia in simplistic and
biased terms. With Soviet scholars generating most of the information on the history of
Central Asia, this bias has greatly influenced how current scholars understand and
interpret the region. Unfortunately, this bias has also influenced understandings of the
nature and extent of the irrigation system and agriculture. This bias can simultaneously
be attributed to Russian colonial arrogance and the Soviet’s political motivations.
The traditional irrigation systems of the region were neither Western nor modem
in design. To the Soviets, the traditional and time tested system of canals, locks, and
dams were thus considered crude and primitive. Coates and Coates^^^ capture the
arrogant view of the Soviets with regard to the traditional canals and structures of the
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irrigation system, describing them as simple and insufficient. To the Soviets, the canals
dug by ignorant, disempowered farmers were incapable of adequately “[alleviating] the
thirst of the land for water.”^^ They go on to describe the outdated nature of the system
by pointing out that many of the canals in use prior to the arrival of the Soviets can be
traced back hundreds of years. The archaic nature of the irrigation system is an
interesting one to consider. For to some, this dated system of canals was a sign of the
need for modernization and improvement in the region. While to others, the endurance
and legacy of the system was a sign of both successful design and management.
Coates and Coates’ unimpressed view of the traditional irrigation systems is
contradicted by Barthold’s description of a dynamic irrigation system that was actively
expanded during the centuries prior to the arrival of the Russians. According to Barthold,
major irrigation projects were carried out in the Transoxiana during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. He describes major expansions to the systems in the Fergana
Valley, and the tapping of the Naryn and Kara Darya for the first time. He also
documents dams being built in the Zeravshan Valley, and new canals dug near the Amu
Darya to increase acreage. Finally, he also describes the construction of new canals to
irrigate Khiva’s Urgench.^^^ Because of the success of the irrigation system in the
khanates, Barthold considered Central Asia to be flourishing prior to the arrival of the
Russians, pointing out that between 1827 and 1837 exports exceeded imports in
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Turkistan.^^ In this description of activities in the region, the irrigation system was both
expanding and actively maintained, and able to support a strong economy.
First the Russians and then the Soviets, considering the irrigation system
inadequate for their interests, greatly revolutionized the system, instituting numerous
expansions and changes. Disruptions to the infrastructure of the system had profound
effects on how the system operated and was maintained. As operations and maintenance
(O&M) changed, so too did perceptions and understandings of the system by those who
were a part of it. In this chapter, the O&M of the traditional irrigation system are
explored. From such a base of understanding, changes in the scale and technology of the
system are then traced from pre-Russian times through the Soviet occupation of Central
Asia. As the nature of the irrigation system changed, so too did the manner in which the
farmers related to one another and to the system itself. Thus by examining these changes
in technology, how social capital was utilized in the system can also be explored.
This chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section focuses upon the
operation and maintenance of the traditional irrigation systems. This section describes
the size, design and construction of the irrigation system. It also highlights the strengths
and weaknesses of the system. This section of the chapter also focuses upon the
maintenance of the system. Because traditional maintenance was largely tied to water
rights, this section draws from the previous chapters’ reviews of tenure, water rights, and
management to highlight how changes to all of these led to separate farmers from each
other and from the successful management of the irrigation system. The second section
of the chapter highlights major changes to O&M under the Soviets.
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Technology and Operations Prior to the Arrival of the Russians
Although the irrigation system prior to Russification was primitive (lacking
control structures, drainage canals, and discharge canals), this is not to say that it was
inefficient. The irrigation system in the Aral Sea Basin developed through trial and error
over thousands of years, and was extremely efficient and sustainable. Upon their arrival
in the region, the Russians were amazed by the size, extent, and history of the irrigation
system. This is all the more impressive considering that the irrigated area at the start of
the nineteenth century was two million hectares—much less than it had been prior to the
Mongols coming to the region.^^^
Each oasis in the region was surrounded by a vast network of canals, some in use
and many in a state of disrepair. As with the overall water-management regime, the
irrigation systems were largely localized in nature. Nevertheless, many aspects were the
same in all three khanates. This brief history will cover the four major physical processes
to the water-supply system—capture, distribution, application, and drainage—giving the
most attention to the distribution component.
The largest and most visible component of the Central Asian water-supply system
was the canals that covered the landscape. To the Central Asians, irrigation canals were
thought of as watercourses. Both natural and human-made watercourses were viewed as
canals. Hence, the irrigation systems were comprised of two different types of canals—
the

and the yap. Amas, although considered canals by the Central Asians, were

Micklin estimates that, in its prime, over 3.8 million ha were irrigated in the Aral Sea Basin.
Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia, 27, 29.
The word ama has a long history in the region, and is derived from the Khwarazmian
language. V. V. Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, trans. V. Minorsky and T.
Minorsky (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1956), 15.
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rivers that had been widened and deepened by human labor. Thus rivers were not only a
part of the irrigation system, but were considered canals in and of themselves. This
inclusive definition has led to much confusion for historians trying to determine what
were natural rivers and what were artificial canals.^^ Yaps, on the other hand, were
courses dug to a width of one or two fathoms. Yaps were fed by an ama and the two
together served to form a net of irrigation canals over the countryside.'*^
The most common layout for the network of canals in Transoxiana was a simple,
hierarchal order of first-, second-, and third-order canals. The amas^^ fed the first-order
canals. Tumens were defined by where the first-order canals ( yaps) branched off of the
ama. The tumen would consist of the territory fed from this single water source. In this,
the tumen was not only a political and administrative region, but also an area that could
be defined upon the basis of the villages that shared a common water source. For the
sake of clarity, it is important to reiterate that the mirab bashi, who served as the chief of
the irrigation system at the regional level, lived at the head of the first-order canal.
Second-order canals branched at an obtuse angle, and ran parallel to their feeding canal.
The second-order canals would feed a group of villages. There is not a clear consensus
on the number of villages tied to a single second-order canal, but it appears that the
For example, Narshakhi describes there being twelve main canals in Bokhara in 943 (332). Of
these twelve, which were canals and which were natural watercourses is not clearly understood. The canal
called “the river of gold" flowed into the “river of the city.” This “river of gold” is assumed to be the
Zeravshan, but some confusion remains. Narshakhi, The History of Bukhara, 31.
Arminius Vambery, Travels in Central Asia, Russia Observed (New Yodc: Amo Press, 1970),
389.
Due to the confusion on what was a canal and what was a river, there are disagreements in the
literature over the ordering of the hierarchal canal system. Kostenko, for instance, considers the first yap
branching off of the ama to be the first order canal. Although this is more in line with weston conceptions
of the order of canals in an irrigation system, it is inconsistent with how the Central Asians defined the
word canal and understood their irrigation systems. This paper, for the sake of clarity, will adopt
Kostenko's ordering to the canals by not considering the ama to be a canal.
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number ranges from between ten^^ to fifteen villages.^^ Each village then had its own
third-order canal. The villages, although the terminus in the irrigation system, were not
independent of one another. The third-order canals that fed the villages also ran back into
the second-order canal. In this, excess water from a village would then return to the
system. This arrangement not only served to increase the availability of water in the
system, but also served to increase the interdependence of the villages upon one
another.'^
Despite the primitive characterization of the native irrigation systems, the canals
were large and lengthy. Kostenko describes first-order canals in Khiva as being 140 feet
across at their head, and many extended over sixty miles from their source river.^^
These canals were significant engineering feats. For the most part, the canals were
unlined and earthen.^ Olufsen, however, describes the canals in Bukhara as being lined
with slate and clay to minimize seepage.'*®^ This description of lined canals is not echoed
in other accounts, requiring much organized labor and expertise to be constructed.

^ Kostenko, The Turkistan Region Being a Military Statistical Review of the Turkistan Military
District of Russia, or, Russian-Turkistan Gazetteer, 196; Henry Lansdell, Russian Central Asia (London:
Sanq)son Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1885), 536.
Olufsen, The Emir of Bokhara and His Country, 491.
Kostenko, The Turkistan Region Being a Military Statistical Review of the Turkistan Military
District of Russia, or, Russian-Turkistan Gazetteer, 196.
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Philip P. Micklin, The Water Management Crisis in Soviet Central Asia, The Carl Beck Papers
in Russian and East European Studies (Pittsburgh: The Center for Russian and East European Studies,
1991), 21.
^ Olufsen, The Emir o f Bokhara and His Country, 490.
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Kostenko describes the canals as being picturesquely lined with trees on both sides.^^
These trees, however, were not merely ornamental. Trees lined both canals and fields to
promote drainage of the land and stave off salinization.'*^
In addition to canals being unlined, a key characteristic of the canals was their
gradient. Canals with a high gradient will allow water to move too rapidly, and thus
increase erosion. Those with a low gradient will accumulate sediment and require greater
maintenance. The surveying of the canals was accomplished in a simple, yet amusing,
way. The mirab would lay on his back and use his big toe to sight off of a man’s head in
the distance. By doing this, the slope of the landscape could be determined, and the
canals were laid out accordingly.'**® Olufsen describes the canals as being level enough to
keep water from eroding the canal.'*** Hence, the canals meandered across the landscape
as they sought their path down slope. Being surface canals, the longer their path the
greater the loss of water through evaporation and seepage.
The capture of water was accomplished through diversion dikes and dams.
Canals were predominantly excavated off of the smaller rivers in the Aral Sea Basin
because of the immense difficulty of diverting waters off the Amu and Syr Darya.'**^
Diversion dikes were used on the smaller rivers to direct water into the main canals.
These dikes were constructed by filling trestles with whatever local materials were
^ Kostenko, The Turkistan Region Being a Military Statistical Review of the Turkistan Military
District of Russia, or, Russian-Turkistan Gazetteer, 195.
^ USSR National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage, History of Irrigation, Drainage, Flood
Control and River Engineering, History of Irrigation and Drainage in the Ussr, vol. 1 (Delhi, India: Central
Electric Press, 1985), 92.
Matley, "Agricultural Development," 276.
Olufsen, The Emir of Bokhara and His Country, 487.
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available, often brushwood and stones.^*^ The head-gates to the canals were
unengineered, simple dams.'^^'^ Made of wood beams and clay, the gates could not
control flow, and were simply put into the top of the canal to restrict flow and lifted out
to allow water to enter the canal/^^
Despite the simplicity of this design, much consideration and care was given to
where the diversion dikes were placed and the canals dug. Canals were dug off of the
rivers to deliberately limit washouts and sedimentation. To accomplish this, canals were
dug on hard, level river banks to minimize sédimentation. At the same time, dikes were
built on the convex bank of a river. By doing this, the Central Asians took advantage of
the physics of stream flow. Sediments largely accumulate on the concave bank of a river.
Hence, by constructing the dikes on the convex bank, sediment build-up was minimized
at the head of the canal.'*^^
Upon reaching the fields, water was distributed chiefly through furrow irrigation.
Matley contends that furrow irrigation was used exclusively in the region, except for rice
and alfalfa, of which both relied upon flood irrigation.^^^ In terms of application, the
Central Asians had many adaptations to minimize water losses. Fields were kept small,
rarely exceeding 0.8 ha. Fields were then divided by low, earthen walls. Mulberry trees
growing along the banks of the fields absorbed and then transpired excess water to help
stave off water logging, as well as decrease soil loss to wind erosion. In addition, the
Matley, "Agricultural Development," 270.
Cyril E. Black and others. The Modernization of Inner Asia (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 94.
Thurman, 0 Modes of Organization in Central Asian Irrigation: The Ferghana Valley, 1876 to
Present□, 63.
USSR, History of Irrigation, Drainage, Flood Control and River Engineering, 84.
Matley, "Agricultural Development," 276.

127
banks absorbed salts helping to reduce soil salinity. These small fields also allowed for
even flooding and limited the amount of wasteful runoff. By irrigating such small fields,
average water withdrawals including filtration losses were between 10,700 to 11,500

m'/ha."'»
Water was applied to the field either directly through a small, distributional canal,
or, if the water needed to be lifted, through the use of a water wheel. The distributional
canals were small. A one-foot wide canal would be used to irrigate three fourths of a
hectare.^

Where water needed to be lifted, water wheels with pots attached to their rims

were used. The wheels were turned either by an animal (camel or horse) or by the force
of the water itself. Although this arrangement was ingenious, the lack of more efficient
pumps had disadvantages. The height to which water could be lifted was limited by the
size of the water wheel and the strength of the animal or force of the water. Thus, water
could not be lifted more than a few meters.
One of the major problems of the native irrigation system was an infrequent and
inadequate drainage system. Most fields lacked a drainage system, and suffered from
salinization—although the farmers had folk techniques, such as crop rotations, to deal
with this problem. The fields that did have drainage systems consisted of crude pipes,
often made of clay, laid into the field in order to collect and deliver excess water out of
the field. These pipes were perforated to allow water to enter, but not sediment.

Amazingly, Micklin notes that water withdrawals increased to over 13,000 m^/ha under Soviet
stewardship. He attributes this increase to the larger fields used by the Soviets. Determining such figures,
however, is not possible without making many assunq>tions. Accordingly, this figure is questioned by
some. Berkoff, for one, is suspicious, reasoning that the difference between new, healthy fields and older,
degraded fields is large enough to discredit such numbers. Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia, 30,
32; Wegerich, □ Institutional Change in Water Management at the Local and Provincial Levels in
UzbekistanD, 97.
Olufsen, The Emir o f Bokhara and His Country, 491.
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However, the pipes frequently clogged, and this rendered the drainage system
ineffective.^^®
According to Thurman’s reading of Russian and Soviet records. Tsarist and
Soviet engineers considered the native irrigation technology and maintenance to be an
obstacle to efficient irrigation. There were three main categories that the engineers found
especially troubling: First, the canals lacked permanent, engineered head gates. The
head gates were trestles filled with local materials. These primitive gates were often
washed out by spring floods, and required emergency maintenance by the farmers at the
worst possible time of the year."^^^ In addition to being prone to failure, these gates
required much more upkeep and maintenance than the engineered gates found in the
West at the time. Secondly, the Soviet engineers felt that the irrigation system was
composed of too many redundant canals. These redundant canals increased the length of
the system, and thus exacerbated water losses from evaporation and seepage. The
redundant canals also increased the aggregate length of canals that needed to be
maintained, and increased the amount of effort took to equitably distribute water
throughout the system. Thirdly, imprecise leveling of fields and canals increased the
amount of maintenance that the system needed, while lowering its efficiency. Because of
a lack of more sophisticated tools and surveying skills, the canals, as well as the fields,
were often not leveled properly. If the fields were not leveled properly, water pooled in
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lower parts of the fields, causing salinization, and other parts of the field did not receive
enough water."*^^
Although the Soviet engineers were correct in pointing out some of the problems
associated with the native irrigation systems, this is not to the say that the systems were
either inefficient or unsustainable. Oases in Central Asia had been irrigated for thousands
of years, and it is only within the past hundred years that major expanses of soil have
been deemed unusable.'*^^ In addition to keeping farms small, the farmers used their vast
folk knowledge to minimize negative effects to the landscape, while maximizing
production. As noted earlier, farmers used furrow irrigation in their fields to minimize
water losses. The furrows were dug in a quadrant formation that broke up the soil and
allowed for even inundation of water, without exposing too much of the soil to the dry
air.'^^'* The silt removed from the canals was used as fertilizer for the fields. The
alluvium of the Syr and Amu Darya was rich in phosphates, lime and potassium."^^^ The
fertilizing nature of the waters of the basin is reflected in the name of the main river of
Bukhara, the Zeravshan. Zeravshan, which means river of gold, was so named for its
fertilizing properties.'^^^ The farmers also actively used crop rotations to lower the salt
level in the soil and fix nitrogen. There was no regulated crop rotation, but the farmers

Thurman, 0 Modes of Organization in Central Asian Irrigation: The Ferghana Valley, 1876 to
Present □.
The International Merv Project, for instance, conducted a detailed paleobotanical analysis of
sediment around the city and found no evidence of salinization.
Thurman, 0 Modes of Organization in Central Asian Irrigation: The Ferghana Valley, 1876 to
Present 0,75.
Sinnott, "The Physical Geography of Soviet Central Asia and the Aral Sea Problem," 83.
Kostenko, The Turkistan Region Being a Military Statistical Review of the Turkistan Military
District of Russia, or, Russian-Turkistan Gazetteer, 193.
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knew how to rotate crops to promote soil health/^^ With regard to crop rotation for soil
health, the farmers “[acted] from their experience.”^^
Throughout the irrigation systèm, water was distributed to the farms according to
custom. The mirab was in charge of water allocations. Water was delivered in the order
of distance. Those closest to the head of the third-order canal received water first."^^^ The
nUrab would release water to a field in the presence of the farmer, and the amount was
measured by eye. Although the Central Asians did not have sophisticated watermeasuring technologies, this is not to say that water was released onto the fields in a
casual manner. In fact, Kostenko contends that much care and attention were given to the
allocation of water to the fields; in Turkistan “every drop [of water] for irrigation is
calculated.”^^® This practice of allotting water by custom and measuring it by eye
worked because the farmers knew that too much water would limit their yield and
ultimately lead to salinization."^^^ Thus, the farmers were interested in ensuring that they
received sufficient water, but not more than they needed.

Maintenance of the Traditional System
The maintenance of a large irrigation system in an arid region requires much
labor, more than can be done by a single farmer. Thus, the maintenance of an irrigation
Olufsen, The Emir of Bokhara and His Country, 494; Schuyler, Turikstan: Notes of a Journey
in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara and Kuldja Vol. /, 290.
Olufsen, The Emir of Bokhara and His Country, 494.
Williams, "Water Law in Czarist Central Asia," 38.
Lev Feofilovich Kostenko, The Turkistan Region Being a Military Statistical Review of the
Turkistan Military District of Russia, or, Russian-Turkistan Gazetteer Volume Hi, vol. Ill (Calcutta:
Superintendent of Government Printing, 1884), 2.
Olufsen, The Emir o f Bokhara and His Country, 493; Schuyler, Turikstan: Notes o f a Journey
in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara and Kuldja Vol. 1,295.
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system is only possible through cooperative effort. The farmers must be motivated and
aware of the need for group maintenance, and how their cooperative actions benefit them.
One of the defining characteristics of the traditional irrigation system in Central Asia was
the tying of water rights to the responsibility of maintaining the system. Every winter,
every family that received water from the irrigation system had to supply an able-bodied
man for two months to maintain and improve the system."^^^ Strangely, this annual
calling of labor has been misrepresented by both Soviet and Western scholars. Bacon, for
example, criticizes the traditional approach to maintaining the irrigation system as being
forced labor
Every spring, the khan would issue firman (edict) calling for the construction
and maintenance of the irrigation systems. From the firman, the regional mirabs received
the authority to enlist any farmer'^^'^ that receives water from the state irrigation system.
Any farmer who fails to participate in the corvée was liable to be fined by the state. The
tax levied against those failing to participate in maintenance projects was called the tengi
(equal). The labor was overseen by the mirab bashi, but the khan and his dignitaries
would often tour the tumens, observing maintenance and construction practices

This

direct involvement by the khan in the maintenance of the system belies the notion of the

Matley, "Agricultural Development," 271.
Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change, 75.
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others fields—had to contribute one farmer for the year’s maintenance projects. If the top failed to supply a
laborer, they could receive no water for the upcoming year. USSR, History of Irrigation, Drainage, Flood
Control and River Engineering, 93.
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khan being completely disinterested in the successful management of water. With the
wealth of the state directly tied to the water system being well run, the khan’s presence in
the various regions of the khanate would help ensure that maintenance was being
accomplished, and the thatfirman was not being abused for personal gain by the beg.
Third-order canals were shut off during the winter. During the month of
February, tertiary canals were cleaned. Once this was completed, water was allowed
back into the canals, and the fields were watered in preparation for the spring season.
Second- and first-order canals were maintained in March."^^^
The farmers had to supply their own tools for all maintenance and construction
projects. As with all aspects of the traditional irrigation system, the implements were
either considered extremely primitive and inefficient, or well suited for the tasks and
environment. Regardless of these differing views, the tools were the product of artisans,
and not of industrial production. The most universal and important tool that all farmers
had was the ketmen. The ketmen was used both in small garden plots and in the
construction and maintenance of canals. It was a long-handled hoe. The blade (see Fig.
6) was used for all digging, as well as moving and loosening soil."^^^ The ketmen was
considered effective, but required a “sweeping, forceful and exhausting blow to use.”^^^
Baskets were used to transport the earth from the canals.
It is clear that the farmers were responsible for the maintenance and cleaning of
the canals and structures from which they drew their water. It is not so clear who
maintained the amas that fed each tumen's irrigation system. Little attention is given to
Ibid., 8.
Matley, "Agricultural Development," 276.
Black and others. The Modernization o f Inner Asia, 94.
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Fig. 6. Agricultural Implements of Central Asia. Second from left is a blade from a ketmen.
Taken from Olufsen, The Emir of Bokhara and his Country, 493.

this process. Olufsen simply says that such projects were conducted by public labor, and
that the laborers were not f a r m e r s T h u r m a n mentions the khan of Kokand forming
corvées supervised by a special representative for large, non-local projects."*^
Kostenko offers one example, however, of two different

joining forces to

complete maintenance projects on a dam. The Kara Darya fed two tumens in Bukhara,
the Zia-ud-Din and the Katta Kurgan. The supply of water for the Kara Darya was
augmented by a diversion dam placed at Chupan Ata mountain. Although this dam was
located outside of both tumens, the farmers recognized the importance of this dam to their
fields. Thus, the inhabitants of both tumens )oinûy maintained the dam.'^^ This example
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is not meant to suggest that large-scale construction and maintenance projects were
accomplished only by those who benefited from them. But, in this example, it is clear
that the farmers understood the necessity for maintaining more than just the canal that
connected the system to their farm. It also reinforces both the mirabs’ ability to
coordinate maintenance projects and the farmers’ ability to operate in a cooperative
manner.
The traditional O&M of the irrigation systems was, as can be expected, simpler
than the system in place today. The traditional system was locally controlled and defined
based upon hydrographical boundaries. In this, the farmers were very much
interconnected. The villages shared a second-order canal, and worked together to
maintain this canal. Through farmers being closely linked to one another by the system’s
infrastructure, the traditional system largely relied upon the individual farmers to operate
collectively for the good of the system. O&M was largely based upon the knowledge and
skills of the individual farmers. As the sophistication of the system increased under the
Soviets, the O&M of the system changed, separating farmers from one another, as well as
fi-om the land and water.

Major Disruptions to the Traditional System
The arrival of the Russians into Central Asia saw a change in the markets and
agricultural practices of the region as the Russians converted the region into a cottongrowing colony. Part of this interest by the Russians to see cotton sown across the
deserts and steppes of the region was coupled with an interest to expand and improve the
irrigation system. Despite this interest, the irrigation system remained largely unchanged

135
under the Russians

Plagued by poor engineering and administration, as well as being

hindered by the revolution, irrigation development did not really begin until after 1920.
In fact, between 1870 and 1917, only 330,000 ha of irrigated fields were added.
Considering that at the start of the revolution there were 3,000,000 irrigated ha,^^ this
was only a nine percent change in the irrigated area of Central Asia.
The Soviets, however, did succeed in completely revolutionizing the irrigation
system. These changes had a profound effect upon the ability of the farmers to
successfully manage not only the irrigation system itself, but also their own farms. The
rest of this chapter examines the changes in O&M to the Central Asian irrigation
system."^ These changes will be examined primarily through two themes: First,
changes are examined through the expansion of the system at the expense of traditional
practices and knowledge. Secondly, the reorganization of the farmers and farms into
large, state-run collectives provides insight into the role that farmers played in the
irrigation system, as well as how the farmers and farms related to one another during the
Soviet reign.
Under the Soviets, the technical aspects of the irrigation system changed in two
fundamental ways. First, and foremost, the system increased drastically in size.
Secondly, the Soviets imported modem engineering to improve the efficiency and the
extent of the irrigation system. These changes started iimnediately after the revolution,
even before the counterrevolution subsided. In 1918, with the Soviet state still in a
Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia, 29.
Lewis, "The Irrigation Potential of Soviet Central Asia," 100.
^ With the arrival of the Soviets, the irrigation systems were expanded and centralized, ultimately
producing a single irrigation system for the whole basin. Thus, under the Soviets it is no longer appropriate
to speak of irrigation systems, but instead an irrigation system.
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period of transition and turbulence, Lenin signed a decree concerning irrigation
developments in Turkistan, and allocated fifty million rubles for its implementation. The
first two points of the decree are listed below:
1. Drought control must be considered a matter of paramount importance in the
country’s agriculture and the measures undertaken in this sphere, urgent.
2. It is to be the duty of the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture to adopt
special measures on drought control by organizing reclamation developments as
well as by developing agronomic and afforestation measures in which the entire
rural population of the Republic participates, with the agreement of the
appropriate institutions and organizations."*^^

In order for drought control to be accomplished, the Soviets wanted to improve
the irrigation system, while at the same time expanding it."*"*^ Improvements to the system
largely followed the criticisms that Russian and Soviet engineers had of the traditional
irrigation system as described by Thurman (see page 128). The Soviets set about
installing engineered head-gates to the canals that allowed for regulating the flow of
water. They also constructed large dams on the rivers to facilitate greater control of
flows, and allow for increased water storage. Through increased water storage, the
Soviets could increase the timing of water deliveries and ensure adequate amounts of
water for the fields. They also centralized the system, removing many of the “redundant”
canals from the system. This served to allow water to be delivered over greater distances

A. N. Askochensky, Irrigation and Water Supply in the Ussr, trans. E. V. Maltsina (Moscow:
Mir Publishers, 1970), 22.
^ The majority of the changes to the irrigation system were a result of expanding it, and this is
reflected in the gross discrepancy between funds spent on maintenance and expansion. During Soviet
times, only ten percent of the water reclamation funds were directed towards the maintenance and
improvement of the system. The rest was invested in expanding the system This vast difference largely
explains the degraded nature of the irrigation system that the CARs inherited in 1991. Craumer,
"Agricultural Change, Labor Supply, and Rural out-Migration in Soviet Central Asia," 137.
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to where it was most needed, but also served to break the long tradition of local water
sources for the irrigation systems."^^
During the first thirty years of Soviet development of the region’s surface canals,
the acreage of irrigated lands increased over 400%. In order to open new fields in the
Central Asian Republics (CARs), the Soviets extended the size and extent of the surface
canals. The expansions of the irrigation system occurred in two phases. The first
occurred largely under Stalin’s rule in the late 1920s as the Soviets enacted a policy to
restore the irrigation system of the CARs. This phase of development is typified by the
excavation of large canals through the use of mass manual labor. One such canal was the
Great Fergana Canal, which was dug by over 160,(XX) unpaid Uzbek laborers who were
supervised by 1,000 Russian engineers. The canal, which was over 270 km long, took
only months to build.'^ Excavation of numerous others in the CARs followed the
completion of this canal. The most notable of these other canals is the Karakum Canal,
which is over 1370 km long, and delivers over ninety percent of Turkmenistan’s
irrigation water t o d a y T h e main effect of these canals was to help fulfill Lenin’s edict
to convert the region into a cotton-growing district by connecting neighboring basins in
order to increase water availability.
Although the success of the expansion of the irrigation system led to increased
cotton yields—by the 1930s the Soviets were producing over ninety-seven percent of the
country’s cotton requirements'^^®—this success came with the price of irrevocably altering

Askochensky, Irrigation and Water Supply in the Ussr, 18-22.
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the traditional irrigation system. The economic policies of the Tsar and the transfer of
water management to the Soviet state had already eroded the traditional irrigation system,
but the development of large-scale canals destroyed the local water sources for the fields
that defined so much of the Central Asian irrigation system. Villages no longer could
represent their own water needs. They no longer even knew from where their water
came. In this, the farmers became dependent upon the state for the delivery of their
water, without the ability to influence or direct the state’s actions.
The second phase of change to the irrigation system under Soviet control occurred
with Nikita Khrushchev, who in the 1950s and 1960s sought to increase agricultural
production in Central Asia through the powers of mechanized t e c h n o l o g y . I n the
1950s, most of the irrigation water came from streams, and not the major rivers of the
basin. Water had not been drawn from the Amu and Syr Darya because their fast
currents, high banks, and greatly fluctuating flows were too difficult to overcome. Yet
the engineering of large dams changed all of that by controlling the flows of these rivers
and providing storage for water to be used for agricultural production. Between the late
1950s and the early 1980s, large dams and reservoirs were constructed along the courses
of both the Amu and Syr Darya. The Toktogul, Andizhan, Kayrakkum, Charvak and
Charda’ya dams were built regulating the flow on the Amu Darya. Similar extensive
developments were made on the Syr Darya, leading to the complete regulation of the
river’s flow by the mid-1980s. These dams stored the high flows of spring for use during

Ian Matley, "The Golodnaya Steppe: A Russian Irrigation Venture in Central Asia,"
Geographical Review 60, no. 3 (1970): 339.
McCray, □Enviro-Economic Imperatives and Agricultural Production in Uzbekistan: Modem
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the dry summer months. The dams also supplied hydropower to the region with much of
this power being used to run the large irrigation pumps.^^^
The construction of such large projects was only possible through a mechanized
labor force. This mechanization also carried over into the construction and maintenance
of the canals themselves. No longer did communities of farmers spend the winter
clearing the silt from the canals that they relied upon. Under the modernization of the
Soviet regime, tractor-drawn graders were used for silt removal.^^^ In the mechanizing of
the construction and maintenance of the irrigation system, specialized crews, whose sole
job was to develop and maintain the infrastructure of the irrigation system, replaced the
farmers for this integral part of O&M. Although these crews were well-trained and
financed, they maintained the system neither with specific interest in the performance of
the irrigation system nor with the folk knowledge that the traditional farmers possessed.
As part of the trend in mechanization, pump stations replaced the old water
wheels to deliver water to locations in much higher elevations. These pumps allowed for
a greater expansion of the area that water could reach. Large, permanent weirs were also
built into the larger canals. These weirs allowed for accurate monitoring of water flow,
and could be used to allocate more accurate water distribution. Increases in the extent
and accuracy of the system, however, did not equate to increases in efficiency and
sustainability.
Again, these increases in technology resulted in an increase in the area brought
under cultivation. In Uzbekistan, for instance, irrigated land grew by a factor of 1.52
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from 1970 to 1985/^ These supposed advances in the irrigation system required
advanced technical and administrative skills. In fact, the Minvodkhoz even established
its own technical school and had numerous training centers around the region. The role
of elites in running the irrigation system, solidified by the need for their own schools,
served to completely destroy the agency of the farmers, and make the farmers completely
dependent upon the knowledge and direction of the centralized water-management
bureaucracy. As the centralized bureaucracy continued to grow with the size and
sophistication of the system, so did interference in the daily operation of the farm. Just as
the dams constructed were outside of the scope and capabilities of what the farmers could
operate and maintain, so too were the mundane and practical irrigation operations, such
as when and how to apply water to their crops. The elites continued to flex and cultivate
their authority until finally the farmers became little more than cogs in the machine of
centralized irrigated agriculture.
At the same time as the irrigation system was being completely reformed, so too
was the nature and functioning of the farms in Central Asia. The land reform initiated
after the revolution was part of the Soviet administration's goal to form large collective
farms. The Bolshevik Party believed that the resources of the CARs could best be
developed through the establishment of large, collective farms. They felt that the
formation of such farms would facilitate the industrialization of the agricultural sector,
and this transformation would lead to greater yields of cotton with less costs. To form
the collectives, the traditionally small fields of individual farmers were consolidated to
form the large collectives {kolhoz\ which were run by a board of directors. These farms
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cultivated the land for the benefit of the state, and left individual workers little incentive
with regard to the success or health of the farm. The formation of the collectives also led
to a dramatic increase in the average field size from .3 to .8 ha to over 3.5 ha.^^^
While the old traditional farms were amalgamated, new lands were opened. The
Soviets viewed the large portion of lands that laid in fallow as a sign of the backwardness
and inability of the khanates to successfully manage the lands for the good of the public.
Thus, as the Soviets expanded the irrigation system, they opened lands that had
traditionally been allocated for growing trees or that laid fallow. In opening these lands,
the Soviets failed to recognize the role that these supposedly under utilized lands played
for the health of the landscape. Thus, this increase in irrigated lands saw an increase to
the area devoted to cotton, but not an increase in yields.^^^ The newly opened lands were
formed into large state farms (sovkhoz).
Kolhozes were producer cooperatives. The state assigned land to the farm in
perpetuity and, in return, the collective had to deliver part of its output to the state. These
farms were run by a chairman and board of directors. The farmers in the collective were
paid based upon their output, but the collective controlled and performed all maintenance
projects and allocated the water according to the state’s plans.^^^ Sovkhozes y on the other
hand, were corporate farms. The farmers were considered workers, and received wages
just as a factory worker would. The state supplied all of the capital to the sovkhozes but
Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia, 32.
'^“ Ibid.
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then took all of the profits

Despite the institutional differences to the two types of

farms, management on both extended down to the field level. Water users—farmers—
had no legal rights to water and no power, let alone interest, to make decisions
concerning water. In this, the farmers completely lost their interest in the successful
management of water and the farm.^^’
The disinterest of the farmers led to their passively watching unhealthy watering
practices be applied to their fields without doing anything to correct it. Thurman quotes
Fayzulla Khojaev, the head of Uzbekistan’s Council of People’s Commissars,
commenting on the poor practice of applying water to cotton fields without regard to the
soils and other local conditions.
Does the [farmer] know about this? Of course he knows, and moreover is more
experienced than [the authorities]. But how is it that the [farmer] knows and still
doesn’t use this experience? Because there is a great deal of command
administration. A plenipotentiary comes around, sometimes with an agronomist,
but they don’t know this piece of land and furthermore, rather than communicate
and advise with the farmer they mechanically implement the decree concerning
on-field irrigation and cultivation."^
Not only were the farmers completely disenfranchised by the new collective and
state farms. They were also expected to compete against one another to see who could
produce the most cotton. Collective farms were grouped together into production units.
The winning units of this “socialist competition” were then lauded in the press and
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deemed heroes and successes of socialism. Losers were blacklisted and threatened with a
loss of grain shipments and manufactured goods from the state.^^
This socialist competition had a strange impact upon the farms of the CARs.
Through water, tools, fertilizers, and all other inputs coming from the state free of charge,
the farmers had little interest in trying to maximize their use of inputs versus outputs
(cotton). Thus, the farmers passively followed the decrees of the elites in terms of how,
when, and where to use water. But by asking the farms to compete against one another,
with repercussions for the losers, the state did two damaging things to the culture of the
farmers. First, competition completely annihilated the tradition of cooperative behavior
between the farmers and water use. Now the farmers were encouraged to increase their
production without having to be concerned about the costs of their inputs. Secondly, the
combination of the large and bureaucratic nature of the Soviet state and socialist
competition simply led to farms “cooking the books” with regard to how much cotton
they produced, as they were not paid for actual production, but instead rewarded for what
they claimed to have produced.'^^ Socialist policy thus made collective farms
competitors. They were encouraged to outperform other farms without regard for the
costs of doing so. In this, not only was the tradition of collective behavior by the farmers
ended, but competition between the farmers encouraged.
The nature of collective and state farms, a lack of control over water allocations
or water rights, and the encouragement of competition between farmers and farms all
served to detach the farmers from the land that they worked and the water needed for
Ibid., 26.
^^Ibid., 27.

144
agricultural production. The negative consequences to separating the farmers from the
land and water remained in place until the 1980s. Amongst the many reforms instituted
by Mikhail Gorbachev during Perestroika was the réintroduction of the “peasant
farmer.”^^ The Soviets pushed for smaller collectives, hoping that would increase the
ties between the farmers and their land. At the same time, the state began contracting
parcels of land to individual farmers. These types of reforms carried out by the Soviets
have been slowly followed by the GOU as described in chapter three.
With the brief description of state and collective farms given, it is clear to see the
damaging effects they had on the land, the irrigation system, and the behavior of the
farmers themselves. Despite the negative impacts of the large farms, it is unfair to put the
blame on collective farms. In the at times all-too-simplisdc debate on how to reform and
improve irrigated agriculture in Uzbekistan, many presume that collectivization in and of
itself is bad. Countering such a sentiment, Thurman suggests that collectivization in the
CARs was not so much the problem as was the command administrative system that they
fell under."^

The Irrigation System since Independence
After decades of Soviet spending that focused upon expanding, instead of
maintaining, the system, the irrigation system that the CARs inherited was highly
Judith Pallet, "Continuity and Change in the Post-Soviet Countryside." in Geography and
Transition in the Post-Soviet Republics, ed. Michael J. Bradshaw (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1997),
111.
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degraded. Canals were unlined and in poor shape. Fields were largely uneven. Pumping
stations were clogged and often not capable of being used. Unfortunately, the condition
of the irrigation system under the independent states has only worsened.
A loss of money and support from the Soviet Empire has left Uzbekistan in a dire
economic position. Because of a shortage of funds, maintenance projects are all too often
dropped from the budget owing to their being considered unessential. The Ministry of
Agriculture and Water Management (MAWM), which is responsible for the maintenance
of the main and distributary canals, has failed to keep up with the needed maintenance
because of a lack of funding."^^ Intensifying money shortages, much of the equipment
and parts used in maintenance projects were produced in the Soviet Union. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the plants producing these parts were closed."^
This has left Uzbekistan with a fleet of maintenance equipment that is no longer usable.
The loss of expensive maintenance equipment decreases the state’s ability to successfully
manage the system and increases the amount of money that the state needs to allocate
towards maintaining the irrigation system.
In addition to money shortages, maintenance of the irrigation system has
decreased with the transfer of management from Moscow to Tashkent. Maintenance of
both inter and intra-farm canals has dropped off since 1991 as the institutions that
managed them under the Soviets have been reorganized and are passing through a period
of transition. Inter-farm canals appear to be the responsibility of the MAWM at the
oblast level. But with these canals lying between the already neglected main canals and
Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia, 62.
^ O'Hara, "Managing Turkmenistan's Kara Kum Canal: Problems and Prospects," 229.
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the farms that they feed, these canals fall to the bottom of the to-do list, and thus remain
largely neglected. The intra-farm canals were the responsibility of the collective farms,
but as more and more private farms are formed, these canals are not being maintained
because of a lack of funding and knowledge of how to properly maintain the canals.^^
A lack of inadequate maintenance, combined with an already decrepit irrigation
system, has led to a deteriorating infrastructure during the past fifteen years. Dredging
sediment from the canals is an endless task; one the GOU has thus far been unable to
complete. This has led to the clogging of many pumping stations and the complete
abandonment of many secondary and tertiary canals. Thus, sediment build-up has
decreased the ability to proactively manage where the water goes and when. Sediment
build-up, along with the antiquated management system, causes excessive amounts of
water to be diverted to fields, and this misuse of water is more than just wasteful; it
contributes to the water logging of soils and salinization.
The highly deteriorated condition of the canals, head-gates, and drains needs
attention when discussing the transfer of management to WUAs. A WUA is judged
successful by its ability to meet its objectives.^* If farmers are forced to join WUAs
against their will, and then expected to maintain a highly degraded system of canals and
drains, the farmers will not see immediate benefits exceeding the costs of collective
maintenance. In this, the WUAs can ultimately be a destabilizing force in the region,
only worsening the condition of the irrigation system.
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Conclusion
The traditional irrigation systems of Central Asia were sustainable and well
adapted for the local conditions. The systems were defined by local hydrographical
features, and were worked and maintained by the very farmers who relied upon them.
Because of the local nature of the irrigation systems, the farmers knew where the water
delivered to their fields came from. At the same time, through connecting water rights to
the need to contribute to the maintenance of the system, the traditional irrigation systems
not only were well maintained and enduring, but also served to form lateral bonds among
the farmers. Each spring, the farmers would work together on the system. In doing so,
the farmers got to know each other and also understood and appreciated how their actions
affected others. Also, by connecting water rights to labor, free riding was not an option
for the farmers. In order to receive water, they needed to collectively manage the system.
In addition to the lateral ties, the traditional maintenance practices encouraged, by
having the water users themselves not only oversee their own fields but maintain the
system, the farmers were intimately aware of, and understood, the operations and nature
of all aspects of the irrigation system. Through this, the water users not only knew the
villages both upstream and downstream from their own, but also the consequences of
overdrawing water, and the impacts that it had on the others. The farmers understood the
implications of overdrawing water and how this could damage not only their yield for the
year, but contribute to the salinization of their fields. By using locally developed
knowledge to operate their farms, as well as the irrigation system, the farmers were the
key constituent to the healthy operation and maintenance of traditional irrigated
agriculture.
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Under the Soviets, all this changed. The irrigation systems were expanded and
ultimately connected, forming one system. In the centralized system, no longer could the
water users know from where their water came or who was at the head and bottom of the
canal. While the size of the system expanded beyond the extent of the traditional
systems, so too did the technologies employed. The irrigation system, in becoming
highly centralized, became a sophisticated engineering project, and control of the system
was removed from the water users themselves and fell to technocrats and politicians.
This change in power also saw the complete abandonment of the locally developed
understandings of water and irrigated agriculture. Thus, the expansion of the system and
the types of knowledge employed ultimately served to disenfranchise the water users, and
separated the water users from one another as well as from the land.
The interface between the elites—the engineers. Communist Party members, and
water managers—and the farmers produced conflict in the types of knowledge used by
the two groups to understand the irrigation system. The elites relied upon nomothetic
knowledge to manage and operate the system. They saw the system in terms of abstract
theories and principles of how water should be managed, delivered, and applied. At the
same time, the remote, mral farmers understood their fields and access to water in terms
of locally developed folk knowledge. This discrepancy between the Soviet elites and
Central Asian farmers served to marginalize the farmers in the management process, as
their folk knowledge was viewed as primitive and inferior. This asymmetrical
distribution of power left the farmers feeling voiceless in the system. The stripping of
value from their knowledge and subsequent control of the irrigation system fostered a
heightened disinterest on the farmers' part in participating in water management.
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Clearly, the advances in the irrigation system under Soviet authority did much to
reduce the role of the farmers. However, this is not to say that the increases in
technology alone resulted in engineers and politicians completely overtaking the water
management system, leaving the farmers out of the equation. The disruptions and
subsequent changes to the traditional irrigation system date back to the economic policies
of the Tsar that favored cotton production. Subsequent Soviet interest in making the
CARs a cotton-producing region, driven by their theories of resource exploitation and
collectivization, also played a significant role in transforming the irrigation system. Thus
it is important to view the changes to the irrigation system diachronically, and not rely
upon preconceived ideas of the interrelations between states and water management, such
as the hydraulic theory.
As the GOU looks to return responsibilities of management and decision-making
to the water users, it is important that the effects resulting from the changes to the
irrigation system be considered. The knowledge, finances, and social structure that
traditionally existed are now gone. Unfortunately, providing education regarding how to
manage intra-farm canals and subsidizing the tools needed to do so is not enough. Under
the Soviets, centralized management served to sever water users from both their land and
each other. Collective management on the part of water users cannot and will not happen
until these ties that traditionally existed are restored. The next and final chapter looks at
where social capital existed in the traditional irrigation systems, what happened to this
capital under the Soviets, and what needs to be done to help foster a successful adoption
of WUAs by the farmers in Uzbekistan today.
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CHAPTER SIX
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND LAND AND WATER REFORM
A culture of water waste emerged, and my own observations confirm that it still thrives
-Thomas R. McCray^^

In the traditional view of the historical irrigation systems of Central Asia, the
khan was a totalitarian ruler who used his despotic tyranny to keep the irrigation systems
running. The farmers were all landless and had no understanding, let alone say, in how
the system that they depended upon operated. The locally developed operations and
practices used by the farmers were considered crude and inadequate. With such a view of
the systems, it is assumed that social capital played virtually no role in the successful
management of water and the operations of the farms.
The perception of the irrigation systems being run by despots and worked by
ignorant and landless farmers is a simplification to the point of being misleading.
Irrigated agriculture had a long and successful history in Transoxiana prior to the arrival
of the Russians, and this success is largely dependent upon the “features of social life”
that enabled the farmers and administration to effectively control, manage and deliver
water. Islam, modes of management, water rights and traditional maintenance practices
all combined to form lateral ties among farmers and strong connections between elites
and farmers. This final chapter summarizes the role that social capital played in the
traditional irrigation systems, the implications of the current stock of social capital, and
the need for further study on water in the Aral Sea Basin.
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Social Capital and the Irrigation System
As current attempts to use social capital through the adoption of WUAs is
pursued, it is important that such reforms are undertaken with a sound understanding of
social capital, as well as its current status. This section attempts to summarize the history
and changes to the irrigation systems as they relate to social capital. The summary is
divided according to Uphoff*s four functions of irrigation management: decision making,
resource mobilization, coordination and communication, and conflict resolution. These
four functions are explained in the literature review found in the first chapter. Within the
summary for each of the four functions, impacts to social capital under the Soviets, as
well as the current stock, are also reviewed.

Decision making
In the traditional irrigation systems of Transoxiana, decisions concerning water
management and usage occurred mostly at the farm and regional level. Farmers had a
voice in decisions through their village elders {aqsaqal). The farmers participated in all
aspects of O&M, and, as such, their decisions were based on experience and an
understanding of the system. Because of this, the farmers played a key role in decision
making. With decisions happening at the field level, decisions were both timely and site
specific, which helped ensure appropriate management.
The rules and procedures concerning decision making were largely made possible
through the strong regulating factors that Shari’a and odat played in the communities.
Through Shari’a and odat, farmers were encouraged to act in a “seemly manner” and
elites to manage for the common good. The importance that religion and custom played
in creating rules, trust and connectedness among all agents in the irrigation systems
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cannot be overstated. Initial failures of Bolshevik land reform, where the farmers failed
to take the land as the Soviets had hoped, illustrates the strength of religion in regulating
social behavior. Farmers would not take land and objects that did not belong to them
because it was not in accordance with their traditional rules.
In addition to religion and custom, the traditional small size of the fields served to
keep the farmers on an equal footing, as power and land did not accumulate in the hands
of a few. This served to promote a democratic character to the decisions made.
Religion, customs, and the farmers’ role in decision-making helped ensure that
decisions were made for the common good. Water rights and land tenure, with both
resources considered public domain held in trust by the khan, served to influence what
decisions were made. Traditional water rights considered water to be an exhaustible
resource, and decisions were made accordingly. Through water being viewed as
exhaustible, the management and water users acted to ensure that it was available for all.
Under the Soviets, however, decision making was moved from the fields and
regional districts to Tashkent and Moscow. With this shift in where decisions were
made, the knowledge used to make decisions was kept fi"om the farmers, and the farmers
ultimately became despondent as they felt left out of the process. Although the technical
advancements to the system influenced the gap between the farmers and decision making,
Soviet politics, which were interested in control and assuagement, greatly heightened the
marginalization of the farmers. Also, with shifts in land tenure and water rights, water
was deemed an inexhaustible resource. This greatly influenced how decisions were made
by elites, and how farmers followed these decisions.
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Any attempt to reintegrate the farmers into the decision-making process must be
accompanied by a strong education program. With decisions moved from the fields to
the capital, the farmers’ knowledge and understanding of the irrigation system has been
squandered. At the same time, with decisions being made so far away from the fields,
and water viewed as inexhaustible, the rules and norms of decision making have also
been lost on the farmers. Thus education programs cannot be solely technical, but must
also help instruct the farmers in the processes and consequences of their decisions.
Resource Mobilization
In the traditional irrigation systems, the state, guided by both religion and selfinterest, served to ensure that sufficient water was available for all. The irrigation
systems were defined by hydrographical boundaries. A group of villages, normally
around ten, would share a second-order canal. The mirab bashi enforced customary
rules, such as banning rice production at the head of a canal, to ensure that water was
available for all villages. At the village level, village identity and close social ties
fostered cooperative behavior amongst the farmers. More than religion or ethnicity,
identity was based upon the village. This village identity produced strong connections
and trust among the villagers. Also, the villagers were aware that it was to their
advantage to work cooperatively in terms of maintenance and fieldwork. Such awareness
limited competition for water. At the same time, farmers’ knowledge of site-appropriate
farming practices and the implications of over-watering the fields led to conservative
applications of water and the minimizing of water use.
Maintenance of the irrigation systems was conducted by the water users
themselves. Every spring, any farmer who drew water from his local irrigation system
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was expected to contribute labor, animals, and tools to help maintain the system.
Through maintaining the system, the water users increased resource mobilization and
developed social capital. By having the farmers perform the maintenance, free riding
was not an option. Drawing water was tied to responsibilities, and established reciprocity
between the state and the water users. Also, the water users became intimately aware of
how their system operated and who they shared water with. Through meeting every
spring to maintain the system, the farmers from the connected villages came to realize
what role their personal practices played upon the health of the system, and who their
practices affected. This helped build strong connections among the farmers and between
the farmers and the system and water they relied upon.
As the irrigation system was centralized and expanded under the Soviets, resource
mobilization became overly hierarchal and specialized. Farmers were given specific
duties on a collective farm, and completely removed from the O&M of the system, as
mechanized crews took over such duties. Although the new duties were clearly defined
by the collective and state farms, the large farms served to separate farmers from each
other and their land. The collective farms also separated those who maintained the
system from those who benefited from the maintenance. Farmers no longer worked
cooperatively, but instead they performed individual duties for the collective (or state)
farm. In this, there was little incentive to form strong connections with the other farmers
or to be concerned with water management. Water was guaranteed by the state and
delivered to the farmers. They merely applied it as they were instructed to. This served
to instill in the farmers a passive nature toward water management.
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The collective farms served to disconnect farmers from the consequences of
their actions. Attempts to reintroduce increased resource mobilization responsibilities for
water users must be pursued very slowly. The culture of passivity towards water use, and
a lack of connections between the farmers, must be addressed. Under the Soviets, a
traditional cooperative culture at the village level was replaced by large state-run farms.
It will take time for trust between farmers and elites to be restored, and thus farmers
should not be given more responsibility than their community can handle.

Coordinatioii and Communication
The khanates were large political entities that encompassed a wide assortment of
lands and peoples. The size of the states, along with the difficulties of traveling across
them, caused communications to be slow and inefficient. The khan's difficulty in easily
communicating with outlying districts led to much regional autonomy. Each region,
defined by water boundaries, was responsible for the O&M within its boundaries. Within
each region, there was a hierarchal organization of senior and junior officials. For the
most part, these officials were elected by the farmers whom they served. In addition, the
elites emerged from the communities themselves. By electing local farmers to higher
positions, the knowledge and customs developed and utilized by the farmers were
maintained and reinforced within the administration of the irrigation system. This not
only served to preserve folk knowledge in the districts, but also minimized the gap in
terms of knowledge, identity, and ultimately trust between the farmers and the officials.
Each village had a democratically appointed elder to represent the village’s needs
to higher officials. This allowed communications to flow from the fields to the elites in a
bottom-up direction. At the same time, officials were paid directly by the farmers under
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them. This gave the water users an ability to hold the officials accountable for poor
management practices.
In addition to the ability for communications to flow in both directions vertically,
horizontal networks among farmers also existed. Within each village, farmers pooled
their labor and resources in associations called tops. At the village level, several villages
would also pool their resources to work together. These organizations were voluntary,
and formed because the farmers understood that they could maximize their efforts
through collective behavior. In these organizations, ideas and decisions freely traveled in
horizontal directions.
The networks that allowed communications to flow in vertical and horizontal
directions were severed by the Soviets. As the irrigation system became more
centralized, so too did communications within an overly hierarchal system. All
communications ran through Moscow, and were controlled by politicians and technocrats
far from the fields. In this system, communications only traveled fi-om the elites to the
farmers under them. Communications among elites were also restricted by officials in
Moscow. Although under the Soviets more information of greater accuracy was able to
travel more quickly, thus allowing more coordinated efforts to take place, these efforts
were not a result of a democratic process. Nor were these efforts successful in facilitating
a sense of belonging and attachment. Instead, the tightly controlled nature of
communications forced the farmers to become dependent upon the Soviets for their
information and operations.
International agencies must proceed with efforts to improve irrigated agriculture
in Uzbekistan with an understanding of the role of dependence and passivity instilled by
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the Soviets. The traditional nature of communications fostered a participatory element in
water management. This was broken by the Soviets. Public participation and awareness
of the issues facing irrigated agriculture is, nearly fifteen years since independence, still
extremely low.^^® The public as well as farmers still expect the state to deliver water, and
thus feel that they need not be concerned with issues of water. Because of this, any
development efforts must be cautious to not fill the void left by the Soviets as the supplier
of water. To do so would allow the water users to continue their passive role in the
system. Such concerns are substantiated by McCray’s interviews with farmers who
expressed their hope that international assistance will fix the problems of water

shortages."^^*
Conflict Resolution
In the traditional irrigation systems, the khan served as the ultimate judge in
resolving conflicts. Despite this power, the khan almost never interfered in decision
making or conflict resolution. Mirabs served as the khan’s agent, and ultimately made
decisions with regards to conflicts. In this system, the mirab was the final judge. Despite
this power, the mirab rarely had to resolve disputes over water rights or allocation. When
problems or concerns arose, the farmers would meet with the mirab bashU and decisions
over conflicts would be made through consensus. In this, decisions were considered
valid and just, and the rules and processes through which they were made were
understood by those affected.
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Starting with the Russians but furthered by the Soviets, the ability for conflicts to
be resolved at the local level disappeared. The expansion of the irrigation system led to
an expansion in the number and scale of conflicts. The expansion saw the resolution
process moved from the fields and farmers to the cities and bureaucrats. Although the
rules under the Soviets were clear, and elites able to quickly and efficiently resolve
conflicts, these decisions were not considered to be equitable. This system left the
farmers uncertain as to how conflicts were resolved, and ultimately left them questioning
whether the resolutions were fair or applicable.
The lack of equity in conflict resolution left the farmers feeling disenfranchised.
Current attempts to shift responsibilities and management to the local level must make
efforts to ensure that conflicts are not simply resolved by those with power. In other
words, it is important that the farmers not feel that unfair and impractical resolutions are
now being made at the local level. If this were to occur, the farmers’ willingness to
participate in collective management would be greatly diminished.

The Current State of Social Capital and Implications for the Adoption of WUAs
There are two clear conclusions to be drawn from the above analysis. First, social
capital did play a role in the successful O&M of the irrigation systems in Central Asia.
Secondly, the networks, norms, and trust that enabled this to happen greatly diminished
under the Soviets, and the current stock of social capital in the Aral Sea Basin is greatly
depleted. Islam and customs served to form bonds between the farmers, the land, water
and the state. These bonds produced trust among all agents in the system, and ultimately
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fostered an increased ability for cooperative action by the farmers. Unfortunately, the
bonds, traditions, and trusts that have been broken cannot easily be restored.
The diminution of social capital in water management and the irrigation systems
of Transoxiana have numerous causes, but two stand out for their prominent role in
separating the farmers and disrupting water management. First, the switch from a
“natural” economy to a market economy that came with the Russians greatly transformed
how water was understood, used, and managed. With the switch in economies, farmers
became more focused upon securing more water for themselves, without regard for
others. Such behavior was partially fostered by the loss of junior officials to supervise
the distribution and use of water, but the drive for profit served to separate the farmers
from one another and their ability to understand and appreciate their impacts upon other
farmers. The collective good was neglected as the farmers worked more for
themselves."^^^ The economic priorities of the Soviets only worsened the stock of social
capital. National priorities, mainly the production of cotton, trumped local
considerations, such as labor concerns and water resources.
The second major force to diminish social capital in the region was the
introduction of a socialist state with its capital in Moscow. In theory, socialism aimed to
connect the farmers, who would then work for the common good. Unfortunately, the
opposite was true. Coercion, land reform, competition amongst the farms, and a
hierarchal and totalitarian management regime all served to breakdown the bonds that

The disrupting and negative intacts of a market economy upon traditional communities is well
documented. Fela Kuti captures the feelings of frustration and disappointment by non-Westem populations
with market economies in his song Coffin for Head of State. Although written from, and for, the African
perspective, his words ring just as true for the traditional farmers of Turkistan: "It is a known fact that for
many thousand years, we [farmers] we had our own traditions. These money making organizations, them
come put we [farmers] in total confusion.” Fela Kuti, Coffin for Head of State (Universal City, Cali.: MCA
Records).
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existed between fanners and elites and reduced the capacity of the state to successfully
manage water.
These two forces that have weakened social capital in water management are
congruent with McKinney’s two explanations for the environmental problems of the Aral
Sea Basin (see page 33): failures in economic planning and changes in traditional farming
and farms. In this, it becomes apparent that social capital, the traditional irrigation
systems, and the sustainability of agriculture in the basin are tightly linked. This is not to
say that economic and political reforms are not needed. They clearly are. But, as such
reforms are pushed forward by international agencies, it is important that they not just
consider treating the economic and structural aspects to farms without recognizing the
implications and need to encourage social-capital development.

Barriers to the Successful adoption of WUAs in Uzbekistan
With the state of social capital so depleted, the successful transition to WUAs will
be difficult to achieve, and should be approached cautiously and deliberately. In order
for self-governance to take place, many changes must first occur. This section briefly
reviews what is needed for a successful transformation to take place, and what can be
done to help the switch occur.
Land and water must both be redefined in terms of “social relations” with respect
to something of value.^^^ Such a redefinition is only possible through an increase in the
trust and connections among the farmers, their land, and water. This will not be an easy
nor quick task to accomplish. It is perhaps worth noting that the Bolshevik land reform
in the CARs was unsuccessful for many years, and that it was only after an intensive
473
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reeducation program that the farmers started to act as the Soviets hoped. Now, once
again, a mix of elites, governments, and international agencies are hoping that the farmers
will quickly adapt to major reforms. The farmers need to fully understand what the intent
of the reforms is, and what the implications are with regards to their livelihood. To
accomplish this, just as with the previous land reform, not only the laws and bureaucracy
that surround tenure and water rights must be changed, but also the culture and values of
the farmers. This will take time, and must be approached with care and sensitivity to the
complex history of the farmers and tenure in the region.
Agricultural production and social organization were connected by the Soviets
through the development of large, inefficient state and collective farms. The adoption of
WUAs thus must involve the development of households and villages independent of the
legacy of the kolhozes and sovkhozes

Although land reform thus far in Uzbekistan has

strived to produce private farms, the necessary subsequent changes in infrastructure,
elites, and community have not been made. Many of these new farms must draw their
water from the collective farms, and local authorities and collective managers still retain
much of their power and influence. Based upon observations made in 2000, Kai
Wegerich noted that WUAs in Uzbekistan were not very active, and that the directors of
the WUAs were the former chairmen of the kolhozes. In this, the WUAs, although
superficially different from the kolhozes, are similar to the old Soviet collectives, with
little input on O&M from its members.'^^^ So far, new villages and communities to

David J. O'Brien, Valeri V. Patsiorkovski, and Larry D. Dershem, "Rural Responses to Land
Reform in Russia: An Analysis of Household Land Use in Belgorod, Rostov, and Tver’ Oblasts from 1991
to 1996," in Land Reform in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, ed. Stephen K. Wegren (New
York: Routledge, 1998), 44.
Wegerich, Water User Associations in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan: Study on Conditions for
Sustainable Development.
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replace the institutional, authoritative and ultimately cultural legacy of the collective
farms have eluded reforms being undertaken. Truly self-governing WUAs cannot be
realized until the control and power of the collective farms are removed from village life.
Building a vibrant, trusting, democratic, and connected community is not easily
accomplished. Despite the difficulty of the task, the importance of strong villages to the
health of water management cannot be ignored, and thus community development should
not be avoided. Rural community development projects have been pursued in Russia as a
means to replace the influence of state and collective farms in agricultural production and
social organization.'*^^ The GOU and international organizations should look to such
projects for ideas and inspiration as to how to help build a rural community more capable
of collective management.

Socialism versus Neoliberalism
WUAs are expected to produce water savings and increase crop yields as the
farmers work to minimize their inputs collectively. The focus of this study has been on
the social variables through which water has been managed. Tangentially, the economic
conditions through which these social variables existed have also been discussed. Of
course, the Soviet era was marked by a command economy and socialism. Many
economists have pointed to the “quotas and free delivery” produced by Soviet socialism
as being a “recipe for disaster.”*’^ Now, in hindsight, the failures of socialist planning
and water management in Central Asia are plain to see, but the path forward—the path
O'Brien, Patsiorkovski, and Dershem, "Rural Responses to Land Reform in Russia: An
Analysis of Household Land Use in Belgorod, Rostov, and Tver' Oblasts from 1991 to 1996," 44.
Zvi Lerman, "Land Reform in Uzbekistan," in Land R^orm in the Former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, ed. Stephen K. Wegren (New York: Routledge, 1998), 155.
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towards a healthy ecosystem, water savings, and better life for the farmers—is,
unfortunately, not so clear.
With the failures of socialism as the background, it is important that attempts at
reform proceed with a balanced view of a way forward. Many within the international
community now feel that much as collectivization and free inputs have destroyed
irrigated agriculture in Central Asia, water pricing and privatization will save the farmers
and landscape."^^* The sustainability of current development models, based upon the
success of the West, must be questioned. Just because socialism has failed does not mean
that neoliberalism will succeed. Bruno Latour articulates the dangers of a world
transitioning from socialism toward neoliberalism:
The various manifestations of socialism destroyed both their peoples and their
ecosystems, whereas the powers of the North and the West have been able to save
their peoples and some of their countrysides by destroying the rest of the world
and reducing its peoples to abject poverty. Hence a double tragedy: the former
socialist societies think they can solve both their problems by imitating the West;
the West thinks it has escaped both problems and believes it has lessons for others
even as it leaves the Earth and its people to die."^^^
When looked at from the context of traditional irrigated agriculture in Uzbekistan,
the prospects for water pricing and privatized land look bleak. The international
community should remember that the long and productive legacy of the agrarian
economy in Turkistan first broke down as free market forces destabilized the countryside.
Russia assumed that a market economy and the Western concept of private property
would lead to increased productivity, stability, and civility.^ As it turns out, the

For example, Kotlyakov et al., "Concept for Preserving and Restoring the Aral Sea and
Normalizing the Ecological, Public Health and Socioeconomic Situation in the Aral Region."; Lerman,
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opposite happened. With regard to Uzbekistan today, water pricing might very well
cripple private farmers who cannot manage to make a living while paying for the water
necessary for their crops. Also, as private farmers cannot afford to make a living with
such reforms, land might very well accumulate in the hands of a few.
The concerns mentioned above are not meant to suggest that there is no value to
water pricing and land reform, only that such reforms should be pursued with sober
leadership. Water pricing and privatization both played a role in the success of irrigated
agriculture and water management in the past, but they did so with elaborate mitigating
factors to ensure that water and land were available to all. It is the author’s fear that a
zealous belief in privatization might lead irrigated agriculture down yet another
destabilizing path. For this, development in the Aral Sea Basin must proceed with great
caution. Despite the huge costs of continuing with the status quo in the region, a blind
dash towards free markets and WUAs in the countryside might only serve to destabilize
the ecosystems, economies, and social conditions further. At the same time, questions
must be raised about the sustainability of the Western model of development. Again, just
because socialism failed, does not mean that neoliberalism—even if its effects are
mitigated through collective user associations—will save the countryside.

Further Studies
In this thesis, the role of social capital in water management has been examined.
From the author’s research, the need for further studies has become apparent. As land and
water reform continue in the Aral Sea Basin, it is important that further research be
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conducted on the historical context upon which such reforms are made, as well as the
current environment—physical and social—for reforms.
The conclusions drawn in this thesis should be questioned and reexamined.
Because of a lack of a detailed historical record of water management in the basin, many
inconsistencies in the literature exist. Further research, especially of Russian records,
should be made to test what role trust, social networks, and reciprocity played in water
management and use. In particular, the historical context of social capital in irrigation
management would benefit from an examination of records and accounts that focused
more specifically on how the farmers interacted and appreciated the irrigation system. At
the same time, the research conducted here only goes back to water use prior to the
arrival of the Russians. As water management evolved over time as a response to
changing political and environmental conditions, it would be informative for further
studies to consider how water was managed prior to the khanates.
In the literature, it was clearly shown that the khanates used religion to make
political capital. Further research could help identify the role that Islam played in
shaping the social context through which the irrigation systems were developed,
managed, and used. SharVa shaped the political and social spheres of life in the khanates
and, through this, how resources were managed. Future research could also examine how
Islam was melded with local customs with regard to natural-resource management in
Central Asia. The Uzbek proverb provided at the beginning of this thesis describes water
as the “lifeblood” of the farmer. Was water made sacred through rituals? It is worth
investigating whether rituals were used to influence and control how water was viewed
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by the public, and if water was deemed sacred by the farmers. If so, how did these rituals
affect the farmers’ use of water and understanding of water management.
In addition to further research on the historical context of irrigated agriculture in
the region, studies need to look at how the farmers and the public currently appreciate
water and land reforms. Traditionally, the farmers were a large component of the
decision-making process and resource mobilization. Through their active participation in
water management, they were very much aware of issues and concerns regarding water.
Currently, farmers do not appear to be either very aware of, or interested in, water issues.
Land and water reforms would benefit from an increased understanding of what the
farmers interpret the current water issues to be, and how they appreciate their role in
implementing solutions. Do farmers understand what the current development efforts
are? Do they agree with them? How do the farmers understand the Soviet legacy? Do
they miss it? If so, why?
If the farmers are to react in a favorable manner to current reform efforts, they
need to be addressed specifically and brought in more directly to the reform process.
Questions such as those above, and others, need to be answered in order for this to
happen. In addition, public awareness of water concerns is extremely low. This
disinterest on the public’s part affects how the government and farmers respond to the
need for reforms. Questions of why the public is disinterested, and what role public
unawareness to water shortages plays in development efforts, must be explored.
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Conclusion
Current environmental, economic, and social conditions of the Uzbek countryside
are not conducive to sustainable irrigated agriculture. Legal, economic, and
infrastructural reforms are being pushed onto the farmers with the hopes of improving
water savings and crop yields. Although such reforms are necessary, in order for them to
be successful they must occur in concert with social reforms that focus upon the culture
of water use and irrigated agriculture. Admittedly, it is difficult to identify and measure
social variables such as trust and the connectedness that foster successful management,
but the costs of ignoring social capital require that this be done.
The partial transfer of water management from the state to WUAs hopes to use
social capital to increase water management. Although social capital has been used to
increase the participation of users in irrigation systems elsewhere, this has not been
accomplished without a strong stock of capital to tap into. Unfortunately, such a stock is
not currently available. Despite the urgent need for change in irrigated agriculture in the
Aral Sea Basin, pushing responsibilities on the water users before they are prepared to
handle them will only serve to further destabilize the system, as the costs of belonging to
a WUA will outweigh the benefits. Thus, it is imperative that elites and international
agencies take deliberate steps to foster networks, trust, and reciprocity that will increase
the farmers’ ability to manage water. Traditionally, successful agriculture relied on trust,
reciprocity and social networks. From this history of success, there is both hope and
suggestions as to how WUAs can be successful in Uzbekistan.
In the traditional irrigation systems, the farmers retained control and power over
their fields, and had to work collectively to maintain the canals. The farmers understood
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the system upon which their livelihood relied, and were active participants in all aspects.
In order for WUAs to work, farmers need to be empowered and encouraged to make
decisions over water. In order for this to happen, they need to be educated not only on
the technical aspects, but also the bureaucratic aspects that influence how and why
decisions are made.
Teaching farmers about democratic modes of government will not take root
unless there is a cultural environment conducive to such management. Power and
knowledge were concentrated within the collective and state farms across Uzbekistan.
Any attempt to rebuild social capital must address the replacement of the functions and
roles that the collective farms played in the countryside. The traditional villages that
relied upon democratically elected elders offer direction with regard to how villages can,
in fact, replace the order of the collective farm. At the same time, communitydevelopment programs underway in Russia can also be instructive.
WUAs as self-governing organizations rely upon the active participation of its
members. Current education programs serve to enable farmers to make wise decisions
for their farms and canals, but these efforts must be accompanied by efforts to encourage
participation in the systems by the farmers. As Uzbekistan breaks its connections from
the Soviet era, there is a great interest on the Uzbeks’ part to purge Soviet influences
from their culture. Education programs in the countryside can take advantage of such an
interest by focusing upon the legacy of irrigated agriculture in Transoxiana, and the role
that the traditional farmers played in managing and operating the systems. By focusing
upon the legacy of the active and involved farmers in the Aral Sea Basin, educational
efforts can help foster a more participatory culture in the countryside.
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